

**DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL**

MASTER OF ARTS-HISTORY

SEMESTER -I

TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD

CORE-101

BLOCK-1

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

Postal Address:

The Registrar,

University of North Bengal,

Raja Ram mohunpur,

P.O.-N.B.U., Dist.-Darjeeling,

West Bengal, Pin-734013,

India.

Phone: (O) +91 0353-2776331/2699008

Fax: (0353) 2776313, 2699001

Email: regnbu@sancharnet.in; regnbu@nbu.ac.in

Website: www.nbu.ac.in

First Published in 2019



All rights reserved. No Part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from University of North Bengal. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this book may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

This book is meant for educational and learning purpose. The authors of the book has/have taken all reasonable care to ensure that the contents of the book do not violate any existing copyright or other intellectual property rights of any person in any manner whatsoever. In the even the Authors has/ have been unable to track any source and if any copyright has been inadvertently infringed, please notify the publisher in writing for corrective action.

FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavors.



TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD

BLOCK-1

unit – 1 Capitalism: Growth And Structural Changes.....	7
Unit-2: Imperialism: Theories, Concepts And Expansion	35
Unit-3: Liberalism And Liberal Ideas.....	62
Unit – 4: Socialism	82
Unit-5: Russian Revolution	105
Unit-6: Socialist Movements	133
Unit-7: Nationalism: Forms, Nature And Effects	151

BLOCK -2

Unit-8: World War I: Causes, Events, Nature and Consequences	
Unit-9: League Of Nations: Failures and Collective Security	
Unit-10: Fascism, Nazism and Rise Of Militarism In Japan	
Unit-11: World War Ii: Causes And Consequences	
Unit-12: Decolonization	
Unit-13: Formation Of Communist Party Of China And War With Japan	
Unit-14: The Chinese Revolution	

BLOCK-1: TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD

Introduction to Block

UNIT I: CAPITALISM: GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL

CHANGES: Analytical view for the Emergence of Capitalism, Growth of Capitalism, Structural Changes in Society and Economy, Entrepreneurism, Bourgeois Culture, New Scenarios in Social Structure, Economic and Demographic Changes

UNIT II: IMPERIALISM: THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND

EXPANSION: Definition of Imperialism, Theories and Concepts of Imperialism, Stages of Imperialism, Growth of Capitalism and Imperialism, Imperialism: England, Rivalries for the Domination of Globe, Effects on World War I

UNIT III: LIBERALISM AND LIBERAL IDEAS:

Liberal Conception of the State, Views of Rousseau and Marx, Concept of Welfare State, Liberal – Egalitarian State, Libertarian – Minimal State, Gandhian Perspective on the State, Feminist Theory and the State

UNIT IV: SOCIALISM : The Theory of Societal Progress, Eccentricity and Capitalism, Meaning of Socialism, Karl Marx and Socialism, Critiques of Marx, Growth of Socialist Model in Soviet Russia, Various Arguments, Cultural Aspects of Socialism in Russia

UNIT V: RUSSIAN REVOLUTION : The Making of Russian Revolution, The 1905 Revolution: Precursor for 1917, First World War and Russia, October Revolution, Responses and Reactions, The Heritage of Russian Revolution

UNIT VI: SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS: Further Developments in USSR 1945-64, Monumental phase of Socialist Industrialization, The Private Sector, Spread of Soviet Model in Eastern Europe, The Achievements of Socialist Industrialization in Eastern Europe, Socialist Initiatives outside Soviet Bloc)

UNIT VII: NATIONALISM: FORMS, NATURE AND EFFECTS:

Meaning, Nature and Types of Nationalism, Stages in the Development of Nationalism, Conservative Nationalism in late 19th century and early 20th century, Effects of Nationalism

UNIT – 1 CAPITALISM: GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES

STRUCTURE

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Capitalism Led Industrialization
- 1.3 Analytical View: Emergence of Capitalism
 - 1.3.1 Adam Smith
 - 1.3.2 Karl Marx
 - 1.3.3 Immanuel Wallerstein
- 1.4 Growth of Capitalism
 - 1.4.1 Different Ways of Industrialization: Britain, France and Germany
 - 1.4.2 Britain, France and Germany: Agriculture and Industrialization
- 1.5 Structural Changes in European Society and Economy
 - 1.5.1 Changes in the Life Style and Social Structure
 - 1.5.2 Entrepreneurism
 - 1.5.3 Bourgeois Culture
 - 1.5.4 New Scenarios in Social Structure
 - 1.5.5 Economic and Demographic Changes
- 1.6 Let Us Sum Up
- 1.7 Keyword
- 1.8 Questions for Review
- 1.9 Suggested readings and references
- 1.10 Answer In Check your progress

1.0 OBJECTIVES

This Unit defines Capitalism and refers to various theories related with emergence of Capitalism. The Unit also highlights how Industrialization is facilitated by capitalism? In addition to talking about the growth of capitalism, it also refers about new social configurations that were

developed in by the process of modernity. Far reaching profound and irreversible changes took place in virtually every section of the society, e.g., new demographic profile, erosion of traditional communities, declining hold of religion, and secularization of life in general, mammoth transfers of population from villages to cities, creation of new and large urban centre, and creation of new jobs and occupations

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Definitions of capitalism are antique, controversial, and give rise to different and often incompatible clarifications of economic history. This is because capitalism is a historical phenomenon. To say this is more than a truism. It implies that capitalism grew over a long period of time. Consequently, historians differ as to the point in time where the phenomenon may be reasonably said to exist. Some scholars take an expansive view, beginning their story in classical antiquity and encompassing all manifestations of profit-seeking trade, investment, and production. Others focus much more narrowly, whether by equating capitalism with a single quality – such as competition, markets, and the predominance of money in exchange – or by identifying this form of economic structure with modern factory industrialization as originally exemplified by England during the Industrial Revolution.

A capitalist system means that property is predominantly in private hands and the allocation of goods, services, and factors of production (land, labour and capital) is made mainly through market mechanisms, with capitalists responding to profit signals, workers to wage incentives and consumers to prices. In the second place, capitalist economies are highly capitalised. Their stocks of physical capital, education and knowledge are large relative to their income flow and huge when compared with pre-capitalist societies because the most striking characteristic of capitalist performance has been a sustained upward thrust in productivity and real income per head, which was achieved by a combination of innovation and accumulation. In this respect, capitalism is very different from earlier modes of production or social orders whose property and

other social institutions were oriented to maintain equilibrium and were less able to afford the risks of change.

Historically, the rise of this new economic system was an entangled and pervasive process nearly involving every facet of economic life throughout Europe. It also has longevity which stretched across the entire early modern period. The development of capitalism entailed a revolution in economic relations, institutions, and attitudes; on occasion it involved violence on the part of proponents and opponents alike which gave birth to new social classes. None of this occurred quickly or abruptly, however. It gradually supplanted the other forms rather than dramatically overthrowing them. Hence its date of birth and critical moments of maturation are difficult to specify. Not only was the advance of capitalism steady or uniform but also a decidedly uneven procedure--one that suffered disruptions, crises, even reversals. The process unfolded in disparate fashion across nations, regions and sectors of the economy; even within the same industry or farming district capitalist and non-capitalist methods might be found cheek by jowl.

1.2 CAPITALISM LED INDUSTRIALIZATION

Capitalism is pre sine qua non which coincides with the phenomenon of industrialization in its full-blown form. With new economic institutions and the new technology (the relations and the means of production) it transformed the world. Technical progress is the most essential characteristic of capitalist advance, but it is also one that is most difficult to elaborate. This is because its effects are permeated throughout the growth process in a different ways. It increases the quality of natural resources and labour power which has an impact on trade. Investment is the major vehicle in which it is engrossed and their respective roles are closely interactive. There is no doubt of its importance in capitalist growth, or the contrast between its role in capitalist and pre-capitalist industry. A major driving force of capitalist industrialization is the strong urge to risk capital and other means of production on new techniques that

Notes

hold promise of improved profits which is in strong contrast to the defensive wariness of the pre-capitalist approach to technology.

Some scholars regard the application of science to industry as brethren. But this view has its difficulties. In the eighteenth century, the body of scientific knowledge was too slim and weak to be applied directly to industrial processes, whatever the intention of its advocates. In fact, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, with the flowering of chemical and electrical sciences, that scientific paradigms provided the foundations for new tools and techniques and new industries. It is evitable, that as early as the seventeenth century the processes of science – observation and experiment – were being applied (not always successfully) for utilitarian purposes. Nor were such efforts restricted to men of scientific training.

Indeed one of the most magnificent features of technical progress in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the large proportion of major inventions made by unsuspecting thinkers, self-taught mechanics and engineers (the word engineer acquired its modern meaning in the eighteenth century) and other self-taught persons. In many instances the term experimental method may be too formal and exact to describe the process trial and error may be more apposite. But a willingness to experiment and to innovate penetrated all strata of society, even the agricultural population was not left untouched, which generally were the most conservative and suspicious sections. The most significant improvements in technology involved the use of machinery and mechanical power to transform tasks that had been done inadequately and lethargically by human or animal power, or that had not been done at all. To be sure, elementary machines like the wheel, pulley and the lever had been used since antiquity, and for centuries humankind had used a fraction of the inanimate powers of nature to propel sailing ships and actuate windmills and waterwheels for rudimentary industrial purposes.

During 18th century, a notable increase in the use of waterpower in industries such as grain milling, textiles, and metallurgy happened. The most important developments in the application of energy in the early stages of industrialization involved the substitution of coal for wood and charcoal as fuel and the introduction of the steam engine for use in

mining, manufacturing and transportation. Similarly, although metallic ores had been converted into metals for centuries, the use of coal and coke in the smelting process greatly reduced the cost of metals and their ores which exponentially increased their uses, whereas the application of chemistry generated new synthetic materials.

Though the term ‘industrialization’ was absent from the work of Marx and Engels, the conviction was clearly present. Marx distinguishes ‘Modern Industry’ (Factory System, Machinery System) from earlier forms of capitalist production. Modern industry is distinguished from manufacture by the central role of machinery: ‘As soon as tools had been converted from being manual implements of man into implements of a mechanical apparatus, of a machine, the motive mechanism also acquired an independent form, entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength. Thereupon the individual machine sinks into a mere factor in production by machinery’. (*Capital, 1, chapter 13, section 1*) In parallel with manufacture, Marx distinguishes two stages in the development of the machinery system. In the first stage, ‘simple co-operation,’ there is only a ‘conglomeration in the factory of similar and simultaneously acting machines’ using a single power source’. In the second stage, a ‘complex system of machinery’, the product goes through a connected series of detailed processes carried out by an interlinked chain of machines. When this complex system is perfected and can carry out the entire process of production with workers only as attendants, it becomes an ‘automatic system of machinery’. (*Ibid*, chapter 13, Section 1)

1.3 ANALYTICAL VIEW: EMERGENCE OF CAPITALISM

The origins of capitalism are traced myriadly to the growth of merchant capital and external trade and to the spread of fiscal transactions within feudalism by the commuting of feudal rent and services into monetary forms. This argument concerns the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism and pertains mainly to Western European experience where capitalism first emerged. Whatever the reasons for its origins, the period

from about the 15th century to the 18th century is generally accepted as the mercantilist capital phase of capitalism. Overseas trade, colonization and imperialism carried out by the state-chartered monopolies played a pivotal role in this phase of capitalism especially in Holland, Spain, Portugal, England and France. The industrial phase of capitalism opened with the rise in power-using machinery in the Industrial Revolution in England.

This section will briefly examine theories for the emergence of capitalism advanced by three major thinkers, namely Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Franklin Mendels and Immanuel Wallerstein.

1.3.1 Adam Smith

In the model put forward by Adam Smith (1723-90) in *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Book 1, the development of a society's wealth –related with the development of the productivity of labour – is a component of the degree of the division of labour. By this Smith simply means the specialization of productive tasks---achieved through the bifurcation of agriculture and manufacturing and their assignment to country and town respectively. The division of labour in industrial production made possible an exponential growth in output and productivity. If it was possible to sell this enhanced output over a wide market, then such division would prove profitable and these profits could be revert back in further profitable activity.

For Smith, the degree of specialization is bound up with the degree of development of trade: the degree to which a interdependent specialized labour force can be, and is, linked up via commercial links. Thus we get Smith's famous principle that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market and the size of the area and population linked up via trade relations. For Adam Smith the development of trade and the division of labour unfailingly brought about economic growth. Smith's view, that the bifurcation of manufacture and agriculture and their allocation to town and country, consequently upon the generation of trading connections, will lead to a process of economic development. This would be because the output of the increased productivity which 'naturally' follows from the producers' concentration on a single line of production rather than a multiplicity of different ones.

1.3.2 Karl Marx

The transition from Feudalism to Capitalism was never a substantive specialization for Marx (1818-83) and Engels. It was nevertheless a problem addressed occasionally in discussion of more concrete themes such as the historical materialist method, the capitalistic mode of production or class conflict in history. To Marx, capitalism was powerful and in a state of flux, a superior means of production that enhanced economic growth far above anything possible in feudalism. He attributed its appearance not to the release of natural, unchanging human preoccupations but to specific economic, political and legal measures.

In Marx's interpretation of the emergence of capitalism two broad views were offered. He first emphasises on the most corrosive effect upon the feudal system of mercantile activity, the growth of a global market and new expanding cities. Mercantile capitalism, within an autonomous urban sphere provides the initial dynamic towards capitalism: merchants entered production and employed wage earners. The second variant, evident especially in *Capital*, centres on the 'producer' and the processes where the producer (agricultural or in the crafts sector) becomes a merchant and capitalist. Marx regards the latter as 'the really revolutionary path' to capitalism since this transforms the means and techniques of production. This is because mercantile activity (the first variant) may well turn products for use into commodities for exchange but it does not explain how and why labour power should itself become a commodity. Although the merchant path separates the worker from ownership of the product, it retains inherited tools and techniques and social organization of means of production. It is therefore ultimately dogmatic. Hence it cannot explain the transition to capitalism. The primitive (or original) accumulation of capital is a concept developed in Marx's *Capital* and *Grundrisse* to designate the process which generates the prerequisites of the ongoing accumulation of capital. In Marx's words, 'primitive accumulation is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production'. (*Capital*, 1: 873-5). Marx's focus is upon how one set of class relations changed into another. In particular, how it is that a property-less class of

wage-earners--the proletariat, becomes confronted by a class of capitalists who monopolize every means of production.

1.3.3 Immanuel Wallerstein

Capitalism was from the beginning, Wallerstein argues, a matter of the world-economy and not a notion of nation states. Capitalism has never allowed its wings to be determined by national boundaries. For him, 'the only kind of social system is a world system, which we define quite simply as a unit with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems.' There could be two varieties of such world systems, one with a general political system and other one without. These were called world empires and world-economies respectively. The modern global system, which created a European world economy with an unprecedented structure originated in 16th century Europe, during what Braudel called the 'long sixteenth century' (1450-1660). The geographical limits of this world economy which was largely determined by the state of technology at that time included North-West Europe---the 'core' of the system. Dividing the world into two more elements, Wallerstein placed Eastern Europe (but not Russia) and Spanish America at the 'outer sphere', while the Mediterranean littoral (Spain and the Northern Italian city-states) became a 'semi-periphery'. How did the European world-economy operate? The core areas had mass market industries, international and local trade and commerce in the hands of local bourgeoisie and relatively advanced and complex forms of agriculture. The peripheral areas were of similar cultural, with the cash crops produced on large estates by forced labour. The semi-peripheral areas were in the process of de-industrializing, although they still restored some share in international banking system and high cost quality industrial production. Sharecropping was the most usual form of agricultural labour control used there---a form that was intermediate between the freedom of the lease system and the coercion of slavery and serfdom.

This world was comprised of many political entities. In the core states, relatively strong state systems emerged with an absolute despotism of monarch and a patriarchal state bureaucracy. By contrast, the critical feature of the periphery was the absence of a strong state. The semi-periphery was, once again, in between in its polity. By the end of the 16th

century the decline of state power and authority was clear in Spain and in the large city-states of north Italy.

Wallerstein identified three stages in the development of the world-economy. The first was one of agricultural capitalism, from the 16th to the 18th century. In this stage wage labour is only one of the modes in which labour is recruited and paid; slavery, share cropping and tenancy are all alternative modes. The second stage commenced with the world-wide recession of 1650-1730. In this stage England first ousted the Netherlands from her commercial dominance and then successfully stopped France's attempt to catch up. It was only in the third stage from the mid 18th century that capitalism became primarily industrial (rather than agricultural or mercantile). In this stage capitalist led industrial production represents a constantly growing share of the world's total production. As importantly too, there is the geographical aggrandizement of the European world-economy to include the entire globe. Some of the other important theorists in this respect have been Robert Brenner, M.M. Postan and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladourie.

Check your progress-1

1) How capitalism facilitated the rise of Industrialization?

2) Distinguish between the views of Marx and Adam Smith vis-a-vis capitalism.

1.4 GROWTH OF CAPITALISM

1.4.1 Different Ways Of Industrialization: Britain, France And Germany

There have been and are many paths to industrialization among countries. One would expect this from their historical and geographical diversity and with associated differences in the gestation periods. It is these variations that militate against a non-country specific theory of capitalist industrialization. Britain's transition to capitalist led industrialization was not at all typical of the European experience. Thus Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, suggest that the British experience is 'initial' rather than 'normal practice', especially with regard to the relative size and increase in production of agriculture. They state that, "Economic theory lends no support to assumptions....that there is one definable and optimal path to higher per capita incomes and still less to the implicit notion that this path can be identified with British industrialization as it proceeded from 1780 to 1914".

Instead of being presented as the paradigmatic case, the first and most famous instance of economic growth, the British Industrial Revolution is now viewed in a more negative light, as a limited, restricted, piecemeal phenomenon, in which various things did not happen or where, if they did, they had far less effect than previously argued. Instead of stressing how much had happened by 1851 it is now frequent to note how little had actually altered. Recent research has stressed the gradualness of change when seen from a macroeconomic standpoint and has also been tending to argue that the 'industrial revolution' was not merely economic, but social, intellectual and political too. The change in emphasis in historiography has been from national aggregates and sectoral analysis to regional alterations and under-development, from the few big and successful businessmen to a many small and inept entrepreneurs. Social history has drifted away from analyses of new class formations and consciousness, as characterized by E. P. Thompson and emphasized by J. Foster to identifying continuity between social protest and radicalism between the 18th and 19th centuries. Then, an influential tendency in the socio-cultural historiography of the 1980s has argued that the British Industrial Revolution was not sufficed because the industrial

bourgeoisie failed to gain political and economic ascendancy. Economic and political power remained in the hands of the landed aristocracy hence 'Gentlemanly capitalism' prevailed.

The historiography of the British Industrial Revolution has moved away from viewing the late 18th and early 19th centuries (particularly 1780-1815) as a unique pivotal point in economic and social development. For example, A.E. Musson's survey, *The Growth of British Industry* criticizes what he regards as 'the general interpretation presented in most textbooks', namely that 'the industrial revolution had taken place by 1850 and the factory system had triumphed.' He emphasized to the extent that consumer goods industries remained handicraft industries which located in small workshops; the degree to which, as shown in the 1851 census, patterns of employment and occupational structure and function remained dominated by traditional artisans, labourers and domestic serfs and the very slow rate at which factories spread and steam power was diffused. He argues that, 'There are good grounds for regarding the period 1850-1914 as that in which the Industrial Revolution really occurred, on a massive scale, transforming the whole economy and society much more deeply than the changes done earlier.' Some historians challenge the elaborative view of the Industrial Revolution expressed in T.S. Ashton's memorable phrase, 'A wave of gadgets swept over England.' Ashton's view was widespread during the 1950s and 1960s. His critics see the Industrial Revolution as a much microscopic phenomenon, as the result of technical change in a few industries, most notably cotton and iron. Crafts wondered whether it was possible that there was virtually no industrial advance during 1760-1850. Since the 1980s, studies of the Industrial Revolution have borne out its pace in leaps and bounds. New statistics have been produced which illustrate the slow growth of industrial output and gross domestic product. Productivity grew slowly; fixed capital proportions, savings and investment patterns altered only gradually; workers' living standards and their personal accumulations remained largely unaltered before 1830 and were certainly not squeezed.

Research by Williamson, Knick Harley and Feinstein has revealed the fact that Britain passed through a turning point around the 1820s. Growth in National Income was not great before than after that year. There was

Notes

exponential growth rate of industrial production too. Feinstein's estimates of the growth of capital formation shows that it drifts incline from then, as does the rate of capital accumulation and the growth rate of capital invested per worker employed in industry. The turning point was substantial in the standard of living. The adult, male, working class real wage failed to increase between 1755 and 1819, but from 1819 to 1851, it rose at an annual rate of 1.85%, according to estimates in 1983 by Lindert and Williamson.

Among the early industrialized nations, France remains the most unusual case. That fact gave rise to a large literature devoted to explain of the supposed 'backwardness' or 'retardation' of the French economy. The major tendency in the Anglo-American literature on modern French economic growth was to treat it in this context. Indeed, in what might be regarded as the founding account of that growth, Sir John Clapham went so far as to amuse that 'it might be said that France never went through an industrial revolution.' What has impressed economic historians as they have looked at nineteenth century France, is the failure of some dramatic breakthrough to appear and subsequent absence of a marked acceleration in growth.

Recent new empirical research and theoretical and rational insights have shown that the earlier arguments were based on a false premise. In fact, although the line of industrialization differed from that of Britain and the early industrialized nations, the outcome was not less efficient and in terms of social welfare, may have been even more humane. Moreover, when one looks at the patterns of development of successful late industrialized nations, it appears that the French pattern may have been more 'typical' than the British.

Two factors in the French situation account in large measure for its unjustified reputation for 'retardation', namely, the dramatic fall in marital fertility, which reduced the growth rate of the population to less than half that of other major nations; and secondly the scarcity and high cost of coal, which resulted in a lower output of the heavy industries (iron and steel) than in other large nations, such as Britain and Germany. Moreover, these two factors in combination help to account for several other features of the French pattern of industrialization, such as the low

rate of urbanization, the scale and structure of enterprise and the sources of industrial energy.

The universal characteristic of French industrialization was a relatively slow expansion of large-scale capital-intensive forms of production. Investment in the advanced sector proceeded at a slow pace, there being no clear acceleration until the 1850s or 1860s and there was a respectively limited growth in new employment outlets. In 1851, at the first industrial census, what the French call *la grande industrie*, it counted 1.3 million workers, or less than 25% of the industrial labour force. Further evidences were the 'proto-industrial' forms. The continuation of domestic workshops and hand tool methods until at least mid 19th century, if not beyond, was common to a large variety of industries with urban artisans tending to work full-time on the higher quality goods and leaving the less skilled tasks to the peasant-worker. Even in the more mechanized industries, large numbers of mines, iron works, spinning mills and weaving sheds were small per the British or German standards, located in isolated rural areas and dependent on labour which continued to work on part-time basis in agriculture.

Unlike Britain or France, before it could commence, the capitalism led industrialization in Germany had to wait the formation for a well-defined area i.e a unified Germany. Before the mid 19th century political fragmentation, whether within the Holy Roman Empire or with the German Federation, was reinforced by the economic conditions of numerous custom barriers, poor communications network, primitive and obsolete roads and the reduction of economic activity to untouched islands that were separately linked to regional markets. As Sheehan pointed out, there was nothing particularly 'German' about these economies.

R.C. Trebilcock had pointed that the German pattern of development was very unsimilar to that of British 'prototype'. Britain had faced an industrialization of low cost, a technology of low capital intensity and had acquired both by recourse mainly to the savings – personal, familial or local which were amassed by entrepreneurs and their thrifty reinvestment of profits. Participation of Banks was usually employed in the provision of short-term working capital and scarcely in connection with long-term capital formation or share ownership. In contrast, Banks

were more important for German industrialization. Indeed Germany was the principal case of ‘moderate backwardness’ for some scholars, in which banks supply crucial financial and entrepreneurial inputs. Unlike Trebilcock, others have found closeness in the British and German paths of industrialization. Both occurred in a relatively brief and clearly marked period of years. Both were based on the classical sectors of coal, iron, engineering, and to a lesser extent, as in the German case, the textiles. The development of the railways triggered a greater range of ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ linkages in Germany (on the metallurgical and mining industries, the employment structures and the rate of capital formation) than the industry had done in England at about the same periods of the 19th century.

German industrialization was also dissimilar on account of the role performed by various cartels. Cartels were groups of firm that combined to control prices, production and markets. They, either the firms making the same range of products or those engaged in different stages of the production of the same products. They began to emerge from the late 1870s and in close collaboration with the biggest banks, gave German industry a degree of concentration in the spheres of capital and labour that was unprecedented anywhere else except in Imperial Russia. They promoted rapid technical growth, a substantial rate of capital formation and an unparalleled supremacy in the export of manufactured products.

1.4.2 Britain, France And Germany: Agriculture And Industrialization

The contribution of the agricultural sector to British, French and German industrialization is different in its chronology and content. Agriculture’s contribution in this respect has been broadly assessed on three parameters, namely whether it created a food security for the non-rural population; whether it helped to widen the scope of home and foreign markets; whether it generated factors of production for industrial investment. The characteristics of the so-called ‘agricultural revolution’ in northern Europe tended to be similar as they included the introduction of new crops like artificial grasses or roots, which preserved the soil’s fertility and so terminated the earlier necessity for fallow periods. The earlier three-field system, where each field followed a cycle of wheat or

rice, barley or oats, was changed to a cycle which eliminated leaving some area fallow and included the cultivation of forage crops. More forage meant that a larger number of livestock hence more organic manure and higher yield of the crops.

English agriculture became the most productive in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, well before the advent of industrialization. Landlords, who already by 1700 A.D controlled three-quarters of England's farm land, contributed to rising outputs and yields by enclosing land and providing capital. But it was now increasingly recognized that it was not them but tenants and owner-occupiers who were in the forefront of the new land use patterns and technologies. Before about 1960, the standard view on British agricultural change assigned it to the late 18th and early 19th centuries, during the period of Parliamentary enclosures, which were seen as its cause. A few works suggest that that the fastest growth in agricultural output occurred before 1760 and this growth was exponential between 1700 A.D to 1730 A.D as agriculture became more capital-intensive.

The capacity of British agriculture to sustain industrialization on an elaborative food basis has been questioned. Addressing the phenomenon of 'A British food puzzle' in 1995, Huberman and Lindert pointed out that even as per capita income was growing from 1770 to 1850, food supplies per capita stagnated or even nosedived. This is the food puzzle. To match the demand from rising real incomes, indigenous agriculture should have grown, they suggest, by 172%-228% in 1770- 1850. But there was actually small gain in productivity in this period. This implies a downfall in living standards since food consumption downsized during the period of the British Industrial revolution despite apparently rising real earnings.

French agriculture increased markedly from 1815 to the early 1870s, the period during which rapid sustained growth was seen to have happened in per capita agricultural production in all regions of France. It grew steadily and rapidly enough to feed a rising population, a miniscule proportion of which was engaged in agriculture, and to meet the demand for industrial raw materials (barring raw cotton). Productivity per unit of capital employed in agriculture increased steadily throughout the 19th century.

Notes

Annie Moulin has elaborately pointed a case for the results of the French Revolution having laid not in the formation of a capitalist economy but rather in the consolidation for a century and a half (up to about 1950) of a system of small-scale peasant agriculture based on subsistence farming and the intensive use of family labour. Over the nineteenth century (1815-24 to 1905-13), productivity per worker employed in French agriculture grew by 0.25% annually as against 1% in Britain. The main reason was clearly that the French economy achieved a far higher share of its labour supply in the villages and small towns rather than re-shifting it to industry. There was also a pressure of population on the land and the problem of declining soil fertility. Yields per hectare cultivated in France were around 75% of the British level for most of the 19th century.

It has been argued that rural France provided little jerk as a market for industrial goods. Overall, French cultivators saved to buy immovable land rather than manufactured goods. Until about 1870, notes Eugene Weber, 'many peasants bought only iron and salt, paid for all else in kind and were paid the same way, husbanded their money for taxes or hoarded it to acquire more land.' Through most of the 19th century, the internal terms of trade and commerce moved in favour of agriculture. The French countryside provided relatively few workers for industry which reflects the fact that a majority of Frenchmen preferred to remain on farms.

David Landes cites an estimate that as much as 55% of the labour force was in agriculture in 1789 and this was still true in 1886; by 1950, the proportion had fallen to one-third. Historians like Dunham and Kindleberger have come to the conclusion that French industry had an adequate supply of labour in the 19th century.

The transformation of German agriculture had to await the amelioration of the peasantry. This process started with the legal reforms of 1807-21 and was largely completed by 1830 in the western provinces and by 1840 in the eastern provinces. The legislation effected the abolition of seigniorial duties concerning the legal protection of farmers, the removal of burdensome medieval obligations and improved efficiency of production by the usage of wage labour. Agricultural production increased more than three-fold during the 19th century, while population increased by a factor of 2.3. Though, the share of agricultural employment fell with industrialization. Germany was almost completely

self-sufficient in foodstuffs by about 1850 and German peasants produced a surplus of food grain, wool and timber for exports. After that, Germany was increasingly unable to feed herself as it became a net importer of wheat, oats and barley. But agricultural productivity went on increasing, though not as rapidly as in industry and craft.

Check Your progress-2

1) How the growth of capitalism and Industrialization differs in various countries?

2) How agriculture led to the growth of Industrialisation in European countries?

1.5 STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

1.5.1 Changes In Life Style And Social Structure

In pre-industrial and peasant societies families were the basic unit of production and subsistence agriculture was the aim of productive activity. From weavers in 18th century England to coal miners in 20th century colonial India, men, women and children could all be found performing different tasks in a co-ordinated work-process. More often than not this labour would be remunerated in piecemeal rates or through the putting-out system based on advances. The families might also be able to cultivate small plots of land and have access to common lands or forests for fuel and forest produce. In the Western world, the experience of industrialization dislocated the family economy. (It is noteworthy that these aspects are substantially modified in the so-called developing countries where casual, informal and seasonal labour was universal and

Notes

takes into its bosom the employment of vulnerable sections as members of work gangs).

Modern industrial economic processes have harmed the economic function of the family as production sites shifted to industries. Most family members have become landless agricultural labourers, tenants-at-will or factory workers. Work for subsistence has been replaced by work in the factories and for daily wages. In the less developed world the conditions remain quite similar to what they were in the initial phases of industrialization in the West. Families struggle to maintain traditional collective bondness and failed to pool their resources and make regular visits to homes. Their daily wages still contribute to a common family fund. In the absence of a comprehensive system of social security and schemes, villages and families failed fulfil their traditional role. Except this, the lives of the workers, whatever is their location, have become dependent upon the capitalist system of wage labour due to which the place and functions of the family had undergone a qualitative shift. The extended families of the pre-industrial and early industrial periods, have given way to nuclear families of parents and dependent children with a sole bread earner.

Under the modern social structures work has become the principal source of individualism. This has been followed by a massive increase in the division of labour and work that went beyond artisanal specialization and what Adam Smith and Karl Marx called the 'detailed' division of labour in the work task itself. The tasks involved in generating a product are fragmented and allocated to several individuals as a means of increasing specialized productivity. This division of labour is the basis for the increase in productivity of modern capitalism. The latter is also associated with the innovations of various entrepreneurs like Henry Ford who introduced the moving assembly line and the 'scientific management' techniques of Frederick W Taylor (a classical thinker) with his 'time and motion' studies.

In modern industrial society, economic wealth, position and relationships has become the keystone to social position. While wealth was always important in determining social position, it was not the central determinant. Other aspects of social being, such as membership of this or that community, race, religion, age or gender were of great importance in

determining positions in the social hierarchy and moving up in the ladder---Sanskritization.

But industrial society has nullified all these principles to the economic one. The position of the individual in the production system and the marketplace gives him place in a particular class, which ultimately increases his/her prestige. Property ownership and education levels also affect market position. Karl Marx predicted that these trends would leave two main economic classes, the proletariat or bourgeoisie. It is a matter of debate among modern sociologists whether these processes of class stratification are still moving in the direction suggested by Marx.

Although it is true that economic linkages have not completely eliminated non-economic determinations of a social status, (a fact that carries a great deal of political significance), it may also be argued that the subordination of human productive activity to capitalist markets and the wage-labour form is going on uninterrupted.

1.5.2 Entrepreneurism

The pre-capitalist social system of the ancient regime was one of 'estates'. An estate was a stratum in which all the four major benefits—privilege, power, prestige and position—were largely determined at birth and also fixed as social inequalities. The aristocracy constituted the influential estate, stratified within itself. The Church constituted a separate stratum but not determined by birth. But even in the 'Third Estate', the stratum of urban tradesmen and artisans i.e the guild system carefully regulated the distribution of income and benefits. The modern bourgeoisie grew out of this Third Estate, as, for instance, the developments preceding the French Revolution make very clear. It is very significant that one of the first demands of this new class was egalitarianism. In other words, the relation of an individual to the order of privilege should no longer be determined by birth or by royal favour but rather by his role and success in the means of production. Max Weber placed the contrast between estates and classes at the core of his theory of social stratification and Marx made this a key criterion in his analysis of what constituted a class. When Marx used the concept of class in political analysis, he held that a class must have a certain degree of cohesion and sense of common purpose, in addition to, having a

Notes

common relationship to the means of production. Feudal estates were too internally stratified to possess this attribute.

One very significant change with capitalism led industrialization had been the enormous expansion of the middle strata. Capitalist accountancy called for a secular and committed bureaucracy (an army of agents and clerks to keep accounts) to attend to correspondence, to furnish the necessary news in order to take advantage of changed market conditions. So perhaps the first visible entry of capitalism into the medieval town was made by the grammar school where the elements of reading, writing and arithmetic were the main subjects of study. Monopolizing paper became the mark of the new commercial bureaucracy. The institution that marked the turning point in the development of the commercial town was the Bourse, or exchange, which began to serve as a centre for large-scale impersonal commercial transactions in the 13th century.

The basic cause for this development was undoubtedly technological and mechanical. An ever-smaller portion of the labour force was required for the actual tasks (to be completed) of material production allowing the shifting of larger numbers of workers into administrative divisions. There was also a vast expansion of the State led bureaucracies. The rise of the capitalist firm/company as a new and immensely important form of economic entity has also fuelled the growth of a bureaucracy. It has meant a divide between the legal ownership of property and the function of economic control of the assets it entails. It has been argued that effective control over economic resources rather than legal ownership of them is the defining criterion for the top and successful capitalist class. Thus Nicos Poulantzas, in *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* begins by defining the bourgeoisie not in terms of a legal category of property ownership but in terms of 'economic ownership' (real economic control of the means of production and of the products) and 'possession' (the capacity to put the means of production into operation). By this criterion, the top and middle level managers belong to the capitalist bourgeoisie proper.

In the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber makes it clear that capitalism and the pursuit of wealth and power is not at all the same thing. People have always wanted to be rich but that has little to do with capitalist enterprise which he identifies as 'a regular orientation to

the achievement of profit through economic exchange'. Pointing out that there were mercantile operations, which were very successful and of considerable size in Babylon, Egypt, India, China and medieval Europe, he pointed that it was only in Europe, since the Reformation, that capitalist activity had become associated with the rational and scientific organisation of formally free labour.

It called for a new type of economic agent i.e the capitalist entrepreneur. One of Weber's insights that had remained widely accepted was that the capitalist entrepreneur was a very different type of human being. Weber was fascinated by what he thought to begin with was a puzzling juxtapose. In many cases, men and women indicated a drive toward the accumulation of wealth but at the same time showed a 'ferocious asceticism,' a singular absence of liking in the worldly pleasures that such wealth could buy. Many entrepreneurs actually pursued a lifestyle that was 'decidedly economical'. Was this not diabolical? Weber thought he had found an answer in what he called the 'worldly asceticism' of Puritanism, an idea that he expanded by reference to the concept of 'the calling'. This idea dates from the Reformation and behind it lays the idea that the highest form of moral obligation of the individual, the best way to fulfil his duty to God, was to help his fellow men in this world. Weber backed this hypothesis by pointing out that the accumulation of wealth, in the early stages of Capitalism and in Calvinist countries in particular, was morally sanctioned only if it was intermingled with 'a sober industrious career'.

1.5.3 Bourgeois Culture

From the viewpoint of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie appeared above all as 'vulgar.' What did this envisage? It meant that these people insisted that economic success should count as much as noble birth, family virtue and values, personal honour and prestige and proximity to the throne. The word 'vulgar' derives from the Latin *vulgus*, denoting common, ordinary people, as against the patricians. This 'vulgarity' was morally disturbing as much as it was politically ferocious. Bourgeois culture, at least from the 17th century and into its triumphal 19th century developed in sharp and conscious separation from the culture of the aristocracy, the earlier ruling class against which the bourgeoisie had to establish its ascendancy. The ideal of the bourgeois gentleman was

deliberately balanced to the older, aristocratic, and ideal of the gentleman. The bourgeois eulogize ‘empirically’ against the aristocrat’s reliance on ‘healthy instinct’ and spontaneity. The bourgeois knew that his life style was a matter of self-cultivation; the aristocrats always believed (falsely) that theirs was the result of genetic inheritance or ‘breeding.’

The bourgeoisie was a literate class but the aristocracy contained many individuals who were proudly illiterate. The bourgeoisie believed in the virtue of work as against the aristocratic idealisation of genteel leisure and merry-making. The deliberate display of wealth was an aristocratic rather than a bourgeois quality. Bourgeois culture, most importantly for industrialization, was individuating at the core of its world-view.

This prompted R.H. Tawney in 1921 to point that capitalism had created *The Acquisitive Society*. He thought that capitalism miscalculated human nature, elevating productions and the making of profits, which ought to be a means to certain ends rather than ends in themselves. This had the effect of encouraging the wrong instincts in people by means of acquisitiveness. A very religious man (and a socialist intellectual), Tawney felt that acquisitiveness went against the grain in particular and sabotaged the instinct for service and solidarity that formed the basis for traditional civil society. He thought that in the strategic run capitalism was unviable with culture.

1.5.4 New Scenarios In Social Structure

Industrialism had opened as a system of ceaseless innovation and experimentation. In its core countries, it has virtually eliminated the peasantry and is now creating automated technologies that can increase productivity while workers became a mere a cog in the machine.

Manufacturing once accounted for about 50% of the employed population of industrial societies, which now is shrinking at 25% to 30%. New employment is now available in the service sector, which measures for 50% to 66% of the work force and over half of the GNP. These occupations in government sectors like health, education, finance, leisure and entertainment are called white-collar jobs and indicate an expansion in health, education and public welfare. The population in the core countries has become healthier, happier and better educated. The ‘educated class’ of scientific and technical workers have become the

fastest-growing occupational group. Pure sciences and technology have intermingled more closely. This is evidenced in heavy investments in research and development, especially in industries such as information technology, cybernetics pharmaceuticals, bio-genetics, aeronautics and satellite communications.

The social sciences also generate complex models of sociological and economic forecasting. Some sociologists have pointed these phenomena as signifying a movement to a postmodern post industrial society. This may be a semantic exaggeration given that most changes under late industrialism have flowed from the logic of capitalist led industrialization itself such as mechanization and technical innovation, the increase in complexity of industrial organization and the integration of science with industry and bureaucracy. But these changes do add a new dimension to modern societies such as the decline in manufacturing and the advent of computerized information processing (Artificial Intelligence) that can replace masses of white-collar workers.

Urbanization may give way to the decentralization and de-population of many centres as old manufacturing industries cities decline and new service industries cities come out.

Recent experiences in the USA and UK indicate that the countryside has begun to gain population and the cities to lose it. Globally, urban life continues to spread over greater areas. Metropolitan areas have integrated into the megalopolises with populations of 20 to 40 million. Chains of contiguous cities and regions with huge and mammoth populations may be found in the developed as well poorer countries. These processes embody trends in contemporary global society. The structural forces of industrialism have produced responses against large-scale bureaucratic structures and movements for alternative, automated and intermediate technologies. The political realm too has witnessed such a reaction.

All over world, in addition to Europe, there have been regional movements for autonomy, self-determination and independence; ironically, globalization has kept pace with fragmentation. Areas such as Scotland in Britain, Normandy in France, the Basque region in Spain, and several regions in the erstwhile USSR have all developed such movements and aspirations. The break-up of Yugoslavia in the civil war

of the 1990s was only the most extreme example of these general patterns. New forms of internationalization and integration of the world economy and polity have given rise to new form of nationalisms. It is arguable that the latest assertions of ethnicity, linguisticity, culture and tradition reflect attempts by endangered elites in disintegrating states to mobilize public unrest towards a new conservative mass mobilization and politics. However historians of the future will see these phenomena; it is undeniable that the process of modernization has reached a significant turning point and the governing institutions of the post-1945 world order no longer seem capable of managing rapidly changing social, cultural, economic and political realities.

1.5.5 Economic And Demographic Changes

World population had reached about 500 million by the middle of the 17th century. During this time tendencies towards population growth were checked by starvation, disease, pestilence etc. The Industrial Revolution of the 18th century brought about certain changes. From about 1700 A.D there was a rapid population explosion. Since then global population has enhanced more than eightfold, reaching 4.8 billion by the mid-1980s and more than six billion by 2000. Thus, not only population but its rate of increase has also accelerated since the advent of industrialization revolution. Europe's population doubled during the 18th century, from roughly 100 million to almost 200 million, and doubled again during the 19th century to about 400 million. Europe was also the location for the pattern known as the demographic transition.

Improvements in public health and food supply brought about a drastic reduction in the death rate but no corresponding decline in the birth rate seems to occur. This contributed to a significant population explosion in the 19th century.

It is only later did the phenomenon emerge of urbanized populations voluntarily lowering their birth rates. The century of Russian and Soviet industrialization that began in the 1880s also illustrates the bonding between industrialization and population. The eastern developing societies experienced rapid population growth, especially after 1945, at rates greater than the West. Medical science reduced the high death rates and the birth rates showed little tendency to subside. Attempts made by governments to persuade non- Westerners to have smaller families failed.

One result was the persistence of young population in societies where people under 15 made up more than 40 percent of the populations of the Third World as compared to between 20 and 30 percent in the industrialized world. The high birth rate in these societies was because industrialization was fragmentary (Urbanization without Industrialization: A phenomena so common in Asian and South American countries) and modern classes took much longer to emerge. It remained inspirational for the bulk of the population to continue to have large families to share in labour and provide security for parents. Lower fertility would come, it was argued, when wealth and education was more evenly distributed (with special emphasis on gender specificity) and social security systems well established.

Economic growth became the defining principle of modern politics, especially in the first industrializing nations of Western Europe and North America. This transformed the nature of society. Underlying this phenomenon were technological change which led to the replacement of animate power by coal and oil-driven engines; the freeing of the labourer from customary old ties and the formation of a free market in labour; the concentration of workers in the factory system. A deicidal role was to be performed by the entrepreneur. Later industrialized nations were able to dispense with some of these for e.g the Soviet Union industrialized largely on the basis of a regulated rather than free labour market and did away with large-scale capitalism and entrepreneurship and Japanese entrepreneurs were sustained by strong state interference in industrialization. Certain states - such as Denmark and New Zealand industrialized through the commercialization and mechanization of agriculture, rendering the status of agriculture as another 'industry'. Mechanization made a large superfluous of the rural labour force, subsequently the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture dropped steadily. This 'sectoral transformation' was one of industrialization's most evitable effects. Most workers came to be employed in the production of manufactured goods and in services rather than in agriculture and allied works. By the mid- 1970s in the United Kingdom and the United States more than 95 percent of the employed population were in manufacturing and services and less than 5 percent in agriculture and allied products. In Japan, in 1970, more than 80 percent

of the employed population were in manufacturing and services, and less than 20 percent in agriculture and allied products. In pre-industrial agrarian societies, on the other hand, typically 90 percent of the adult population were peasant or farm workers.

1.6 LET US SUM UP

This Unit, in addition to defining capitalism, shows how capitalism led industrialization took place in Europe. You have also seen the ways in which various scholars have tried to understand this phenomenon which even today remains central to our lives. Further, this Unit also covers the growth of capitalism in various countries and its effects on social structure and economy. Terms like bourgeoisie, capitalist entrepreneur and bourgeois culture have become parts of our everyday vocabulary and despite a comprehensive criticism of this phenomenon which presumably led to large-scale underdevelopment in large parts of the globe, especially by Marxist thinkers, it retains its hold over our existence. There have been attempts to provide alternative frameworks of shaping human lives, economic structures etc--one of them being the socialist industrialization, yet it still is very much present before us, moreover in more complex forms.

1.7 KEYWORDS

- 1) **Capitalism:** an economic and political system in which a country's trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state
- 2) **Industrialization:** the development of industries in a country or region on a wide scale.
- 3) **Entrepreneurship:** the activity of setting up a business or businesses, taking on financial risks in the hope of profit
- 4) **Bourgeoisie:** the middle class, typically with reference to its perceived materialistic values or conventional attitudes.

1.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

- (1) Define Capital and Capitalism.

- (2) Discuss the role of technology in the process of capitalist industrialization.
- (3) Who is a capitalist entrepreneur? Discuss in the light of the debates around the term.
- (4) How different was bourgeois culture from the aristocratic culture?
- (5) What are the ways in which human life under modern conditions is different from earlier times?
- (6) What do we mean by modern society?
- (7) How is the process of secularization a part of modern social structure?

1.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Barrington-Moore, Jr , *The Social Origins of Dictatorship & Democracy*, Penguin, 1966.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, articles and social structure & process of Modernization.

Giddens, Anthony, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*, Cambridge, 1971.

Habermas, Jurgen, *Post-National Constellation*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001.

Lenin, V.I., *The State and Revolution*, 1917.

Luhmann, Niklas, *Political Theory in the Welfare State*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998.

McLennan, Gregor, Held, David and Hall, Stuart, eds., *The Idea of the Modern State*, Open University Press, Philadelphia, 1984.

Miliband, Ralph, 'Marx & the State', in Jessup, Bot, ed., *Karl Marx's social & political thought: Critical Assessments*, Volume 3, London & NY, Routledge 1990, Hp 14-33. Miliband, Ralph, *Marxism and Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977.

Roll, Eric, *A History of Economic Thought*, London, Faber & Faber, 1954.

Rostow, W.W., *Theorists of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present*, USA, OUP, 1990.

Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The End of the World as We Know It*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999.

1.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) A major driving force of capitalism is the strong urge to risk capital and other means of production on new techniques that hold promise of improved profits which is in strong contrast to the defensive wariness of the pre-capitalist approach to technology.

2) To Smith, the development of a society's wealth –related with the development of the productivity of labour – is a component of the degree of the division of labour. To Marx, capitalism was powerful and in a state of flux, a superior means of production that enhanced economic growth far above anything possible in feudalism. He attributed its appearance not to the release of natural, unchanging human preoccupations but to specific economic, political and legal measures.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Low rate of urbanization, the scale and structure of enterprise, sources of industrial energy and availability of raw materials etc---different lines of production were the factors responsible for varied capitalist and Industrial growth in different European countries. (see section 1.4.1)

2) Agriculture's contribution in this respect has been broadly assessed on three parameters, namely whether it created a food security for the non-rural population; whether it helped to widen the scope of home and foreign markets; whether it generated factors of production for industrial investment.

UNIT-2: IMPERIALISM: THEORIES, CONCEPTS AND EXPANSION

STRUCTURE

2.0 Objectives

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Definition of Imperialism

2.2.1 Empire versus Imperialism

2.2.2 Imperialism versus Colonialism

2.3 Theories and Concepts of Imperialism

2.3.1 The Economic Explanations

2.3.2 Non-Economic Explanations

2.4 Stages of Imperialism

2.4.1 Mercantilism and Early Trading Empires

2.4.2 Industrial Capitalism-----Imperialism of Free Trade

2.4.3 Finance Capitalism

2.5 Growth of Capitalism and Imperialism

2.5.1 Imperialism: England

2.5.2 Rivalries for the Domination of Globe

2.6 Effects on World War I

2.7 Let Us Sum Up

2.8 Keyword

2.9 Questions for Review

2.10 Suggested readings and references

2.11 Answer In Check your progress

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit we will study about various theories and concepts of Imperialism. We will also highlight the expansions of Imperialism in various countries. In the end, we will discuss the consequences of Imperialism and how it leads to the First Great War.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit attempts to explain imperialism both as a concept and historical phenomenon. Various scholars have attempted to explain imperialism from different perspectives but also differentiate it from terms like colonialism. The Unit begins by looking at some of the definitions of imperialism. It then look into the theories of imperialism and examine different explanations of imperialism that have been offered by various thinkers. The Unit will also focus on the stages of imperialism and see how these stages coincide with the growth and dissemination of capitalism. It will finally take up Great Britain as a case study of the largest imperial power of the 19th and the 20th centuries and rivalries for the dominations of globe between various European powers.

2.2 DEFINITION OF IMPERIALISM

There is no standard definition of imperialism. Let us look at frequently used ones. “Imperialism refers to the process of capitalist development which leads the capitalist countries to conquer and dominate pre-capitalist countries of the world”.

OR

“Imperialism is the system of political control exercised by the metropolis over the domestic and foreign policy and over the domestic politics of another polity which we may call the periphery (countries at the margins of the economic hierarchy)”.

OR

The term imperialism is used to designate the international practices and relations of the capitalist world during the distinct stage of mature capitalism that begins in the last quarter of the 19th century.

All these definitions, on the whole, firmly establish imperialism as a modern phenomenon and distinctly different from pre-modern forms of conquests and political domination. In this context four features of imperialism are:

□ □ sharp increase in international flow of commodities, men, material and capital,

- □ interdependent set of relations between countries at different levels of industrial growth,
- □ advanced and superior technologies in imperialist countries,
- □ competition between advanced western capitalist countries

2.2.1 Empire Versus Imperialism

It is important to distinguish between empires and imperialism. There were many empires in history but empire in the era of capitalism is called imperialism. What was new about imperialism in the modern era? What made it different from earlier expansions of empire? In earlier eras the motive was exaction of tribute or gifts. Under capitalism the economies and societies of the conquered or dominated areas were transformed, adapted and manipulated to serve the imperatives of capital accumulation in the imperialist countries placed at the centre of the economic hierarchy.

2.2.2 Imperialism Versus Colonialism

The distinction between imperialism and colonialism is equally important. The history of imperialism is different from the history of particular colonies. Imperialism is a specifically European phenomenon whereas colonialism is the system prevalent in the colonies. It can also be argued that since European imperial history had a basic unity – therefore to study an empire in isolation would be pointless. When we study imperialism we examine the impact of empire on the metropolis, whereas colonialism refers to the impact on the colony. The advantages of the empire to the mother country ranged from the colonial wealth which financed the industrial revolution to the evolution of superior military technology, mechanisms of control such as the army and bureaucracy and disciplines such as anthropology.

2.3 THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF IMPERIALISM

The theories of imperialism can be grouped into two broad types, economic (J.A. Hobson, Hilferding, Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin) and

political (Schumpeter, Fieldhouse, Gallagher and Robinson). They can also be distinguished as metrocentric (Schumpeter, Lenin, Hobson) and pericentric (Gallagher and Robinson, Fieldhouse). Let us look at these separately.

2.3.1 The Economic Explanations

The economic explanations offered by Hobson, Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin had a common feature — a political agenda. Hobson's purpose was to alert the British public to “the new plutocratic phenomenon that was hijacking British foreign policy” — to the expansionist agenda that was extracting a heavy price from the ordinary people merely to satisfy the financial capitalists who cared for nothing except maximizing returns on their investments. Hilferding was a German Social Democrat who was Finance Minister and paid with his life for being anti-Nazi. Rosa Luxemburg, born in Poland, was a fiery revolutionary Social Democrat leader in Germany. Vladimir Lenin, the prominent Bolshevik leader and maker of the Revolution in Russia in 1917, wished to convince the Russian people that World War I was an imperialist war which they would do best to stay out of.

In *Imperialism* (1902) Hobson explains imperialism as an outcome of the capitalist system. The key concept used is under consumption. Industry looked for foreign markets as it cannot find domestic markets for its goods, wages being low. With major industrial powers competing for foreign markets there was a race for colonies which would serve as captive markets. Under consumption also leads to over saving as domestic investment does not make sound economic sense when there is little purchasing power. Here again colonies serve as channels for investment. Thus Hobson concluded that “the dominant directive motive” behind imperialism “was the demand for markets and for profitable investment by the exporting and financial classes within each imperialist regime.” He dismissed other motives as secondary, be it power, pride and prestige or “trade follows the flag” or the mission of civilizing the natives.

Rudolf Hilferding, in his work, *Das Finanzkapital*, (*Finance Capital*) published in 1910, demonstrated how big banks and financial institutions in fact control industrial houses in this last stage of capitalism, better

known as finance capitalism. Monopoly capitalists looked to imperialist expansion as a way of ensuring secure supplies of raw materials, markets for industrial goods and avenues for investment. As each big European power was a monopoly capitalist, economic competition soon became political rivalry, which in turn escalated into war.

Rosa Luxembourge's study titled *Accumulation of Capital* (1913) highlighted the unequal relationship between the imperial powers and the colonies. The European powers gained captive markets and secured profitable avenues for investment. In contrast, the colonies were merely suppliers of raw materials and foodstuffs. In *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) Lenin argued that advanced capitalist countries invest in backward countries because the limits of profitable domestic investment have been reached. To invest at home would require development of the economy and better standard of living for workers, neither of which was in the interest of the capitalists. Lenin's argument was that imperialist interests lay behind the rivalries between European powers that culminated in World War I. His intention was overtly political – to expose the capitalist designs and convince the people of Russia that they should not participate in the War.

2.3.2 Non-Economic Explanations

Schumpeter's *Imperialism and the Social Classes* (1931) broke away from the leftist paradigm which located imperialism and capitalism on the same grid. In his scheme, imperialism and capitalism were seen as clearly separate phenomena. Imperialism was atavistic, generated by pre-capitalist forces (pre-modern in essence). In contrast, capitalism was modern, innovative and productive and did not need control on a territory in order to prosper.

Whereas the writers on the left saw imperialism as an economic system, for Schumpeter, "Imperialism is the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion." However, the problem with the usage of a conceptual attribute like 'disposition' is that it cannot be empirically tested and can, therefore, never be proved or disproved. Gallagher and Robinson (*Africa and the Victorians*) questioned the common interpretations of modern imperialism on two counts. They understood the distinction between pre 1870 and post 1870 imperialism

Notes

to be invalid. Also, imperialism of free trade or informal imperialism was seen to be as important as formal imperialism.

Political expansion was a function of commercial expansion - "trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary." Gallagher and Robinson's explanation of imperialism was pericentric. In their view imperialism was a process driven by pressures from the peripheries - Asia, Africa and Latin Africa. The scramble for colonies was a pre-emptive move by European powers to occupy whatever territory they could in Asia and Africa so as to keep out rival nations. This view questioned the traditional Eurocentric explanation of the scramble for colonies in terms of the great conflicts of European diplomacy or the great thrusts of expansionary financial capitalism.

Fieldhouse advanced a political explanation for imperialism. The new imperialism was the extension into the periphery of the political struggle in Europe. At the centre the balance was so nicely adjusted that no major change in the status or territory of any side was possible. Colonies became a means out of this impasse. For the British this "impulse" meant protecting the route to India through Egypt and the Suez Canal which necessitated control over the headwaters of the Nile and a predominant position in North Africa. For the French and Germans the impulse meant acquiring "places in the sun" to demonstrate national prestige.

Fieldhouse concluded: "In short, the modern empires lacked rationality and purpose: they were the chance products of complex historical forces operating over several centuries and more particularly during the period after 1815."

Colonialism, according to AJP Taylor, became a "move" in the European game of balance of power. Doyle uses the term 'colonialization of the diplomatic system' to describe the developments between 1879 and 1890. Bismarck acquired colonies in the early 1880s in the hope that a colonial quarrel with England would establish German credibility in France. France had to be compensated with colonies and overseas adventures in lieu of her loss of Alsace Lorraine. Competition for colonies led to a rift between England and Italy and Italy went over to the side of Germany.

To sum up this section, a whole range of theories and explanations have been offered for imperialism and are now available with us. These can

broadly be classified into economic and non-economic explanations. The economic explanation includes the factors pertaining to overproduction and under consumption (Hobson), requirements of finance capitalism (Hilferding), unequal exchange between the imperial powers and the colonies (Rosa Luxemburg), and the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin). The non-economic explanations have looked at imperialism as a pre-modern atavistic force (Schumpeter); or have offered a pericentric view concentrating on the developments in the colonies rather than the metropolis (Gallagher and Robinson); or have seen it merely as an expression of political struggles within Europe (Fieldhouse).

Check Your Progress

- 1) Define the concepts of Imperialism and Colonialism.
- 2) “Imperialism is an outcome of Capitalism”. Elaborate.

2.4 STAGES OF IMPERIALISM

The previous section was a discussion of the different ways in which imperialism has been understood and defined by scholars. In this section let us examine its development through various stages.

2.4.1 Mercantilism And Early Trading Empires

What enabled Europe to become the world leader? If we looked at the world in 1500 Europe’s dominant position could not be taken for granted. The Ottoman Empire, China under the Mings and India under the Mughals were at the same stage of development. They suffered from one major drawback, however, and that was their domination by a centralized authority which did not provide conditions conducive to intellectual growth. In contrast, the competition between different European powers encouraged the introduction of new military techniques. For example, the long range armed sailing ship helped the naval powers of the West to control the sea routes. This increased military power combined with economic progress to push Europe ahead of other continents.

The growth of trans - Atlantic trade was spectacular. It increased eightfold between 1510 and 1550 and threefold between 1550 and 1610. Trade was followed by the establishment of the empires and churches

Notes

and administrative systems. The Spanish and Portuguese clearly intended their empires in America to be permanent. The goods obtained from America were gold, silver, precious metals and spices as well as ordinary goods like oil, sugar, indigo, tobacco, rice, furs, timber and new plants like potato and maize. Shipbuilding industry developed around the major ports of London and Bristol in Britain, Antwerp in Belgium and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The Dutch, French and English soon became keen rivals of the Spanish and Portuguese. This competition encouraged the progress of the science of navigation. Improved cartography, navigational tables, the telescope and the barometer made travel by sea safer. This strengthened Europe's technological advantage further.

The discovery of America and of the route to the Indies via the Cape of Good Hope had great consequences for Europe. It liberated Europe from a confined geographic and mental cell. The medieval horizon was widened to include influences from Eastern civilizations and Western peoples. Discoveries, trade and conquests, which followed them, had practical consequences. Every colony or trading centre was a new economic stimulus. America was a market and American bullion increased the supply of money circulating in Europe and intensified existing economic and social developments. The volume of trade with America increased. For four centuries America satisfied the hunger for land among Europeans. Gold and silver stimulated exploration and conquest and attracted immigrants, who were followed close on their heels by missionaries. American colonies were set up by individuals; the state, patriotism and missionary impulse played little part.

Before 1815 Spain and Portugal were the pre-eminent imperial powers. Their primacy lay not only in the fact that they were the first discoverers but that they worked out four of the five models for effective colonization which were typical of the first colonial empires. Both made huge profits from their colonies. Portugal had a huge empire in Asia and then in America and Brazil. Colonial revenues brought in the equivalent of 72,000 pound sterling in 1711. This was almost equal to metropolitan taxes. One special feature of the Portuguese empire was that she made no distinction between her colonies and the metropolis. No separate colonial department was set up till 1604.

France, like Spain and Portugal, carried out expansion in the Americas – in the regions of Canada and Latin America. This was undertaken by individual Frenchmen supported by the Crown with the aim of ensuring supplies of groceries and increasing naval power. The task of setting up the empire was carried out by the chartered companies. This worked to the advantage of the state as it was at a minimum cost. After 1660s the colonies became royal possessions and royal agents headed the government. French colonial government was as authoritarian as that of Spain. France was then an absolute monarchy and ruled colonies without giving them any constitutional rights. Local administration and law in the colonies were modelled on those prevailing in France. Her colonial empire suffered from too much state interference. France made no fiscal profits on her colonies, in sharp contrast to Portugal. This was despite the fact that more than two fifths French exports in 1788 were to colonial governments. By 1789 France lost most of her colonial possessions in America and India to Britain. The crucial weakness was her inferior naval power.

Some of the Western states developed their colonies in the tropics, in India, Africa, Latin America and Australia. The Europeans did not settle in Africa, they were content with slaves, gold dust and ivory. The colonies were crucial to the British economy as they supplied raw materials and were markets for metropolitan products. The French minister, Choiseul, regretted that ‘in the present state of Europe it is colonies, trade and in consequence sea power, which must determine the balance of power upon the continent.’”

Of the five big European powers, France, Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, Britain soon emerged as the leader. She had many advantages — the first was a developed banking and financial system. Her geographical location at the westward flank of Europe helped her to maintain a distance from the continent when she wished. The most important factor, which gave Britain an edge, was that it was the first country to undergo the Industrial Revolution. This enabled it to dominate Europe and to acquire colonies. In Bernard Porter’s words, she was the first frogspawn egg to grow legs, the first tadpole to change into a frog, the first frog to hop out of the pond.

Notes

The first empires represented European ambition, determination and ingenuity in using limited resources rather than European predominance throughout the world. “Christendom is also the proper perspective from which to view the religious drive behind the Spanish justification for empire.”(Doyle: 110) Doyle further sums up Spanish and British empires: “Spain and Britain focused on trade in the east, on settlement and production in the west, and neither acquired colonies for immediate reasons of national security.”

Decline

The old colonialism had its natural limits. Flow of precious metals declined. By the late 18th Century Spanish and Portuguese power declined and they lost their colonies. Dutch monopoly on shipping ended. Colonial rivalry between France and Britain ended in Britain’s pre-eminence. Britain was now the world leader in empire, finance and trade. As Eric Hobsbawm put it, “Old colonialism did not grow over into new colonialism. It collapsed and was replaced by it.”

Let us sum up the discussion so far. Europe’s conquest of America, Africa and Asia from the sixteenth century was possible only because of her mastery of the seas. In this the countries on the Atlantic seaboard, Portugal, Spain, France, Britain and Holland, had an obvious advantage because of their geographical location. Europe’s domination was disastrous for other peoples: the indigenous populations in the Americas were wiped out and twelve million Africans were made slaves between 1500 and 1860. Europe benefited vastly in this era when merchant capital controlled the world economy. Institutions such as the modern state and bureaucracy and the scientific revolution in knowledge laid the foundations of the modern world.

2.4.2 Industrial Capitalism—Imperialism Of Free Trade

Hobsbawm describes the Industrial Revolution in Britain as that unusual moment in world history when the world’s economy was built around Britain; when she was the only world power, the only imperialist, the only importer, exporter and foreign investor.

The description of Britain as the workshop of the world was literally true in the middle of the nineteenth century when she produced most of its coal, iron and steel. The Industrial Revolution was followed by the single

liberal world economy (in the 1860s possibly because of the monopoly of Britain) and the final penetration of the undeveloped world by capitalism.

The early British industrial economy relied for its expansion on foreign trade. Overseas markets for products and overseas outlets for capital were crucial. The cotton industry exported eighty per cent of its output at the end of the nineteenth century. The iron and steel industry exported forty per cent of its output in the mid nineteenth century. In return Britain bought specialized local products such as cotton from the US, wool from Australia, wheat from Argentina, etc. Britain's trade also increasingly became greater with the empire. In cotton Latin America accounted for thirty five percent of British exports in 1840. After 1873 the East absorbed over sixty per cent of British cotton exports. Thus there were sound economic reasons for Britain opposing these areas being opened up to others.

By 1815 Britain had already become the preeminent world power, combining naval mastery, financial credit, commercial enterprise and alliance diplomacy. The following decades of British economic hegemony were accompanied by large-scale improvements in transport and communications, by the increasingly rapid transfer of industrial technology from one region to another, and by an immense increase in manufacturing output, which in turn stimulated the opening of new areas of agricultural land and raw material sources. The age of mercantilism was over and with it tariff barriers stood dismantled. The new watchword was free trade and this brought international harmony rather than great power conflict.

Europe's military superiority continued. The improvements in the muzzle loading gun, the introduction of the breechloader, the Gatling guns, Maxims and light field artillery constituted a veritable firepower revolution, which the traditional societies could not withstand. The decisive new technology was the gun, the symbol of European superiority in the armament factory. As Hilaire Belloc said, "Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not."

In the field of colonial empires, Britain brooked no rivals. The empire grew at an average annual rate of 100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865. One group of colonies comprised those acquired for strategic

and commercial reasons like Singapore, Aden, Falkland Islands, Hong Kong and Lagos. A second group was that of settler colonies, such as South Africa, Canada and Australia.

With the spread of industrial capitalism the need grew for colonies as markets for manufactured goods especially textiles and suppliers of raw materials such as cotton and food grains. The colony emerged as a subordinate trading partner whose economic surplus was appropriated through trade based on unequal exchange. This international division of labour condemned the colony to producing goods of low value using backward techniques.

Late Industrializers and Colonial Powers

By the 1860s the other countries like Germany and United States, were catching up with Britain in industrialization. In 1870 the figures for share of world industrial production were 13 percent for Germany and 23 percent for the United States.

In 1900 Britain was the unquestioned world leader. Her empire extended to twelve million square miles and a quarter of the world's population.

The race for colonies speeded up from the 1880s with the entry of Germany, Italy, US, Belgium and Japan into the race for colonies. These rivalries between the powers led to a race for new colonies as each power sought to make secure her markets, raw materials and investments.

Backward regions were annexed in order to control their raw material supplies. Malaya gave rubber and tin and the Middle East gave oil.

Empire was a cushion in a hard world. These imperialist rivalries which carved up the world into colonies, semi colonies and spheres of influence also divided Europe into blocs armed to the teeth, the logical corollary of which was World War I. World War I ended in the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and re-division of colonies among the imperial powers, which were henceforth called trustees. The Depression of 1929 brought a change in the attitude of imperial powers. Gone were the days of Free Trade; protectionism was the new catchword.

2.4.3 Finance Capitalism

Stages of capitalism and imperialism could overlap, as in the case of industrial capitalism and financial capitalism, where one did not replace the other, it was superimposed on it. The informal empire of trade and finance was added to the empire of industrial capital. Many major

changes took place in the world economy after 1860. Industrialization spread to several countries of Europe, the US and Japan with the result that Britain's industrial supremacy in the world came to an end. For Britain this was a setback. She exchanged the informal empire over most of the underdeveloped world for the formal empire of a quarter of it, plus the older satellite economies.

The application of scientific knowledge to industries led to an intensification of industrialization. Modern chemical industries, the use of petroleum as fuel for the internal combustion engine and the use of electricity for industrial purposes developed during this period.

Moreover, there was further unification of the world market because of revolution in the means of international transport. Capital accumulation on a large scale took place because of the development of trade and industry at home and extended exploitation of colonies and semi-colonies. This capital was concentrated in a few hands. Trusts and cartels emerged and banking capital merged with industrial capital. Outlets had to be found for this capital abroad. Significant export of capital had been there even before the stage of predominance of finance capital. By 1850 Britain's capital exports were 30 million pounds a year. In 1870-75 this was 75 million pounds. The income from this came to 50 million pounds, which was reinvested overseas. This financed the trade with the colonies, wherein huge quantities of raw materials were procured and equally vast quantities of industrial goods sent out. As Paul Kennedy puts it so evocatively, the world was the City of London's oyster.

The stranglehold of monopoly capital can be gauged from the statistic that by 1914 European nations controlled over 84.4 per cent of the world. Capital was concentrated in and channelled through first, the City of London and then New York, the centres of the international network of trade and finance.

The metropolitan country also used empire for political and ideological ends. Jingoistic nationalism and glorification of empire acted to reduce social divisions in the metropolis. Bipan Chandra notes that the slogan — 'the sun never sets on the British empire' — generated prides among British workers on whose hovels the sun seldom shone in real life. Each country justified its empire in different ways — for example, the "civilizing mission" of the French and the pan-Asianism of Japan.

Between 1870 and 1913 London was the financial and trading hub of the world. By 1913 Britain had 4000 million pounds worth abroad. Most international trade was routed through British ships at the turn of the twentieth century. After World War I Britain lost this position to the US. The US became the major dominant capitalist economy. She was now the world's largest manufacturer, foreign investor, trader and banker and the US \$ became the standard international currency. From the mid-twentieth century onwards, decolonization gathered pace, as did the rise of multinational companies, international donor agencies and the entire gamut of mechanisms of international economic influence. This process is generally known as neo-imperialism.

2.5 GROWTH OF CAPITALISM AND IMPERIALISM

2.5.1 Imperialism : England

Let us take Britain and her empire, especially India, as a case study to assess the advantages accruing to the mother country from her imperial possessions. Bipan Chandra draws our attention to the simultaneity of birth of the Industrial Revolution and the British Empire in India, which, interestingly, was not merely coincidental. The conquest of Bengal in 1757 enabled the systematic plunder of India and the Industrial Revolution took off around 1750. The drain of wealth or the unilateral transfer of capital from India after 1765 amounted to two to three per cent of the British national income at a time when only about five per cent of the British national income was being invested. In the 19th Century India emerged as a major market for British manufactures and supplied food grains and raw materials. Opium from India was sold in China, enabling Britain's triangular trade with China. Railways were a major area of investment of capital. Britain's international balance of payments deficit was handled by the foreign exchange got from Indian exports. British shipping grew in leaps and bounds on the back of its control over India's coastal and international trade.

India played a crucial role in the development of British capitalism during this stage. British industries especially textiles were heavily dependent on exports. India absorbed 10 to 12 per cent of British exports

and nearly 20 per cent of Britain's textile exports during 1860-1880.

After 1850 India was also a major importer of engine coaches, rail lines and other railway stores. Moreover, the Indian army played an important role in extending British colonialism in Asia and Africa. Throughout this stage the drain of wealth and capital to Britain continued.

England was particularly keen on the Indian empire as it provided a market for cotton goods; it controlled the trade of the Far East with her export surplus (opium) with China. The Home Charges (India's payments for receiving "good" administration from Britain) and the interest payments on the Indian Public Debt were important in financing Britain's balance of payments deficit.

India strengthened Britain's position as an international financial centre. India's trade surplus with the rest of the world and her trade deficit with England allowed England to square her international settlements on current account. Also India's monetary reserves helped Britain. Hence in India even the free traders wanted formal control!

The projection of India as the brightest jewel in the British crown played an important role in the ideology of imperialism. The British ruling classes were able to keep their political power intact even when it was being riven with class conflict. Thus the pride and glory underlying the slogan of the sun never sets on the British Empire were used to keep workers contented on whose slum dwellings the sun seldom shone in real life. India also played a crucial role in one other, often ignored, aspect. India bore the entire cost of its own conquest. India paid for the railways, education, a modern legal system, development of irrigation and detailed penetration of administration into the countryside.

Lastly once the struggle for the division of the world became intense after 1870 India was the chief gendarme of British imperialism. She provided both the material and the human resources for its expansion and maintenance. Afghanistan, Central Asia, Tibet, the Persian Gulf area, Eastern Africa, Egypt, Sudan, Burma, China and to some extent even South Africa were brought or kept within the British sphere of influence by virtue of Indian men and money. The British Indian army was the only large scale army contingent available to Britain. It is therefore not a surprise that the British Empire in Asia and Africa collapsed once Britain lost control over the Indian army and finances.

2.5.2 Rivalries For The Domination Of Globe

We shall now look at the rivalries between the Great Powers in Europe that ultimately culminated in the First World War. The period we are dealing with begins with 1870 and ends with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1914. This is one of the most significant periods in the history of Europe, not only because it saw the diplomacy of Bismarck working itself out most clearly, but because of the peculiar system of defensive alliances that all the major European powers entered into, in order to contain each other and to prevent the outbreak of an open war. The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the subsequent Peace of Frankfurt in 1871 set the pace for the developments that were to follow in this period. Under the Peace of Frankfurt, France had to pay an indemnity of 200 million pounds and thirty thousand German troops would remain in Paris until the amount had been paid. No one had expected France to be defeated in this war. The outcome of the war was to enhance the prestige of Germany under Bismarck considerably. Indeed Bismarck inaugurate the period of Prussian diplomacy which would hold all Europe for the next twenty years. As Agatha Ramm has explained, Bismarck evolved the "system of the great European alliances": "This remarkable arrangement of international checks and balances for a long time preserved peace among the peoples, but by the very fact of its existence ultimately engendered strife. For the system was one of competing alliances, not a universal league. It was a Balance, not a Concert, of Power. As one combination strengthened or developed, its growth alarmed other states outside its orbit and mechanically produced a counter combination.

Competing alliances produced competing armaments and the rivalry of hatred and of fear ended in the two opposed groups carrying their competition to the battlefield." What were these 'combinations' and 'counter-combinations'? Which were the 'competing alliances' and how did they ultimately lead to conflict?

If we look at the economies of the European countries in this period, we find the following picture. The German economy, which until 1870 was well behind Britain's, was now poised to overtake it in practically every sphere - whether it was in the production of steel or iron or alkalis. The

massive size of the German industrial units called for extensive mechanization.

The French pattern of industrialization was very different. According to David Landes, France's was a "muffled industrialization", a "measured autumnal advance", and one which "called forth repeated warnings from [those who were] ... aghast at the increasing gap between the French and German economies." Italy, Hungary and Russia assimilated only pieces of modern technology and "these advances, achieved at discrete points of the economy, were slow to break down the tenacious backwardness of most branches of economic activity". It is difficult to correlate the differential rates of industrial development in the above mentioned European countries to their relative importance in the struggle for mastery in the world. However, the growing importance of Germany, which practically called the shots in all international dealings until 1890, must have, to a large extent, to do with its economic preponderance. Apart from the growing strength of Germany, another important development in this period was the expansionism of Russia. As the Ottoman Empire weakened and the nationalist aspirations of the Balkan peoples became stronger, the Russians could not restrain themselves. Many of the subject nationalities of the Ottoman Empire were Slav and therefore had a strong ethnic affinity with the Russians. Hence Russia gave support to the secessionist moves of these various Balkan peoples, especially the Rumanians and Serbians. This went against the interests of Britain which did not want a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. France was also unhappy. From the time of the Crusades France had been regarded as the protector of Christian rights in the East. But now the Russian Tsar, by posing as the champion of Orthodox or Eastern Christianity, which was the version of Christianity largely followed in the Balkans region, was challenging the French claim. However to return to the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War: Germany did not expect France to recover soon from the disastrous defeat. But France actually did so. She succeeded in paying back the indemnity owing to Germany with remarkable ease. Germany had therefore to withdraw its troops from Paris earlier than it had expected to. It was aware to the fact that France resented the loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine greatly, and that this issue would be a potential source of

Notes

conflict between the two powers in the future. As a result, Bismarck's entire effort in the following years was to try and deflect the attention to Britain and France away from the European continent towards Africa and a more indirect way towards Asia.

French imperialism in Africa made rapid strides in the 1880s. Tunis was occupied in 1881. Madagascar was brought under French control in 1884. It desired to advance into the Sahara region for which it would have to control Morocco. But Germany and Spain were also interested in the Morocco region. French expansion into the Sudan region led to conflict with Britain and confrontation on the Niger and at Fashoda. Moreover, by 1882 France had to forego its control over Egypt to Britain.

In Europe, the only area left for expansion was the Balkans where the rising nationalist ferment and the continuing decay of Turkey offered fresh opportunities. Here, Russia was the most interested of powers. Since Russian goodwill was important to Bismarck, Germany did not want to oppose Russia in its activities here. In 1877 Russia went to war with Turkey and defeated it. It was able to obtain strategic sites like Kars, Ardahan and Erzerum as well as all of Armenia. In fact, the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, which concluded the Russo-Turkish War, almost brought Britain and Russia to war with the British fleet being ordered to proceed to Constantinople and the British Parliament voting six million pounds for Disraeli's anti-Russian efforts. The Treaty of San Stefano was then placed before a congress of all the major European powers - Britain, France, Turkey, Russia, Italy and Germany - in June 1878 at Berlin. Russia's gains were reduced while Austria stood to gain by being allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. Britain got Cyprus and France was promised a free hand in Turkey's North African territory of Tunisia. However, Italy and Germany did not gain any territories as a result of this Congress. Bismarck had played the role of the honest broker at this Congress. However, this was not enough to end the simmering conflict between Russia and Britain. Benjamin Disraeli or the Earl of Beaconsfield as he was now known was singularly anti-Russian. On the other hand, he had a "misplaced faith in the Turkish Sultan".

But what was even more gnarling for Britain was Russia's expansion in the Central Asian region.

From 1860 onwards Russia was making rapid strides in the Turkestan region. Eastern Turkestan was a nominal province of China. From these regions, robber horsemen would raid the adjoining Russian provinces and [he governors of the border provinces of Russia would have to organise frequent punitive expeditions into Turkestan. In 1864 Tashkent fell to the Russians. It was followed by the capture of Samarkand, the famous city of Chenghis Khan and Timur. Soon all of Eastern Turkestan fell into Russian hands. The Western region held but longer hut the Khan of Khiva was finally forced to cede his territories to Russia in 1873. This added immensely to Russian prestige but it also brought Britain and Russia face to face with each other. Britain felt that India, the jewel in her crown, was threatened. But what was more likely was the prospect of a Russian takeover of Afghanistan, which was a buffer state within the British sphere' of influence. In 1885, Russian forces occupied a part of Afghan territory. The British Prime Minister asked Parliament to vote him eleven million pounds for resisting the Russians. But once again the Tsar, now Alexander III, realizing that it was better to exercise discretion, decided to withdraw and to turn his energies instead towards expansion in China.

Check your progress-1

1) Describe the different stages of Imperialism.

2) How did Britain practise its imperialist designs?

3) Write a short note on the rivalry of European powers.

2.6 EFFECTS ON WORLD WAR I

Austria-Hungary was steadily losing its importance during this period. However, for Germany it was a natural ally, especially against Russia. Though the alliance of the Three Emperors (Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary) known as the Dreikaiserbund had been forged in June 1881 and renewed in 1884, it finally broke down in 1887. As differences between Russia and Germany increased, Austria-Hungary as well as Italy drew closer to Germany. This process culminated in the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1882.

By the 1890s Russia was experiencing great isolation. So was France. This brought the two together in a Dual Alliance in 1893. Thus, in the 1890s, two sets of European alliances existed. But this did not mean that the European continent was split into two. In the ensuing years, there were several occasions on which Russia cooperated with Germany and Austria and Germany cooperated with Russia and France. It was England which now felt its isolation most keenly. This was because French and Russian interests in many parts of the world conflicted with those of Britain (as in Sudan or Persia or Afghanistan) and sometimes Germany too joined Russia and France in opposing British war aims. With talk of building a Berlin-Baghdad railway at the close of the nineteenth century it seemed as if Germany was well on its way to replacing England as the protector of the Ottoman Empire. Britain tried to end its isolation in Europe by seeking an alliance with Germany in 1898. But the Germans were not too enthusiastic because they enjoyed a favourable position between the Franco-Russian and British camps and did not want to change this position. Anglo-German negotiations broke down in 1901 because of Germany's unwillingness to help Britain against Russian encroachment in the Far East and Britain's corresponding reluctance to help Germany against Russia in Eastern Europe.

In 1902 Britain made an alliance with Japan in a bid to stop Russia's advance in the Far East. But this was not enough to end England's feeling of isolation, especially in Europe. Hence it began to extend the hand of friendship to France. The latter was in a mood to respond because its alliance with Russia had worn thin over the Fashoda incident, when the Russians had refused to support France. Fashoda in Sudan had witnessed a clash of British and French troops in 1898. Both the powers wanted to control Sudan. Finally, the French gave in and Britain gained control over this region.

In 1904 the Entente Cordiale or Anglo-French agreement was signed. It settled all their main differences over colonies. France recognised British interests in Egypt while Britain in turn endorsed French interests in Morocco. This agreement was only a "friendly understanding", not an alliance. But Germany's aggressive postures, especially in Morocco, brought the French and the British closer to each other. It also brought Germany and France very close to war in 1906 and it was only an international conference at Algeiras, in which the independence of Morocco was reaffirmed, which defused the issue.

In 1905 Russia suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of Japan. This had a humbling effect and in the post-1905 period Russia was much more willing to mend relations with Britain. The latter was also keen to end its colonial differences with Russia. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 settled the long-standing rivalries between the two powers over Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet. Thus a Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia, to rival the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, had materialised.

But now the focus of attention shifted to the Balkans. The outbreak of a revolution in Turkey in 1908 provided the impetus. Tired of Sultan Abdul's corrupt and decadent regime and his refusal to live up to the repeated promises of reform, a group of liberal patriots, who called themselves the "Young Turks", overthrew the Sultan's rule. As fallout of these developments, Austria decided to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had been administering since 1878. This brought protests from Russia. It demanded that Austria's action be brought before an international conference. The Serbians, who had nurtured hopes of acquiring Bosnia-Herzegovina some day, joined the Russians in their

Notes

protest. But Germany and Austria held that they would not agree to a conference unless the annexation of Bosnia- Herzegovina was recognised beforehand. Ultimately, they had their way largely because Russia, after its defeat at the hands of Japan, was in no position to go to war against Austria-Hungary and Germany at this juncture. This incident revealed the might of Germany and its growing ability to strongly assert itself, though on this occasion on behalf of Austria. This tendency had ominous forebodings for the future.

The Bosnian crisis left a legacy of tension which lasted until the First World War. Both Russia and Serbia were feeling humiliated. Italy felt slighted because Austria had not consulted it before annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perhaps as a consequence of this, Italy entered into a secret understanding with Russia in 1909 whereby it promised to support Russia's interests in the Straits of Dardanelles in return for Russia's support for Italian designs in Tripoli (Libya).

1911 saw the outbreak of the second Moroccan crisis. There was a local insurrection in Morocco. French troops intervened. Germany protested against what it described as a violation of Moroccan independence. It sent a gunboat, the Panther, to the Moroccan port of Agadir to protect German lives and interests in Morocco. Finally, at the initiative of Britain, Germany was persuaded to go back on its claims and settle the crisis. Europe had once again brought to the brink of war. During the second Moroccan crisis, Britain suspected that Germany wanted to establish a naval base in Morocco which would threaten Britain's own base at Gibraltar. Anglo-German naval rivalry had originated earlier. In 1889 England had adopted a "two-power standard" whereby the British would have a naval fleet 10% stronger than the combined navies of the two next strongest powers.

Germany had in 1898 embarked on a course of naval expansion which made it the second-strongest naval power in the world by 1914. This was galling for England which felt that Germany did not really require a navy, especially since it already had such a powerful army. A naval build-up could only mean that it wished to challenge Britain's naval supremacy sometime in the future. On at least two occasions, first in 1908 and then again in 1912, Britain urged Germany to slow down its naval construction, but Germany was in no mood to back down. The

naval rivalry worsened relations between Germany and Britain considerably.

In this narrative we have discussed Italy's role in the imperial rivalry only marginally. Italy was also desirous of acquiring colonies, especially in North Africa, at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. However, because of its relatively insignificant status, it had had little success. In 1912, Italy suddenly decided to take the plunge and annexed Tripoli. It had secured the consent of all the major powers in this campaign and hence there was no major Moroccan-type crisis this time. But the impact of the annexation of Tripoli was far-reaching in a more fundamental sense. If Tripoli could be wrested from the Ottoman Empire, then why should not Serbia and Greece also try and seize territories from it? In October 1912 Greece and Serbia invaded the Ottoman Empire and decisively defeated it. By the Treaty of London of May 1913, the Ottoman Empire lost all its European possessions except the region adjacent to the Straits of Dardanelles.

That was the First Balkans War. It was followed within a month by a second Balkan War but now the conflict was over the division of the spoils. Serbia wanted an outlet to the Adriatic, which Austria and Italy were not willing to concede. Following this, tension erupted between Bulgaria and Serbia over some territories in Macedonia - a war in which Bulgaria had to back down and concede the greater part of Macedonia to the Greeks and Serbians. In the immediate run-up to the First World War the growing strength and aggressive designs of Serbia were an important contributory factor. This small country was determined to add to its territories - not content with the Macedonian territories, it now laid claim to parts of Albania as well. Russia backed Serbia in this attempt. Austria was bitterly opposed to it, but Germany restrained Austria. England and Italy were in favour of the independence of Albania.

Finally, Russia withdrew its support to Serbia and the crisis was diffused. But the Serbians continued to harbour strong resentments against Austria. It is well-known that the immediate cause of the First World War was the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne at the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. A secret society of Serbian nationalists called the "Black Hand" was responsible for the killing. Even though the Serbian government did not

have any hand in the assassination, Austria was determined to punish Serbia for the murder. On 28 August 1914, it broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia and declared war on it. Russia, anxious about Serbia's fate, also prepared for war against Austria.

Germany, on seeing this, sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding that it cease its preparations of war. On receiving a reply from the Tsar that this was impossible, Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914. It followed it up with a declaration of war on France two days later. The idea was to strike France at its most vulnerable spot, at the border between France and Belgium. It was Germany's invasion of Belgium which brought Britain into the war.

Thus the caution and care that had been taken over the previous thirty-four years to prevent the outbreak of a general European conflict was now thrown to the winds. It seems ironic that of the smallest and newest nations of Europe, Serbia should have triggered off the First World War. But as in all such historical events: the immediate cause reflected the larger forces at work. Behind Serbia was the long-standing conflict between the Russians and the Austrians. Austria had Germany as a strong ally and Russia had France. If France was threatened with invasion, Britain felt vulnerable and was therefore compelled to come to the rescue of France. The First World War was fought-in Europe but the rivalries that brought this climax, had covered practically the entire planet. From China to India to Central Asia to Persia to Greece and the Balkans to Africa the conflict ranged and the peace agreements after the conclusion of the War also affected all these far flung parts of the world.

2.7 LET US SUM UP

Hobsbawm has described the history of the world from the late fifteenth to the mid twentieth century as the rise and decline of its domination by European powers. Britain was the first unquestioned world power. Since 1870 this position was under challenge from other countries in Europe who were industrializing and gaining military and economic power. Even when this domination ended formally, the influence of Britain, and then the US, continued, be it in multinational banks or financial institutions,

parliamentary democracy or association football. This Unit then is an exploration of the domination of these geo-political forces in different forms in modern times.

The theories of imperialism formulated by various scholars mainly emphasized on the European domination of the world in the period under review. Later in the 20th century, USA and Japan also emerged as two major players in the global arena. But till the World War I in 1914-1918, European nations remained the major colonial powers. Spain and Portugal were the earliest countries to acquire colonies in various parts of the world. Britain and France later supplanted them on account of their superior economic and military powers. Russia, on its own, went on expanding its territories .by grabbing the adjoining areas thereby emerging as a major power in Europe. Germany was a late entrant on the scene. But its pace of industrialization was so fast that it soon developed as a great power. However, by that time, the scope of colonial expansion had become limited. Although it got its share in Africa, it was not satisfied and this dissatisfaction led to intense rivalry giving rise to various political alliances worldwide. Spurred by political and economic ambitions, these alliances finally led to the World War I.

2.8 KEYWORDS

- 1) **Imperialism:** a policy of extending a country's power and influence through colonization, use of military force, or other means.
- 2) **Colonialism:** the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically.
- 3) **Mercantilism:** the economic theory that trade generates wealth and is stimulated by the accumulation of profitable balances, which a government should encourage by means of protectionism
- 4) **Free Trade:** international trade left to its natural course without tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions

2.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

- 1) What are different theoretical explanations for imperialism? Discuss briefly.
- 2) Describe different historical stages through which imperialism took different forms on a global scale.
- 3) Why was India crucial as a colony in the expansion of British imperialism?
- 4) In what ways the theories of imperialism propounded by Gallagher and Robinson differed from that of V.I.Lenin?
- 5) Describe in 100 words the Russian expansions in the 19th century.
- 6) Why did Britain ally with its traditional rival, France, in the beginning of the 20th century?

2.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agatha Ramm : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, 1789-1905.

James Joll : *Europe Since 1870*.

David Thomson : *Europe Since Napoleon*.

Owen and Sutcliff't. (ed.) : *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*.

2.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check your progress 1

- 1) The three main stages of Imperialism are Mercantilism and Early Trading Empires, Industrial capitalism—Imperialism of Free Trade and Finance Capitalism. (See section 2.4 for explanation)
- 2) The conquest of Bengal in 1757 enabled the systematic plunder of India and the Industrial Revolution in Britain took off around 1750. The drain of wealth or the unilateral transfer of capital from India after 1765 amounted to two to three per cent of the British national income at a time when only about five per cent of the British national income was being invested furthered the imperialist designs of Britain.
- 3) The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the subsequent Peace of Frankfurt in 1871 set the pace for the developments

that were to follow in this period. Under the Peace of Frankfurt, France had to pay an indemnity of 200 million pounds and thirty thousand German troops would remain in Paris until the amount had been paid. This started the rivalry between various European powers.(for explanation see section 2.5.2)

UNIT-3: LIBERALISM AND LIBERAL IDEAS

STRUCTURE

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Understanding the State
- 3.3 Liberal Conception of the State
- 3.4 Rousseau
- 3.5 The Marxist Perspective
- 3.6 Welfare State
- 3.7 Liberal – Egalitarian State
- 3.8 Libertarian – Minimal State
- 3.9 Gandhian Perspective on the State
- 3.10 Feminist Theory and the State
- 3.11 Let Us Sum Up
- 3.12 Keyword
- 3.13 Questions for Review
- 3.14 Suggested readings and references
- 3.15 Answer In Check your progress

3.0 OBJECTIVES

This Unit gives us the knowledge of the liberal, the Marxist, the welfare, Gandhian, feminist and the post-modernist conceptions of the State

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The State is central to the understanding of modern societies and politics. It is truism to mention that State plays a crucial role in the functioning of modern society. What then is the State? This appears to be a simple question but when we attempt to answer this we find the answers elusive. In the course of answering this question we would realize that our understanding of politics itself is to a great extent linked with our

understanding of the State. Today it is impossible to think of life without the framework of the State. The State has come to be equated with civility and identity. Although there are enough sceptics and critics who decry the institutions and the practices of the State, it has become an integral part of everyday life. It would not be an exaggeration to say that we start and end our lives within its confines and the recognition of the State in both these matters is rather crucial. This should amply illustrate the significance of the concept and our need to study it. Besides most of our fundamental concerns and the debates surrounding it (for instance around the concepts of rights, obligations, laws) acquire meaning only in the context of the State. Our attitude to the State is to a great extent determined by our conceptualization of it. From the point of view of an active citizenship it is important to include a critical and insightful understanding of the State as part of any meaningful political education. All this makes the study of the State significant.

Having highlighted the importance of studying the concept of the State, it needs to be mentioned that it is done of the most problematic and ambivalent concepts in politics--its ambivalence being a consequence of its certain yet elusive character. So overwhelming is the importance of the State in contemporary societies that politics is itself conflated with the State, the appropriateness of this conflation is the subject of a rather lively debate in political theory. Differing historical experiences have led to differing perceptions and practices of the State.

Yet all States do have a territory, legal system, judiciary and monopoly of force and so on. The idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order is an intrinsically modern idea and by extension also the idea of citizenship. The gradual erosion of feudal ties and controls meant a redefinition of political authority and structures as well. The idea of the modern State which we will examine in this unit emerges around this time. In fact it was only towards the end of the sixteenth century that the concept of the State became central to European political thought.

3.2 UNDERSTANDING THE STATE

Notes

It was around the time of the Enlightenment that major enquiries into the basic nature and structure of the State began to be made in a systematic manner. The new concerns focussed on the distinctions between the new, modern State that had come into being and the traditional state systems. The new concerns also focused on the relationship between the State and society. The Enlightenment thinkers were particularly concerned with the question of where the State ended and the society began. It was as a result of the intellectual efforts of the Enlightenment thinkers that we are today in a position to address some key questions regarding the nature of the State.

Some of these questions are: What is the State? How long has it been with us? What are its main features? These are all important questions and need to be answered before we proceed to enquire into the theories of the State. State can be defined as the centralized, law making, law enforcing, and politically sovereign institution in the society. In other words, it is useful to understand and define the State in terms of the functions it performs. Put briefly and simply, the State comprises a set of institutions with ultimate control over the means of violence and coercion within a given territory; monopolizes rule-making within the territory; develops the structures for the implementation of the rules; regulates market activity within the territory; and ensures the regulation and distribution of essential material goods and services.

However, in modern times, that are to say during the last three hundred years or so, a whole new set of functions have been added to this. It has been argued that a major task of the modern state system in Europe was to enable the development of industrialism. It was also under industrialism that the modern State came to enjoy tremendous powers. It also became so omnipotent that it became virtually impossible to think of human life outside the framework of the State. The state is all pervasive today, but was it always like this? Was there a time when people could live without a state? This leads us to the second question: how old is the State?

Living in modern times we tend to take the State for granted as if it has always been a part of human society. Moreover, we also tend to take some of the features of the modern State – national, representative, centralized, interventionist – for granted. We need to recognize that not

only were these features not always a part of the State, the State itself was not always there. Therefore the question on the life of the State can be answered by suggesting that although there is nothing exclusively modern about the State, it nonetheless does not have a very long life in human history. It is therefore best to look upon State as a contingency and not a perennial feature of human life. If we were to divide the entire human history into three phases – pre agrarian, agrarian and industrial – then the State certainly did not exist in the pre-agrarian phase of human life.

In the elementary situation of the hunters and gatherers, there was no surplus and no division of labour. As a result, there was no need for any political centralization. However, once humans took to agriculture and consequently to a more settled life, a division of labour and a more complex form of human organization began to emerge. It was then that gradually a State came into being to extract surplus, regulate the division of labour, maintain exchange mechanism and settle disputes whenever required.

However not all the agrarian societies had a State. Only the large and the more complex ones did. Small, primitive, simple and elementary agrarian societies could still manage their affairs without a State. Although the State had arrived in the human world at this stage, it was still an option and not inevitability. Some agrarian societies had a state and some did not.

It was however in the third phase of human society, i.e., under industrialism that the State ceased to be an option and became an integral and necessary part of human society. With a limitless increase in the division of labour and an increasing complexity of human life, people have found it impossible to manage without a State. So it would be fair to say that in the beginning, i.e., in the pre-agrarian stage of human life there was no State. Then, under agrarian conditions, some human societies had a State and some did not (we can even say that some needed a state and some did not). But under industrial condition there is no choice but to have a State. State under modern conditions is no longer an option but a necessity. The range of the nature of state-systems in human history has varied a great deal. There have been small kingdoms, city-states as well as large empires. However under modern conditions, a

new type of State – nation-state – has emerged and pervaded the modern world. We can say that the history of State in modern times is the history of nation-states. It is this nation-state – centralized, interventionist, representative – that has been the object of theorizing by various scholars. We can now turn to some of the theories that have propounded about the modern State.

3.3 LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Jean Bodin (1530-96) were amongst the earliest writers to articulate the new concerns, although it was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1642) nearly a century later who addresses the question sharply. The questions that arose were seeking answers to basic issues like, what is the State? The State's origins and foundations were examined, as also its relationship with society and the most desirable form of this relationship, its functions and of course whose interests should the State represent, and then at the end of it all how would the relationship between States be governed?

Thomas Hobbes offers a brilliant analysis of the State and related issues. He represents a point of transition, between a commitment to the absolute State and the struggle of liberalism against tyranny. Without going into too many details, liberalism can be explained as that worldview which gives central importance to the idea of choice, this choice is to be exercised across diverse fields like marriage, education, enterprise, work and profession and of course political affairs. This ability to choose is what characterizes a rational and free individual and politics is about the defence of these rights and any interference whatsoever is to be limited and through the State based on a constitution. Hobbes in his book 'Leviathan' acknowledges clearly the development of a new form of power, public power characterized by permanence and sovereignty.

Hobbes is a fascinating point of departure for our discussions on the modern theories of the State, because he combines within him many profoundly liberal and at the same times many illiberal arguments.

Hobbes opens his account by describing human nature that he says always seeks 'more intense delight' and hence is characterized by restlessness and a desire to maximize power. This famously reduces human society into a 'war of all against all'. The idea that people might come to respect and trust each other and co-operate and honour their promises and contracts seems remote to Hobbes. This is what he describes as, the state of nature; here life becomes to quote him 'nasty, short and brutish'. What then is the way out? It is the creation of the State, which in this case turns out to be an absolute State, and this is quite clearly a direct outcome of the dreadful life that Hobbes visualizes in the absence of the State.

He suggests that free and equal individuals should surrender their rights by transferring them to a powerful authority that can force them to keep their promises and covenants, then an effective and legitimate private and public sphere, society and State can be formed. This would be done through a social contract wherein consenting individuals hand over their rights of self-government to a single authority, authorized to act on their behalf. The sovereign thus created would be permanent and absolute. At this point it is interesting to note the liberal in Hobbes emphasizing that this sovereign would be so only as a consequence of consenting individuals, who in turn are bound to fulfil their obligations to the sovereign. It would be the duty of the sovereign however, to protect the people and of course their property.

Thomas Hobbes considers the State to be pre-eminent in social and political life. According to him it is the State that gives to the individuals the chance to live in a civilized society. The miserable life in the state of nature is altered by the emergence of the State and then follows the creation of a civilized society. Thus it is the State that in Hobbes' conception constructs society and establishes its form and codifies its forces. Moreover the self-seeking nature of individuals leads to anarchy and violence and hence State has to be powerful and strident enough to resist this and maintain order, for order is a value that Hobbes cherishes greatly. And since it is all the consenting individuals who have created the State, the State is legitimate and represents the sum total of all individuals enabling them to carry on with their businesses and lives in an uninterrupted manner. To do all this, a giant and powerful State is

Notes

envisaged, and this vision is remarkably close to the image of a modern all pervasive State that we are familiar with. His conception of individuals as being nothing more than self- interested is also a depressingly modern and familiar view. Hobbes' political conclusions emphasizing on an all powerful State does make him profoundly illiberal, and this tension in his writings between the emphatic claims on individuality on the one hand, and the need for an all powerful State on the other hand make his arguments very exciting.

Rapid and far-reaching technological, economic, political changes apart from a good number of years separate John Locke from Hobbes. Locke is not prepared to accept the idea of an absolute sovereign, and this is a major point of departure from where he then establishes his theory of the State. For Locke the State exists as an instrument to protect the life, liberty and estate of the citizens. Locke like Hobbes saw the establishment of the political world as preceded by the existence of individuals endowed with natural rights to property, which includes life, liberty and estate. Locke begins with a picture of free, equal and rational men (Locke like Hobbes and in fact like most other political theorists is not thinking of women when he writes about social and political issues) living quite amicably in the state of nature governed by natural laws. In the state of nature they enjoy natural rights, but Locke points out that not all individuals would be equally respectful of the natural laws. This creates some inconveniences, the most significant of these being inadequate regulation of property which for Locke is prior to both society and the State.

Locke suggests that these inconveniences can be overcome only by the consenting individuals forging contracts to create first a society and then a State. The State is thus very obviously a creation for the purpose of the individuals and it would be they who would be the final judges in this matter. This is a very novel idea though today seems common place because it has become almost the central idea of liberalism. Locke holds categorically that the individuals do not transfer all their rights to the State, and whatever rights are transferred is only on the condition that the State adheres to its basic purpose of preserving the individual's life, liberty and estate. This is today one of the central ideas of liberalism and is central to our understanding of the State.

Thus Locke paved the way for representative government although Locke himself advocated constitutional monarchy and was clearly not articulating any of the now routinely accepted democratic ideas of popular government based on universal adult franchise. Yet there is no denying that it was his idea that the State should be for the protection of the rights of the citizens which made the transformation of liberalism into liberal democracy possible.

Taking off from Locke's ideas that there must be limits upon legally sanctioned political power, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and James Mill (1773-1836) developed a systematic account of the liberal democratic State. In their account the State would be expected to ensure that the conditions necessary for individuals to pursue their interests without risk of arbitrary political interference, to participate freely in economic transactions, to exchange labour and goods on the market and to appropriate resources privately. In all this the State was to be like an umpire while individuals went about their business as per the rules of the free market, and periodic elections determined who would be in power. The idea was that such an arrangement would lead to the maximization of pleasure for the maximum numbers as per the principle of utility, to which both Bentham and Mill subscribed. This argument was clearly advocating a limited State on the grounds that the scope and power of the State should be limited in order to ensure that the collective good be realized through individuals' freely competing and pursuing utility without State interference.

Yet significantly certain kinds of interference were allowed, any individual, group or class that would challenge the security of property, the working of the market or the upkeep of public good could be held by the State. Prisons became the hallmark of this age, the enactment and enforcement of law backed by the coercive powers of the State and the creation of new State institutions advocated in order to uphold the general principle of utility.

The modern liberal democratic State which we are familiar can be traced to the writings of Bentham and Mill. However they stopped short of advocating universal suffrage (for instance workers and women were kept out of the charmed circle), finding one reason or the other to deny the vote to all individuals. For the utilitarian, democracy was not an end

in itself only a means to an end. Democracy was seen as the logical requirement for the governance of a society freed from absolute power and tradition, inhabited by individuals who seek to maximize their private gains, constituted as they are by endless desires.

John Stuart Mill (1806-73) is perhaps one of the first and strongest advocates of democracy as an end in itself who saw its primary purpose as the highest and harmonious development of the individual. John Stuart Mill was deeply committed to the idea of individual liberty, moral development and the rights of minorities. He was concerned with the nature and limits of the power that could be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. Liberal democratic government was necessary not only to ensure the pursuit of individual satisfaction, but also for free development of individuality. While he conceded the need for some regulation and interference in individual's lives, but he sought obstacles to arbitrary and self-interested intervention. To ensure all of this, Mill proposed a representative democracy. However despite the firm commitment to liberty and democracy that Mill makes, he too believed that those with the most knowledge and skills should have more votes than the rest, inevitably this would imply that those with most property and privilege would have more votes than the rest. Of course it needs to be mentioned that deep inequalities of wealth, and power bothered Mill who believed that these would prevent the full development of those thus marginalized.

3.4 ROUSSEAU

Standing apart from the liberal and democratic tradition is Rousseau (1712-1778) who might be described a champion of the 'direct' or 'participatory' model of democracy. Rousseau is uncomfortable with the idea that sovereignty can be transferred either by consent or through the ballot; actually he did not think it possible even. Rousseau justifies the need for the State by beginning his arguments in the 'Social Contract' with the description of the state of nature in which human beings were rather happy but were ultimately driven out of it because of various obstacles to their preservation (some of these obstacles that he identifies

are natural disasters, individual weakness and common miseries). Thus human beings come to realize that for the fullest realization of their potential and for greatest liberty it is essential for them to come together and co-operate through a law making and enforcing body. This State would be thus a result of a contract that human beings create to establish possibilities of self-regulation and self-government. In his scheme of affairs individuals were to be directly involved in law making and obeying these laws would not be akin to obeying a sovereign authority outside on oneself but it would amount to obeying oneself and this to Rousseau constitutes freedom.

Individuals are thus to vote in disregard of their private interest, to each individual who is an indivisible part of the sovereign what matters is only the interest of the body politic itself. Rousseau calls this general will. For Rousseau the sovereign is the people themselves in a new form of association and the sovereign's will is the will of each person. The government is thus the result of an agreement among the citizens and is legitimate only to the extent to which it fulfils the instructions of the general will and obviously should it fail to do so it can be revoked or changed.

3.5 THE MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

The take off point for Karl Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-95) in their analysis of the State is unlike the preceding accounts not the individual and his or her relation to the State. As Marx put it very eloquently 'man is not an abstract being squatting outside the world...' Marx argued that individuals by themselves do not tell us much, it is the interaction between individuals and institutions and the society that makes the account worthwhile. He contends that the State has to be seen as a dynamic institution circumscribed by social forces and always changing. Thus the key to understanding the relations between people is the class structure.

Classes they argued are created at a specific conjuncture in history, the implication is that historically there was a period characterized by the absence of classes and the future could hold a classless society. With the creation of surplus produce a class of non-producers that can live off the

Notes

productive activity of others emerge and this is the foundation of classes in society. Those who succeed in gaining control over the means of production form the ruling class both economically and politically. This leads to intense, perpetual and irreconcilable conflicts in society. Such struggles while becoming the motor force for historical development also become the basis for the emergence of the State.

Marx and Engels challenged the idea that the State can be neutral and represent the community or the public interests as though classes did not exist. When the liberals claim that the State acts neutrally it is according to Marx protecting a system of individual rights and defending the regime of private property, thus its actions produce results that are far from neutral. Marx is of the opinion that the dichotomy between the private and the public which characterizes the modern State is itself dubious for it depoliticizes the most important source of power in modern society i.e. private property. That which creates a fundamental and crucial divide in society is presented as an outcome of free private contracts and not a matter for the State. However he argues, all the institutions and structures of the State defend the interests of private property and thus the claims of neutrality that the State makes are untenable.

Marxist politics would therefore require an action plan to overthrow the State and by implication the classes that uphold the State. Marx characterized the history of State broadly as having set out from a slave State, to feudal State and then to the modern State (with capitalism as its basis). The last mentioned carries within it as a consequence of heightened class struggle the possibility of revolutionary transformation and the creation of a socialist State. This would be for the first time in history a State representative of the majority. It would be controlled by the proletariat, and unlike the earlier dictatorships controlled by the property owning classes, this State would be the dictatorship of the proletariat, the toiling classes.

Eventually Marx argues that the logic of historical development would lead this State to a communist stage. Material abundance and prosperity would distinguish this State from the earlier stage of statelessness described as primitive communism by Marx. In the communist stage of society's evolution due to the absence of classes and class struggle, the

State would become redundant and wither away. The State according to Marx exists to defend the interests of the ruling classes and is deeply embedded in socio-economic relations and linked to particular class interests.

We can discern at least two distinct strands in Marx explaining the nature of this relationship between classes and the State. Of the two, the more subtle position is the one that we will examine first. This position holds that the State and its bureaucratic institutions may take a variety of forms and constitute a source of power which need not be directly linked to the interests or be under the unambiguous control of the dominant class in the short term. Thus, according to this view, the State appears to have a certain degree of power independent of class forces, thus it is described as being relatively autonomous. The other view that we find often represented in Marx's writings is that the State's role is to coordinate a divided society in the interests of the ruling class, thus it sees the State as merely a 'superstructure' serving the interests of the dominant class.

Later Marxists have differed considerably with each other on the interpretations of the Marxist concept of the State. One of the most celebrated of such differences is the now famous 'Miliband vs. Poulantzas' debate. Ralph Miliband begins by stressing the need to separate the governing classes from the ruling classes. The latter exercises ultimate control whereas the former makes day-to-day decisions. Miliband is suggesting that the ruling class does not get embroiled in the everyday business of governance, for the State is an instrument that is for the domination of society on behalf of this very class. His contention is that in order to be politically effective the State has to separate itself from the ruling class. And in doing this, it might even have to take actions that might not be in the interests of the ruling class, of course in the long run.

For Poulantzas the class affiliations of those in State positions and offices is not of any significance. He draws attention to the structural components of the capitalist State which enable it to protect the long-term framework of capitalist production even if it means severe conflict with some segments of the capitalist class. A fundamental point in Poulantzas's argument is that the State is what holds together capitalism by ensuring political organization of the dominant classes that are

Notes

constantly engaged in conflict due to competitive pressures and short term differences.

Further the State ensures 'political disorganization' of the working classes which because of many reasons can threaten the hegemony of the dominant classes, the State also undertakes the task of political 'regrouping' by a complex 'ideological process' of classes from the non-dominant modes of production who could act against the State. Thus in this perspective the centralized modern State is both a necessary result of the 'anarchic competition of civil society' and a force in the reproduction of such competition and division. The State does not simply record socio-economic reality, it enters into its very construction by reinforcing its form and codifying its elements.

Check Your progress

1) Write a note on Rousseau conception of State ?

.

2) What are the Marxist views on State?

3.6 WELFARE STATE

Marxist theory of the State as we have seen challenged the hegemony of individualism that was intrinsic to liberal and liberal-democratic theories. However from within liberalism attempts at revisiting the basic assumptions came with the reversal of the explanation of the process of social causation, and the consequent effect this had on the idea of personal responsibility that had been a feature of nineteenth century thought. The emergence of the case for the welfare State began with the argument that instead of public welfare being the cause of dependence,

loss of autonomy and capacity for individual responsibility for action and the market the source of independence and freedom, the opposite was the case.

A considerable amount of re-interpretation of certain basic concepts like liberty, community and equality were undertaken, and the nature of society was no longer visualized as a loosely coordinating set of individuals bound together by common rules but lacking a common purpose rather as a more intimate form of order. People were seen as being held together by social bonds that were not merely contractual and hence they could make claims on one another as citizens engaged in a common enterprise. This made the welfare State appear less like a charity and more like a form of entitlement. T. H. Green (1836-82) was one of the first and strongest advocates of the kind of the welfare State that Europe became familiar with. It began with a redefinition of liberty and its recasting of the notions of citizenship and community, moving as it did from the earlier foundation of the State based on the subjective preferences of atomized individuals.

The theory of modern welfare State stems out of an enquiry into the alleged inadequacies of the individualistic market order rather than from a socialist or Marxist theory. The latter theories would not argue for a welfare State without the backdrop of socialism. In fact Marxists are deeply critical of the welfare State institutions since they are merely set upon existing capitalist structures. On close scrutiny of the intellectual foundations of the welfare State we would notice that it does not sanction the abolition of the market but only a correction of its defects. Hence the successful welfare State is something that would in the long run help the capitalist State.

3.7 LIBERAL EGALITARIAN STATE

The primary concern of welfare State theories has been equality, and to realize this goal an interventionist state was advanced as an option. John Rawls on the other hand has been concerned with the justification in rational terms of socially and economically necessary inequalities.

Rawls's notion of State is similar to that of Locke: the State is a voluntary society constituted for mutual protection. This civil association

regulates the general conditions so that individuals can pursue their individual interests. In Rawls' conception individuals are viewed as rational agents with interests and right claims, and a State can provide a general framework of rules and conditions which enable the fulfilment of these rights and claims. Rawls bestows upon the State an active role in the integration and promotion of the lives of the individual.

Rawls believes that 'public reason' would be the basis of the liberal legitimacy of the State. This is described by him as intellectual and moral power of citizens. In Rawls' most well known work, 'A Theory of Justice' as well as in his later works there is no conscious attempt made to develop a theory of State. However a close reading of his works suggests that he has in mind a constitutional democracy based on the principle of 'public reason' where each departure from the principle of equality should be justified on the basis of the famous Rawlsian principles of justice. The State would in this framework be expected to intervene in favour of establishing the principle of justice as fairness, and establish the principle of equality of individuals.

3.8 LIBERTARIAN MINIMAL STATE

Robert Nozick has in his work 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' (1974) expressed his deep reservations regarding a State that is allowed to intervene and in fact to the whole quest for equality. Nozick is of the view that it is only the minimal State that can be morally justified, being limited by rights bearing individuals. Nozick challenged both anarchic visions of statelessness as well as welfare oriented interventionism. Nozick repudiated the claims of any State to 'forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults'. He argues that a State that does anything more than provide services will necessarily violate people's rights and so cannot be morally legitimate. He argues primarily against the view that a major function of the State is to achieve distributive justice on the basis of some conception of the right pattern of distribution. Nozick therefore argues that a State which is more extensive than the minimal State is bound to be non-neutral by increasing the scope for manipulations. The position that Nozick took led him to become one of most invoked philosophers of the New Right, who were arguing through the 1980s for

the rolling out of the State from the society. Nozick's prescription for a minimal State seemed to fulfil these requirements and thus gave an intellectual basis for the rapid withdrawal of the State from many key areas in England, Europe and America.

3.9 GANDHIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE

We have till now looked at theories of the State that are circumscribed by the western experience. Anti-imperialist movements and the subsequent de-colonization was the context of new theories of State that questioned, re-examined and in some cases moved away completely from the western vantage point. Of these Mahatma Gandhi's is a profound challenge to both the liberal and the Marxist views of the State.

Gandhi's views on the State begin from a position of deep distrust and discomfort vis-à-vis the State. He differed from the core commitment that liberals make to the idea of unbridled individualism. Hence he obviously does not subscribe to the notion of the State that has as its fundamental principle competing individuals pursuing an end defined by the interests of the isolated, atomized self. Gandhi was equally uncomfortable with the interventionist role of the State advocated by some other theories albeit in the interest of equality. Gandhi argued, that increasing State interference is immoral and opens up ever increasing possibilities of violence

and corruption. Gandhi described swarajya as the ideal State. This would imply not only self-rule as is commonly understood but also implied governance of one's self, self-control and self regulation. Swarajya is a situation where each individual is able to govern and control himself or herself thus making the State redundant.

Gandhi advocated an active citizenry that would be involved in decision making and control of its destiny, rather than a huge and centralized, monolithic State structure. For Gandhi such a structure would be an embodiment of violence and would lead to alienation. This was an extension of his opinion that large scale industrialization would lead to violence and alienation. Gandhi denounced the modern State as a soulless machine, which even while engaging in ostensibly egalitarian

acts unwittingly leads to violence and in the last instance a destruction of the individual. Gandhi expected the State to ensure internal peace and external security. He was however extremely sceptical of the modern State's claims to act on behalf of something described as autonomous 'national interest'.

This discussion is only a fleeting glimpse of the very interesting arguments Gandhi puts forth in his dialogue with the tradition of western political theory that we have looked at so far. Needless to add that in order to present the total picture we need to place this discussion in the larger context of Gandhi's political philosophy.

3.10 FEMINIST THEORY AND THE STATE

Feminists of the liberal persuasion do not see any harm in engaging with the State and using the State as an ally to fight for their rights. They see the State as a neutral institution from which women had so long been excluded and into which they should make an entry.

However there are many that see the above approach as being rather short sighted. Malestream (which is also mainstream) political theory and politics has all along had a way of structuring politics and political institutions that does not permit the entry, articulation and much less the realization of feminist goals. The State from this point of view is presented as male in the feminist sense. The laws thus see and treat women the way men treat women. Radical feminists would go on from here to urge abandonment of such a State. This is however not a very widely shared view, most feminists would argue they need to engage with this State as women, challenging the State's spurious claims to gender neutrality, and insisting on the validity of female voices.

Marxist-feminist attitude of scepticism towards the welfare State is premised on the belief that the benign use of the State to provide welfare for its citizens simply represents the most cost-effective way of reproducing labour power. It also assumes and reinforces women's domestic responsibilities and their economic dependency on a male

breadwinner within the patriarchal family. The contention is that far from freeing women, welfare provision has helped to maintain oppressive gender roles, and has led to increased surveillance of sexual and reproductive behaviour and of child rearing practices. In the 1960s at the height of political radicalism, feminists argued that collaborating with the State amounted to a sell out. Today however there is a much more open-ended and less consistently hostile attitude to the State and to conventional political activity.

Post-Modernism and the Understanding of the State

Post-modernism sees the sovereign State as a meta narrative that is part of the totalizing discourse of modernity. Michel Foucault has argued that power is exercised not only at the level of the State but at the micro levels where it is constantly being redefined and experienced. Resistance too therefore to power has to happen not just at the spectacular levels but at these micro levels. Since such an approach is questioning the existence of a centralized system of power, there is no basis within this approach for either the use or the undermining of State power.

3.11 LET US SUM UP

We have in this Unit surveyed the liberal, the Marxist, the welfare, Gandhian, feminist and the post-modernist conceptions of the State. Each of these short discussions is a pointer to a much larger debate and analysis that can be developed with the help of further readings. The modern nation-State emerged at a particular historical juncture, and the changes in the contemporary world seem to suggest a difficult future ahead for the nation-State. Technological, economic, financial, cultural and political changes seem to suggest a disjunction between the structure of the modern nation-State and the world around it. The future would hold answers as to the form and longevity of the institution of the nation-State as we know it.

3.12 KEYWORDS

1) **Liberalism:** the belief in freedom and human rights

- 2) **Egalitarian:** believing in or based on the principle that all people are equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities.
- 3) **Feminist Theory:** It is the extension of feminism into theoretical, fictional, or philosophical discourse. It aims to understand the nature of gender inequality.
- 4) **Minimal State:** The State which provides protection for the people in its domain but does nothing else.

3.13 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you understand by the State?
2. Write a note on the liberal conception of the State.
3. Briefly compare the conceptions of the welfare State and the minimal State.
4. Write a note on Gandhian conception of State.
5. Describe the views of Feminists on State.

3.14 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agatha Ramm : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, 1789-1905.

James Joll : *Europe Since 1870*.

David Thomson : *Europe Since Napoleon*.

Owen and Sutcliffe. (ed.) : *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*

3.15 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your progress 1

- 1) The human beings come to realize that for the fullest realization of their potential and for greatest liberty it is essential for them to come together and co-operate through a law making and enforcing body. This State would be thus a result of a contract that human beings create to establish possibilities of self-regulation and self-government.
- 2) Marx argued that individuals by themselves do not tell us much, it is the interaction between individuals and institutions and the society that

makes the account worthwhile. He contends that the State has to be seen as a dynamic institution circumscribed by social forces and always changing. Thus the key to understanding the relations between people is the class structure.

UNIT – 4: SOCIALISM

STRUCTURE

4.0 Objectives

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Theory of Societal Progress, Eccentricity and Capitalism

4.3 Meaning: Socialism

4.4 Karl Marx and Socialism

4.4.1 Critiques

4.5 Growth of Socialist Model in Soviet Russia

4.5.1 Importance

4.5.2 Arguments

4.6 Cultural Aspects of Socialism (Russia)

4.7 Let Us Sum Up

4.8 Keyword

4.9 Questions For Review

4.10 Suggested Readings And References

4.11 Answers To Check Your Progress

4.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit you will read about Socialism and Marx influence on the former. You will also read the effects of Socialism on the Russian Model and how it underwent various phases in accordance with the demands of time. Further, this Unit will highlight the application of Russian Model on different countries under the Soviet experiment.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this unit, we will discuss the following issues--What is it that calls forth the need for socialism? And, what is socialism? Socialism is a set of doctrines or a cluster of ideas and a political programme that emerged at the beginning of the 19th century. It arose out of a revolt against bourgeois property. Property in all "civilized" societies has been considered sacred. (Exception: primitive communities also known as tribal.) In bourgeois society, it loses its sacredness but gets a new type of sanction; it now becomes an inalienable right. What then are the implications of property rights as inalienable? One main objective of the state is to ensure the liberty of property. Right to private property has been regarded, by much of the liberal theory, as the key to liberty of the individual and to the pursuit of his happiness. To John Locke, the father of liberal view of society, "right to life, liberty and property" is a natural right and human beings enter into a contract to create a state for the protection of this right. From then on, through Adam Smith to Jeremy Bentham and the modern proponents of capitalism the institution of private property has been politically sacrosanct and an essential condition of social progress.

4.2 THE THEORY OF SOCIETAL PROGRESS, ECCENTRICITY AND CAPITALISM

The doctrine of social progress is predicated on the assumption that the perusal of self-interest (rational) by every individual will over a period of time--even if temporary setbacks have to be faced--lead to social good. This means that general social welfare will be the result of individual maximization of interest.

We all know Adam Smith's oft quoted maxim of the "invisible hand." Everyone is not only a maximizer of self-interest but is an infinite appropriator and an infinite consumer of goods of every kind. Property is the measure of man and in a capitalist society, whichever way one looks

Notes

at it, all routes converge on property and through it the individual's pursuit of his happiness. What we get, as a picture of man under such a social arrangement is an egoistic person, dissociated from all other individuals and all by himself in a space called the market place.

This extreme individualism is best captured in the words of John Locke, the father philosopher of liberalism. He says, "The state exists to promote civil interest and civil interest I call life, liberty, inviolability of body, and the possession of such outward things as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture and the like". He then argues that, "Though the earth be common to all men, yet everyman has a 'property' in his own 'person'. This nobody has a right but himself". It is clear in the above statement that, bourgeois property is exclusively individual and that it legitimates the exclusion of others from it. (In feudal property, other members too had entitlements on the fruits of property.) In this view of things, there is no sense of an individual's social obligation to others or of sharing in the benefits of a social system in the creation of which people cooperate together. In any complex system, even property is the result of the common exertions of people but its possession is always exclusively private. The common good is identified with the individual good. The individual good is each man for himself, The state has the function to ensure that those who succeed in acquiring property have full protection.

All the means of production (land, factory, raw material, tools and instrument and such other things which go into the production of necessities of life & other goods) in such a society are privately owned. And these get, as history shows, concentrated in fewer and fewer hands as capitalist production is based on accumulation. This has two very important consequences for society. First, all decisions about investment choices -which commodity to produce and in what quantities - is determined by a small group of people who own these means of production. Whether the commodity is socially beneficial or not is not the main consideration. What determines the investment choices is whether effective demand can be created. In other words, profitability of goods is the sole consideration in the making of choices about investment. Whether luxury cars will be produced when there is a crying need for buses (public transport) is left to be decided by the profit motive

of the individual entrepreneurs; same is the case whether guns or bombs should have precedence over the urgent need to have a hospital or a school. Production in society is without any plan and often can be of a wasteful nature; expensive fatless potato chips can score over the need for cheap bread which ordinary people may badly require. Distribution following from the above investment choices for wrong kind of commodities goes on regardless of social need or urgency of one who can pay.

Secondly, such an economic system or mode of production creates a class freed from social and legal obligations to perform labour. This is the class of capitalists. It stays out of the labour process and imposes the burden of productive labour on the rest of the society. So we have a large part of society, a majority, who live solely on their wages which in turn are determined by the cost of reproducing the labour power of the person as well as the demand and supply of labour. We, thus, find that the capitalist society is sharply divided between those who own the capital and other means of production and those who have nothing but empty hands and sell this labour power under conditions which are loaded against them.

Just look around the world to see the truth of this statement. A society with such a class division cannot respect the person who labours. One who labours is dispossessed as he just survives on the wages he receives. Property and possession is the basis of esteem. All the economic privileges, social predominance and prestige are with those who own the means of production i.e. the capitalists. All of these social assets are means to and provide immediate access to political power. That is why the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies have rightly been called the ruling class, the class with the power to determine the main features of any capitalist society. In sum, we can say that class determines the structure of society, which in turn conditions the values, attitudes, actions and the overall articulation of any civilization. So when we talked in the beginning that socialism has been a revolt of sorts against bourgeois property, it was not just property per se, but the entire system of production and government that the bourgeois property gives rise to and imposes on the rest of the society.

4.3 MEANING: SOCIALISM

What is the shape that this revolt takes; in other words what is socialism? In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the common elements of what was emerging as the socialist outlook were falling in place. There grew the conviction that the uncontrolled concentration of wealth and unbridled competition was bound to lead to increasing misery and crises and that the system must be replaced by one in which the organisation of production and exchange could do away with poverty and oppression and bring about a redistribution of the world's gilts on a basis of equality (Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*). Early socialism did not grow into any clear-cut doctrine, but a set of values and beliefs held together by the view that private ownership of production should be replaced. But there was no unanimity about "replaced by what." There were common currents of thinking that some or other forms of common ownership of productive property should be the basis of social organisation of society.

Socialism is not against property per se. For example, owing a flat or a refrigerator or driving one's own car does not militate against the spirit of socialism. All these are consumable items. When socialist talks against the private ownership of property, it means such property which is productive and yields profit, or rental income i.e. the private ownership of means of production. Early socialists thought that property is theft. This comes to mean that the owners of means of production cheat the workers, the direct producers, of whatever production which takes place over and above the wages paid to them. This denial of what they produce is theft. The accumulation of this theft is property in the form we see it in our societies. Being a theft it is morally unacceptable. So it must be abolished and as a form, private ownership must be converted into one or another form of common ownership.

The later socialists did not consider property as a theft, but viewed it as the appropriation and accumulation of the surplus value that the worker produces. This process is built into the labour process, which produces goods for exchange in the market. It is therefore internal and structural to

the capitalist process and this is also instituted in law and hence legal. So it cannot be theft but exploitation and nevertheless remains, from a normative point of view, illegitimate and unacceptable. Therefore, they agreed with the early socialists that it must be abolished and common social ownership instituted. This common notion about the unwelcome nature of private ownership of the means of production and following on that, the idea of one or another form of common ownership is what unites the socialists, anyone who agrees with these views is a socialist whatever else their differences. This common outlook is well summed up in the following words. Socialism is that organisation of society in which the means of production are controlled, and the decisions on how and what to produce and on who is to get what are made by public authority instead of by privately-owned and privately managed firms'. (Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*.)

Within these broad agreements, it is the differences about (a) how does one replace capitalism and (b) what exactly is the version of social ownership which create so many different schools of socialism. There is finally the all important question of how does one arrive at socialism; in other words, who will bring it about. In looking at these questions we will know the different versions or schools of socialism. In the aftermath of the French Revolution of 1789, two important features changed in the way people related to the world. The French revolution put into the shape of political agenda, the theories of Enlightenment and enthroned the value of equality and fraternity as of the same importance as liberty and thus egalitarianism became a creed with the masses. The second momentous development was the fast emerging working class all over Western Europe in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, a class large and growing in number but living in deep misery.

Early socialism grew as a popular movement with a festive play of ideas. The earliest of the voices were those of Robert Owen (1771-1858), Saint Simon (1760-1825), Charles Fourier (1772-1837), Proudhon (1809-65) and many lesser figures. But it was only with Karl Marx (1818-1883) that a general theory of socialism emerged which could rival those of Adam Smith or Ricardo about capitalism. The ideas and prescriptions of these men were very different but there was a general

Notes

accent, which was common. An emphasis on social as against individual, cooperation as against selfishness or egoism, cooperative activity as against competition; they all agreed private ownership and market competition is bad for common good and that in spite of large increases in production, there has been no social progress. Social progress as society-wide happiness can come about only with the removal of the criteria of profit and its replacement by a system of rewards based on moral adequacy of claims.

Robert Owen was the first to use the word Socialist in 1827 in his *Cooperative Magazine*. He was a self-made Scottish Cotton Manufacturer who believed Industry-Factory could work as the liberator of mankind from poverty and ignorance. This could happen only if, as he showed, production is organised on cooperative principles and not on competition. He carried on in any experiments in cooperative organisation of production. On a nationwide scale, only the State could do it. He also believed that human nature could be transformed, if environment could be reconstructed. In this reconstructed environment, education would be a powerful conditioning influence. He also advocated the formation by public authorities of "villages of cooperation" to put the unemployed to work. He looked at cooperation not merely as a better alternative to competition in production, but also looked at it as a way for moral improvement of human beings. Owen was also a strong advocate of the right to work. He addressed memorials to the heads of states of Europe in 1817 urging them to implement his new proposals so that an 'age of plenty' could be ushered in for the human race. His ideas caught the imagination of the working classes in Britain who moved on to build popular movements around his ideas leading eventually to the formation of trade unions which in his times were considered illegal.

A different socialist vision emerged from Charles Fourier who came from a merchant family made impoverished during the French Revolution. Waste, inefficiency, boredom, and inequality of modern work appalled Fourier. His main interest was in making work pleasant and adjusted to the character of the individual. Therefore, he found division of labour unacceptable because it broke up work into minute

repetitive operations. Unlike Robert Owen, he did not believe in the efficacy of big industry. Work should be concentrated in the countryside and small shops in towns where family life can be lived in communities and where all can know each other. Work can be enjoyable only if competition is eliminated and organised in cooperatives of small producers. Goods should be well crafted and good to look at and made to last. He, therefore, opposed large industry, which he felt threatened individuality and the pleasure of work. He was a spokesman of the fast dwindling craft manufacturers who conceived and executed work all by themselves, unlike in modern industry where conception and execution of work is separated from each other.

Saint Simon was, in contrast to Fourier, a man of science, industry and large administration. He was Rousseauian in spirit in that he believed the common man of work to be good, honest and virtuous. He disliked both aristocrats (corrupt) and scholars (arrogant) may be because he came from an impoverished junior branch of an aristocratic family. He was all for people's causes. He fought in the American War of Independence and strongly supported the French Revolution. Like Owen, he was a great believer in science, technology and Industry. The 19th century, he foresaw as the era of science and industry from which will follow the unity of mankind and the prosperity of woman. But in contradiction to his distrust of scholars as arrogant, he believed that social reconstruction should follow the advice of what he called 'luminaries' - learned elite. They must work towards the redesigning of social institutions with the aim of moral, intellectual and physical improvement of the poorest who also happen to be the most notorious class in society. In all of this the state has to play a central role. The state must find work for all because all are capable of and want to work. What made him a socialist was his conviction that there is room only for one class in society, the workers. Wages should be according to one's capacity to work for the good of society. The non-workers are layouts and should be weeded out. Through state control of education and propaganda, the state should seek to bring about harmony.

Another very important figure among the early socialists was Proudhon. He was the one who explicitly referred to property as theft and also had a

Notes

very polemical argument with Marx on the nature of property and poverty. He wrote a book called 'Philosophy of Poverty' to which Marx replied with 'Poverty of Philosophy', pointing to the inadequacies of his philosophical convictions. One central concern of Proudhon was the importance of liberty of the ordinary people. He thought that the greatest obstacle in the way of realisation of liberty is inequality. So we can say that equality was sought by Proudhon as a precondition of liberty and in that sense, he is in line with modern radical ideas. An equalitarian ethos, Proudhon believed, can only be achieved in a classless society, but he shunned the idea of class war for social change. Voluntary agreement of the working people should lead the way towards a classless society. He advocated a nationwide system of decentralised workers cooperatives which can bargain with one another for mutual exchange of goods and services. At the apex, constituent assemblies of these cooperatives should define the nature of the state, which in effect meant that the bourgeois oppressive state will cease to be.

It is clear from the exposition of the views of the four leading exponents, there were many lesser ones too, that 'early socialism', was not any kind of theory, but a festive play of ideas against capitalism and all that it represented. Many of these ideas are still around us, in different garbs and exercise considerable influence. Marx was both critical and appreciative of these writings on socialism. He critically referred to them as purely "Utopian" in character. What is utopian about these, for Marx? There is, first of all, no conception of "revolutionary action." What are the forces within the capitalist society who will fight to replace it and how they will fight? Instead what we have, secondly, is an assortment of vague and diffuse ideas.

All the early socialists were sceptical of class struggle waged by the working class. They all talked of, as we have seen above, voluntary agreements, change of heart, propaganda and practical carrying out of social plans, personal inventive actions, small experiments expanding into society-wide activity even while all agreed that the working class is the most suffering class, but that the entire society be convinced through peaceful means of the need to replace capitalism without distinction of class. Marx thought that it would be impossible to bring about socialism

by such means. But he appreciated the contribution of these writers. He thought that by these instinctive yearning for the reconstruction of society, these early thinkers had succeeded in creating an atmosphere in favour of socialism. Moreover as Marx remarked in the Communist Manifesto, these ideas became 'valuable materials for enlightenment of the working class'. So Marx's attitude was one of criticism without being dismissive as happened with many later Marxists.

4.4 KARL MARX AND SOCIALISM

Marx's importance in the history of the struggle for socialism lies in the fact that he was the first man who could propound a theory of socialism, which could, as noted earlier, rival and stand on equal footing with the theory of capitalism developed by Ricardo and Adam Smith. Marx did not simply propound a theory in the old style, but developed a doctrine which unified, or at least so he claimed, theory with practice such that theory could guide practice and practice could rectify the errors in theory. In short, what Marx did was to build up a theory of revolutionary action identifying the class, which will carry out the revolutionary task of replacing capitalism with socialism.

In a general historical theory of, in what has now come to be known as historical materialism, (a) why and how human societies change, and (b) what further changes are in store for human society, Marx showed that historical change is neither accidental nor a result of sheer will; that it has laws which are dialectical. Contradiction is the essence of dialectics. This contradiction is not logical (like incompatibilities in an argument) but an inner attribute of reality. Social reality is more discernibly marked by this inner contradiction. This fact of contrary pulls or oppositions within a reality impels a movement in reality. In other words, society changes because of its inner contradictory pulls towards evolving stages. Like in other earlier stages (feudalism for example), so in capitalism, it is its internal contradictions which propel it towards change into something else.

Notes

Every mode of production (sum total of forces and relations of production) gives rise to two classes, in perpetual opposition to each other. One is the ruling or the exploiting class and the other is the oppressed or the exploited class. The constant conflict and opposition between these two classes to get the better of the other is class struggle. Marx remarks in the very beginning of Communist Manifesto that, “The History of all hitherto existing society is the History of class struggle”. He then goes on to remark, “Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and proletariat”. (Manifesto)

So, one pole of the Marxist structure of theory is class struggle. It was in term of this that Marx had concluded after a very detailed study of the capitalist mode of production (in Capital, Vol.1) that contradictions within it would go on intensifying leading to increasingly intense struggle between the capitalists and the working class. This would give rise to a revolutionary consciousness among the workers and teach that only a takeover of power from the minority of capitalists could create conditions to free the working class from exploitation and lead to tile emancipation of society.

All this sounds neat, and on the face of it, is persuasive too. But it begs the question. What needs an answer is; why should the contradiction intensify so much that the proletariat will feel compelled to overthrow the bourgeois rule and institute its own in place of that? There is an elaborate answer for this in Marx, which is what makes Marx claim that his system is scientific. (But it is not easy to summarize, still an outline is needed to complete the answer).

This then takes us to the second pole of Marxist analyses, which looks the future of class struggle from the view point of the process of accumulation of capital and the rate of exploitation. These two are literally related to each other. There is first the appropriation of surplus value (S.V.) from the labourer. The labourer is given a wage is paid at the cost of reproducing his labour power, that is, what it costs to buy the

subsistence goods for living. In other words, the labour power of the worker is bought in the same as any other commodity, say iron or cloth or whatever else is needed to produce further goods, i.e. at the cost of its production. So labour power is like a commodity among other commodities. It has been established that he reproduces that much of an value in 4/5 hours of work, whereas a worker normally works for 8/10 hours. The extra hours of works that he puts in is the basis of additional value that he produces and which is appropriated by the capitalist. This Marx calls exploitation, "a built-in structural and relational feature of capitalist production, which has nothing to do with cheating or theft. It is legal and necessary for capitalism.

Such a process goes on along with improvements in the technical means of production. Over a long period of time, the cost of machinery and other fixed capital - known as Constant Capital (C.C.) becomes more and more expensive in relation to the cost of hiring labour power- referred to as Variable Capital (V.C.). In other words, in the overall (composition) of capital, there is an increase in the relative importance of C.C. vis-a-vis V.C. This goes on as the capitalist mode of production progresses. This Marx shows leads to the centralisation of capital; that is, the ownership of capital gets into fewer and fewer hands; big fish eating the smaller ones, as we popularly hear. This Marx further shows leads to a fall in the rate of profit. To compensate for this, the capitalist tries to intensify exploitation, which means he tries to increase the rate of exploitation and this is resisted by the workers. This results in the impoverishment of the working class in relative as well as absolute terms vis-a-vis the capitalist. This Marx demonstrates will necessarily lead to greater and greater class struggles leading eventually to the overthrow of capitalism and the capture of power by the workers. That is why Marx could say in the Manifesto that, "What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers." The first stage of the working class is the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat which prepares the way for the establishment of socialism which then paves the way for communism - the stage where everyone works according to capacity and takes according to need; the world of choice.

4.4.1 Critiques

At the end of the Unit, it is important to look at a two way challenge to Marxism that emerged at the end of the 19th century. This took the shape, during the course of the 20th century, to evolutionary or "democratic" socialism. (Many other versions like Guild Socialism and Syndicalism and so on are also there, but we will not deal with these as these are by now unimportant and can also be easily read in any chapter on socialism in a standard theory book).

When the workers' revolution did not take place, as Marx had foreseen that it soon will, there emerged strong reservations about Marxism as a body of doctrines. One who expressed this in systematic terms was a long time German Marxist Eduard Bernstein. In a book entitled, "Evolutionary Socialism", he elaborated a wholly different route to and tactics for achieving a socialist society. The other line of development took shape not because revolution did not come about, but because a large group of British Socialists had intrinsic reservations about Marxism. They thought that some of its goals and methods and tactics will result in authoritarian despotic politics. They took exceptions to goals like the dictatorship of the proletariat, class warfare, violent overthrow of capitalism etc. To further an alternative way-of achieving socialism together with strengthening democracy, leading socialists formed themselves into a Fabian Society in the middle of the 1880's and this version eventually came to be known as Fabian Socialism. Important names within this tradition are Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Cole, Bernard Shaw, Laski, Tawney, and many others. (Remember that some leading Indian nationalist leaders led by Nehru during the Freedom Struggle were deeply influenced by this current and which after independence gave birth to in the middle of 1950's to the idea of "Socialist Pattern of Society.")

Bernstein argued that the wages of workers are not falling but are, relatively rising because the rate of profit is not, as Marx argued, declining and therefore, the expected impoverishments of the workers and the consequent uprising will not come about. Rather, the workers would get more and more integrated into the capitalist system. Hence, the need is to work within the capitalist system by accepting its

institutional framework of parliament, elections, open political activity and thereby, striving to improve the condition of the working class. The class of workers has already become the majority and by proper organisation, it is now possible to win a majority in parliament and strive towards socialist ideals. In short, they declared that there is no need for revolution. (This viewpoint came to be termed, in organised Marxism, as 'revisionism' and 'reformism', a pejorative way of referring to those who abdicated their responsibility of working for the revolution.)

Through the different routes, these two critiques of Marxism came to similar conclusions, which can be stated as the core tenets of "democratic socialism". Four of these deserve a mention. First, socialism is not as Marx thought a historical necessity or inevitable but a moral need for the good of humanity. Humanity can realise its potential only within a radical egalitarian ethos. For this to happen, people will have to be won over for socialism and parliamentary majorities gained by carrying political education among the masses. Secondly, that in a transition to socialism it is not only the working class, but the entire people who will play a part; working class as the predominant part of the world will no doubt be strategic. But middle classes too can be imbued with socialist ideas and can play a major role in building public opinion.

Thirdly, the route to socialism will not be through a violent rupture, as Marx thought, but would be by a gradual ascent. In this, by degrees, through closely interconnected legislative measures, the structure of socialist economy can be put in place. Equal opportunity of effective participation in the running of the state, cooperation rather than competition, equality to fully develop human personality and similar other views, will become norms of society. And, lastly, the state will remain an institution of strategic importance. Through a series of nationalisation measures, the state will ensure that the private ownership of the means of production will be socialised; that is, different forms of state and cooperative ownerships in industry and public services like health care, education, electricity, railways, etc., will be instituted. Everybody will thus have equal access and entitlement to goods and services. That is how the planned economy of public ownership of the

Notes

means of production together with the deepening of democracy and freedom of intellect will be the way for the emancipation of humanity.

Socialism is no simple, monolithic doctrine like Soviet communism was. It represents a variation upon variation, a multiplicity of viewpoints but, as we have seen, sharing some core assumptions and presuppositions. One such presupposition is that every human being is capable of making an equal contribution to the common good and this can only be done when human beings exert together for common welfare. Socialism is a special form of democracy which extends the idea of freedom from civil and political rights to equal claims on economic well being and social status and this can only be achieved when human beings cease to be egoistically competitive as under capitalism. So long as capitalism is there with its exploitation and disregard for human dignity in favour of efficiency of production and market equilibrium, the yearning for socialism will be there; the revolt against bourgeois property will not come to an end.

Check your progress

1) Explain what socialism is.

2) Write an essay on the doctrine of social progress in the context of individualism and capitalism.

3) Discuss any two early trends in socialism.

4) Discuss Karl Marx's Theory of socialism.

4.5 GROWTH OF SOCIALIST MODEL IN SOVIET RUSSIA

With the coming of the October Revolution, entirely new sets of economic principles and policies were sought to be employed with the purpose of achieving a socialist state. In this section, different phases of these programmes have been discussed and also the kind of impact it brought on the Soviet economy and society.

4.5.1 Importance

In such circumstances, where there was no model of a 'socialist' economy before 1914, practices in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution were the first major large-scale experiment with socialism in Europe and became a model of socialism. By 1939, the main features of this 'model' were fundamental restrictions on private property, major state regulation of production, finance and trade, and a system of Planning which schematized the economy and provided flexible targets and goals. Governments, as they evolved state control of the economy, used public welfare as their reference point. The economy was regularly mapped, in order to indicate where state investment was necessary: initially through 'control figures' and later through adjustable Plan figures. Hence, the economy, as it matured, was called a 'Planned Economy'. The system of 'Planning' was highly innovative. It was only feasible because relatively high control over different economic sectors made the mobilization of resources possible on an unparalleled scale, ignoring market pressures of demand and supply. Such control over the economy was unknown in any economy before 1917, even in conditions of War.

The Bolshevik Party, which took power in October, was the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, which was

duly, renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Its members were committed socialists and encouraged the notion that the Soviet economy was a socialist economy, and was an exemplar for socialism. Each step of economic reform was justified as a contribution to socialism. The Komintern, and Communist Parties in Europe took up the refrain. Socialist parties in France, Britain, Germany and Italy did not adopt Soviet technique when in power. But since a long stint of socialist government was rare anywhere else, the Soviet economy became the reference for what socialism was. After 1945, the prototype was exported to Eastern Europe, whose experience added a new dimension to the model. Economists such as Maurice Dobb, encouraged such notions, as did CMEA economists such as Oskar Lange, W. Bruz etc.

The Soviet Planned Economy was considered the archetype of socialist experiment. The Bolsheviks set out to provide the benefits of industrial development to as many people, in as just a manner, in as short a time as possible. Here, we shall deal with how the Soviet system came to take shape during 1917- 1989, and how it evolved in the CMEA countries. The stages of development are important, since all of them, at various times, have been defined as 'socialist'. Also, two points must be noted in addition to the features mentioned above. First, the socialist initiative cannot speak for all initiative in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at this time. Both in Russia and in Eastern Europe, sectors operated (however weak) which did not follow the priorities and logic of socialist experiment. Again, ideas from the Soviet model were taken up and used by 'socialist' governments in France, Britain and Italy after 1945. Their initiatives must also be added to the economic record of European socialism.

4.5.2 Arguments

Some arguments about Soviet industrialization are worth considering.

- i) Was socialist industrialization on the Soviet pattern more concerned with socialism and justice than with economic growth?

Socialist historians such as Maurice Dobb have argued that Soviet industrialization came about through policies that had an eye to economic and industrial growth as well as social justice. Ideas of

socialism, defined by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were important in everything that occurred; and steps taken for growth were a success. Some non-socialist historians such as Jasny have agreed that growth was achieved, while others, such as Alec Nove, have argued that, even if there was growth, the industrialization was inefficient and the weaknesses were the result of obsessions with socialist doctrines. E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies pioneered work that goes against this kind of perspective. They showed how the Soviet leadership was divided on the meaning of socialism and evolved policy while adapting to problems of growth. Davies, though, disagrees with Carr that this was *generally* true. He feels that concerns with doctrine and politics became crucial in the 1930s in Soviet policy. In recent writings in the Russian Federation, there is a division of opinion about how important doctrine was in socialist industrialization. The debate is important because it raises questions about whether Soviet socialism deserves attention as an experiment that took stock of what was convenient and useful for the country's population. Clearly one perspective runs that it was an experiment where policy makers lost a sense of what could lead to prosperity because they became wrapped up in Soviet politics and in ideas about what was socialism.

- ii) Was socialist industrialization on the Soviet pattern a product of Russian circumstances and inapplicable for other countries or regions?

A line of argument also runs that Soviet industrialization was not socialist since socialism could not be constructed in an underdeveloped country like Russia where industrial capitalism had been weak. V.I. Lenin, the leader of the October Revolution, himself did not consider it possible for Russia to build socialism without a revolution in the West. He was disturbed about the prospects of constructing socialism in a country which was mainly agricultural, where industrial and finance capitalism were features of the late 19th century. Following this position, socialism in Russia is regarded as a travesty: economic experiment on a bad foundation with socialist jargon thrown in. There are some problems with this argument. It implies that socialist experiments cannot occur where there is no advanced capitalism: that socialist industrialization must post-date capitalist industrialization. Marx was not certain about

this. In correspondence with Vera Zasulich, the Populist activist, in the 1870s, Marx conceded that Russia might be able to proceed to socialism, bypassing capitalism, since Russia possessed institutions which lacked capitalist orientation and which were deeply influential. They were discussing the prevalence in Russian agriculture of the repartitional commune, which prevented accumulation of land in peasant land tenure. Other questions can also be raised. What is adequate capitalism? Lenin wrote in 1891 that Russian agriculture was capitalist, and that the commune was in retreat. Did not this provide some ground for socialist construction; even it was not the foundation that Lenin wanted? Again, in countries which are backward even when capitalism has developed elsewhere, is full-blown capitalist development always possible? Or will socialism have to finish off the job that capitalism was meant to achieve? Leon Trotsky suggested that this might be necessary. In the Soviet Union and later in Eastern Europe, were we dealing with such situations? These remain important questions in economic history, and debates on ‘development’.

- iii) Was Soviet socialism an instrument of a new ruling class in Russia and a Russian instrument to rule non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

This perspective has been raised by Leon Trotsky (*The Revolution Betrayed*), and the historian who has followed his ideas most closely, Isaac Deutscher (in his biographies of Trotsky and Stalin). Since it is somewhat a social question, it will be dealt with in the unit on social development under socialism. Certainly, as next section indicate, Soviet economic development registered a good deal of inequality. Also, in Eastern Europe, in the early phase and in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was harsh in his treatment of ‘fraternal’ socialist countries. It remains a moot point though whether these ‘inequalities’ were substantial. Surely they came to be considered substantial when growth itself was in a poor state (in the 1980s)?

- iv) The Anders Aslund perspective

The anti-Soviet economist has recently advanced the notion that Soviet production was so incompetent that it does not deserve serious attention as growth. This has been his answer to contemporary criticism of the post Soviet economy of the Russian Federation, where growth rates have

been negative (i.e. the economy has contracted). The argument runs that so much worthless production took place in the Soviet economy and that shortages were so great that we cannot seriously talk of growth. Aslund's perspective *may* hold good for a limited period (the 1970s and 80s) - although only with heavy qualifications. More significant, though, is an underlying assumption of most of his work i.e. that the Soviet economic system was, in the long term, incapable of wealth-generation.

4.6 CULTURAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM (RUSSIA)

Socialist achievements in the early years were limited only in terms of their own vision and the agenda they had set for themselves. Given what existed before Revolution in Russia, and the priorities and ethics of the capitalist world during the same years, their achievements were many. The early socialist state ironically experimented with guaranteeing full employment, free and equal education for all, free health care, equal access to culture and cultural advance, and equality for women. In giving recognition to the legal right of every citizen to a good life the Bolshevik socialist revolution enlarged the realm of freedom to include also social and economic equality. In adopting the principles of right to employment and according to each his or her work, it guaranteed the implementation of this equality. The area of freedom and rights now ranged from freedom from hunger to freedom of access in real terms, leisure and culture. The abolition of private property and the creation of welfare infrastructure were meant to ensure its guarantee to all including minorities and women. By creating economic equality the Revolution also sought to bridge the gap between elite and popular culture, and made possible a significant contribution of working people to literature, cinema, art and music, and a revival of the music and languages of the minorities. Much of the very high quality of artistic production in the later years as well as the big scale of books production were a result of this enlargement in the realm of freedom. The revolution presented an alternative vision of modernity to the world.

It also experimented with a new relationship between party, individual and the state with new forms of collective political expression made people the central focus of national policies, achieved popular participation of people in local and national policies. It sought the abolition of ranks and privileges and changed the very scale of participative democracy.

In all their actual achievements over the years were mixed. The early years were heady and hard. The civil war and allied intervention impinged on all aspects of policy and political life. But in the early years the Revolution had set for itself standards by which it was to be judged not merely by others, but by the revolutionaries themselves and the entire Soviet people.

4.7 LET US SUM UP

In this Unit you have read about the way Soviet experiment in application of the socialist model underwent various phases in accordance with the demands of the time. You have also read how it was not a model which could completely shun the principles of market economy, but tried very often to overcome the restrictions put in its way. There were contradictions from within and outside which eventually led to its disintegration. At the same time, the same model was applied differently even in the countries under the Soviet influence, which gradually gave way to the dominant capitalist system.

4.8 KEYWORDS

- 1) **Socialism:** a political and economic theory of social organization which advocates that the means of production, distribution, and exchange should be owned or regulated by the community as a whole.
- 2) **Capitalism:** an economic and political system in which a country's trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state

4.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

- 1) Examine the critiques of Marxism.
- 2) Describe the salient features of Democratic Socialism
- 3) In what ways socialist industrialization is different from capitalist industrialization?
- 4) Was socialist industrialization a uniform policy initiative in the case of Soviet Russia? Comment.
- 5) How different was the experience of other countries under the hegemony of Soviet Russia in terms of socialist industrialization?

4.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agatha Ramm : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, 1789-1905.

James Joll : *Europe Since 1870*.

David Thomson : *Europe Since Napoleon*.

Owen and Sutcliff't. (ed.) : *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*

4.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check your Progress 1

- 1) There grew the conviction that the uncontrolled concentration of wealth and unbridled competition was bound to lead to increasing misery and crises and that the system must be replaced by one in which the organisation of production and exchange could do away with poverty and oppression and bring about a redistribution of the world's goods on a basis of equality. This should be done by the State rather than the private individual.
- 2) The doctrine of social progress is predicated on the assumption that the perusal of self-interest (rational) by every individual will over a period of time--even if temporary setbacks have to be faced--lead to

Notes

social good. This means that general social welfare will be the result of individual maximization of interest. (for explanation see section 4.2)

3) Early socialism did not grow into any clear-cut doctrine, but a set of values and beliefs held together by the view that private ownership of production should be replaced. But there was no unanimity about "replaced by what." There were common currents of thinking that some or other forms of common ownership of productive property should be the basis of social organisation of society.

4) Marx showed that historical change is neither accidental nor a result of sheer will; that it has laws which are dialectical. Contradiction is the essence of dialectics. This contradiction is not logical (like incompatibilities in an argument) but an inner attribute of reality. Social reality is more discernibly marked by this inner contradiction. This fact of contrary pulls or oppositions within a reality impels a movement in reality. In other words, society changes because of its inner contradictory pulls towards evolving stages

UNIT-5: RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

STRUCTURE

5.0 Objectives

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Making of Russian Revolution

5.2.1 Russian Proletariat

5.2.2 Tsarist Despotism

5.2.3 December Uprising

5.2.4 The Russian Intelligentsia

5.2.5 Populist

5.2.6 Growth of Socialist Democracy

5.3 The 1905 Revolution: Precursor for 19 17

5.4 First World War and Russia

5.5 October Revolution

5.5.1 Bolsheviks?

5.5.2 Soviets

5.5.3 April Thesis of Lenin

5.5.4 Appalling Situation

5.5.5 Mutiny of Kornilov

5.5.6 Taking Power: Bolsheviks

5.5.7 Early Legislation of New Regime

5.6 Responses and Reactions

5.6.1 The Heritage of Russian Revolution

5.7 Summary

5.8 Keyword

5.9 Questions For Review

5.10 Suggested Readings And References

5.11 Answers To Check Your Progress

5.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit we will study about the Russian Revolution and its effect on global politics. The leaders of the revolution actually provided a theory of the transformation of the world from a capitalist order into a socialist one. The revolution inspired similar activities in other parts of the world and also motivated a number of anti-imperialist liberation struggles taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America against colonial domination.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit on Russian Revolution will go into details of the Revolution and also on the 19th century social conditions of Russia that led to it. The Russian Revolution was an unprecedented event in the sense that it was the first revolution that was based on a concrete and explicit theory of revolution. The coming of the revolution, though not its details, had been both predicted and anticipated. Another crucial aspect of this Revolution was that it was not projected as a national or a Russian event. Russian Revolution was visualized as an important step in the coming of the world socialist revolution. It was for this reason that the Russian Revolution was called not a national revolution but a world revolution, by many scholars. This Unit will examine a range of factors that prepared the Russian society for the revolution. It would then focus on the major events surrounding the Revolution. Finally it will briefly talk about the legacy of the Revolution and what it meant to the rest of the world.

5.2 THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

An important paradox of the Russian Revolution is its self-image as a global phenomenon and the specificity of Russian conditions that brought it about in Russia. According to the Marxian theory of revolution, it was to take place first in advanced industrial societies as a result of the maturing of the contradictions of capitalism. But the Socialist Revolution occurred in a backward industrial country like Russia. However, the coming of the revolution was nothing short of a storm that had a dramatic impact on the society and people of Russia.

The following quote is an attempt to capture this impact: All Russia was learning to read, and reading-politics, economics, history -because the people wanted to know. In every city, in most towns, along the front, each political faction had its newspaper - sometimes several. Hundreds of thousands of pamphlets were distributed by thousands of organizations, and poured into the armies, the villages, the factories, the streets. The thirst for education, so long thwarted, burst with the Revolution into a frenzy of expression. From Smolny Institute alone, the first six months, went out every day tons, car-loads, train-loads of literature, saturating the land. Russia absorbed reading matter like hot sand drinks water, insatiable. And it was not fables, falsified history, diluted religion, and the cheap fiction that corrupts -but social and economic theories, philosophy, the works of Tolstoy, Gogol, and Gorky..... (from John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World*, 1987 Edition, Moscow, p.37.)

That was Russia in 1917 as described by John Reed, an American journalist, who had come to Russia to cover the event and who was, in the words of Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, "not an indifferent observer, but a passionate revolutionary. . . ." There were many others like him, who flocked to the city of St. Petersburg, or Petrograd as it was called from 1917 onwards, simply because that city symbolized all that they dared to believe in and hold dear. If the French Revolution symbolized Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the Russian Revolution symbolized much more—organized struggle, clarity of perspective and courage to go against the tide even if it meant being isolated in the whole world wide. How did all this happen? Why did Russia and not Germany stage the first socialist revolution, contrary to the expectations of everyone? How could the working class of this backward country, with its half-baked capitalism, have the courage to overthrow the Tsarist autocracy and move, with almost lightning speed from a semi feudal political and social order, into a socialist system, bypassing the capitalist phase almost completely?

The answers lie in the many peculiarities of Russia. It had a weak bourgeoisie and the industrial development that had taken place in Russia from the 1880s was entirely at the initiative of the Tsar and financed by foreign capital. While the French companies invested in the mining and metallurgy sectors, oil was in the hands of the British concerns and the

chemical and electrical engineering industries in the hands of the Germans. Within Russia, the capital for industrialization was raised largely by taxing the peasantry even as the agrarian sector continued to remain backward technologically, the best lands remaining with Industrialization in Russia was limited to certain pockets in the country like St. Petersburg and Moscow districts, the Donetz and the Dneiper basins. They were, in the words of Maurice Dobb, no more than industrial islands in a vast agricultural sea. Yet, these industries gave rise to a powerful working class movement. This was because the typical Russian factory was a huge industrial unit with a high level of concentration. All stages of production were housed under one roof. This meant that workers of all kinds - from the unskilled to the highly skilled - were thrown together and the task of mobilizing them was correspondingly easier.

5.2.1 Russian Proletariat

The Russian worker was part-peasant, part-worker, with strong roots in the villages. Given a situation of peasant discontentment owing to the problems mentioned above, this meant that the Russian working class reacted not only to the subhuman conditions under which they worked in the factories, but also against the crushing burden of land tax and redemption payments that weighed their families down in the villages. Thus, the fact that Russian industrialization was built, not upon a strong agricultural base as in the case of England, but on a backward rural sector where many problems had been left unresolved, contributed to the growth of an extremely volatile working class movement in this country. Of course, the leadership that was available to this working class also played a crucial role, but we shall come to that later.

The Russian working class was largely concentrated in the textile industries, but there were substantial numbers of workers in the metallurgical and railway sectors as well. In 1900, there were three million industrial workers in Russia. Of these, 5,50,000 were working in textile factories, 500,000 in metallurgical industries and 400,000 in the railways. Wages were paid irregularly and employers drove their men hard. Even in 1913, the average working day of the Russian worker was 10 hours. Studies of working class budgets indicated that a large

proportion of the total expenditure went on food. Few could afford proper clothing. And yet, interestingly, the literacy levels among the working class were at a higher level than general literacy in Russia. According to the 1897 census, 57.8% of the male workers and 28.4% of the female workers of Russia were literate. By 1918, 79.2% of the male workers and 44.2% of the female workers were literate. Besides the schools run by the Zemstvos (locally elected councils to look after public health, education and road maintenance), schools financed by the state, some educational institutions were even maintained by the employers. They offered evening courses and set up public libraries, which were well attended. Thus the Russian working class, even while chafing against its abysmal working and living conditions and threatened with job insecurity, was able to absorb the flood of pamphlets and books which were being smuggled into the country, defying all attempts at censorship by the Tsarist authorities. Hence Russia had a peculiar combination of backwardness and modernization. This was evident not just in the industrial sector.

5.2.2 Tzarist Despotism

The Tsarist autocracy was unimaginatively backward even while the intelligentsia was the most vibrant intelligentsia in the whole of Europe in the nineteenth century. The autocracy, which originated in the medieval period, was said to have been influenced by the Mongol tradition. For two hundred and fifty years, i.e., from 1240 to 1490, Russia had been under Mongol rule. According to Tibor Szamuely Mongol concept of society, based on the unqualified submission of all to the absolute power of the Great Khan, had its impact on the Russian political structure. Every member of society was dotted his specific position, to which he was bound for life. Revolutions and which he could never desert, on pain of death. The Great Khan not only had unquestioned authority over the lives of his subjects, he was also the sole owner of all the land within his domains.

After the break-up of the Mongol empire, the power that emerged was that of Muscovy, a principality centred around Moscow. This region had several natural advantages, since it was situated at the heart of the principal waterways, with comparatively easy access to all parts of the

Notes

country. In Muscovy, the position of the Tsar was one of unique strength - all authority in the country emanated from him. He shared power with no one. There was no opportunity, either within the government or outside it, for the development of rival centres of power capable of limiting, balancing or checking the authority of the ruler. What was more; these doctrines of authority enjoyed the full support of the Church. The next great landmark in the history of the Tsarist autocracy was the reign of Peter the Great (1682- 1725). He was the great modernizer. Until his time, the function of government was primarily conceived as a negative one - to defend Muscovy against external enemies and safeguard domestic law and order. This picture changed radically when Peter gave a positive role to the government. He began with a rapid modernization of the military and naval establishments. This entailed the setting up of factories, mines and collieries, leading to a modernization of the economy and fiscal reforms. All this naturally enlarged the functions of the government and to take care of this, ten 'colleges' or rudimentary ministries, were set up. The task of supervising and co-ordinating the work of these 'colleges' was performed by Peter himself and the officials of these colleges were encouraged to keep an eye on each other. Thus emerged the tradition of mutual suspicion and vertical communication with the Tsar, which remained a characteristic feature of the Tsarist autocracy until the end. Ministers reported directly to the Tzar and even tried to undercut each other. In the late nineteenth century, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior were constantly at loggerheads with each other. The former's efforts at modernization would be stymied by the latter, fearful as he was of the political consequences of any attempts at bringing about change in the country. Until the very end the Tsarist autocracy remained a top-heavy political structure, in which the individual competence of the Tsar was of vital importance. Of course, Tsars like Alexander I (1801 -1825) drew upon the talent of officials like M.M. Speransky, who has been described as the most brilliant Russian statesman of the nineteenth century. Yet Speransky himself suffered disgrace and exile when the Tsar, puffed up with his victory over Napoleon and Russia's primacy in the Concert of Europe, retracted on his reformist promises and became more and more reactionary. The reforms of Tsar Alexander II, remembered as the man

who carried out the Emancipation of the Serfs and instituted the Zemstvos, were carried out in an authoritarian manner. He brushed aside all suggestions for popular participation in government even though he had encouraged such expectations.

5.2.3 December Uprising

Gradually, a mood of discontent spread over all of educated Russia. The first expression of this spirit of revolt was the Decembrist uprising of 1825, known by this name because the revolt occurred in the month of December. The 'Decembrists', as those who participated in the revolt came to be known, were patriotic and intelligent young men of the aristocracy who had served as officers in the Tsar's army. They had fought in the Napoleonic Wars and when they travelled abroad they were greatly influenced by the Western way of life and the ideas of the French Revolution. When they returned to Russia in 1816, they formed a secret society for constitutional and judicial reform, for the abolition of serfdom that was still prevalent in Russia and for the curbing of foreign influence on the Tsarist state. When Tsar Alexander I died unexpectedly in 1825, there were some weeks of confusion before the next Tsar ascended the throne. The Decembrists used this opportunity to make their point. They tried to prevent several military regiments from taking the oath of allegiance to the new Tsar unless he committed himself to a constitutional form of government. However, they were unable to carry out their plan successfully. Some of the regiments deserted them and the new Tsar, Nicholas, had prior warning of the revolt. Hence he was able to put down the revolt very firmly by firing upon the insurgents. About a dozen men were killed, 289 others either condemned to death or sentenced to hard labour in Siberia. Most of the Decembrists were serving officers under the age of thirty. There were also some senior officers of distinguished lineage. John Keep and Lionel Kochan have described the Decembrist uprising as "an attempted revolution on the people's behalf by a section of the educated elite."

5.2.4 Russian Intelligentsia

The Decembrist uprising may have been crushed brutally and news of it blacked out completely in the press, but it remained in popular memory as a heroic struggle and inspired several generations thereafter. As the

Notes

nineteenth century advanced, the numbers of educated Russians who turned against the Tsarist system grew by leaps and bounds. There emerged a clearly recognizable class known as the intelligentsia. In fact, the word "intelligentsia" had its origins in Russia and was first used in this country in the mid-nineteenth century. The word then spread to other countries and came to signify at- Ate of writers, academicians and cultural figures, who were often critical of the establishment. In Western societies, the intelligentsia was not sharply differentiated from the professional and middle classes as a whole. But in a more backward political order as prevailed in Russia, the intellectual elite did not grow with the society as a whole and did not share a common ethos with the other middleclass groups. The Russian intelligentsia represented a small crust of well- educated people with a European outlook, who had few links with Russian society.

It was the reforms of Tsar Alexander II, which marked the turning point for the intelligentsia. He was known as the reforming Tsar and when he announced his intentions of carrying out reforms, there were great expectations amongst the intelligentsia. There was hope that he would consult the progressive sections of his people. But soon there was disappointment. Alexander II chose to carry out the reforms by authoritarian methods and brushed aside all suggestions for popular participation in government. When he constituted the Zemstvos, it was only the propertied classes and the higher taxpayers who were given representation. All suggestions for a nationally representative body or parliament were firmly turned down. So great was the anger of the intelligentsia against the Tsar that he faced a series of assassination attempts. The last one, in 1881, took his life. His successor, Alexander III fiercely cracked down on the intelligentsia and many intellectuals had to flee the country. Many found refuge in Switzerland and Geneva became a centre of their activities.

The mid-nineteenth Russian intelligentsia was of two kinds. There were the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. While the former, i.e., the Westernizers, were ashamed of Russia's past and believed that the future for Russia lay in imitating the West, the Slavophiles maintained that Russia's salvation lay in a return to the true traditions of Russia. It is important to note that the Slavophiles were also in favour of change. But

they felt that the Western values of rationalism and individualism were disintegrating forces. The strength of Russia lay in the faith of her people and the sense of community of which the 'mir' (village community) is the essence. Russia, in fact, should show the way to the West. This controversy between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles was but the first of a series of polarizations amongst Russian intellectuals. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Russian socialism split into the Populists and the Marxists and still later, the Russian Marxists split into the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki.

In the post-Decembrist period the new intellectual tradition that unfolded was characterized by an indifference to political reforms. There was a general belief that it was more important to improve the material conditions of the people than to give Russia constitutional liberties. Chernyshevski, a leader of the radicals in the 1860s, for instance, distinguished clearly between liberalism and democracy. While liberalism, representing freedom of speech and constitutional liberties, was essentially for the educated class, democracy was concerned with the material welfare of the masses. Chernyshevski went to the extent of stating that if the welfare of the people could be served by despotic methods, he would not hesitate to support these methods.

5.2.5 Populist

In the 1860s, almost every section of the Russian intelligentsia shared an extravagant idealization of 'the people'. There was an almost mystical belief in 'the people' as the repository of some profound truth of life. 'The people' would even cleanse the intelligentsia, who were corrupted by worldly education and material goods. Alongside with this, however, there was also a deep-rooted conviction that 'the people', left to themselves, were incapable of overthrowing oppression and achieving the just society. An interesting aspect of the Russian intelligentsia was that many of its members were creative writers who produced excellent short stories, plays and even novels. Their works were reflective of the politics of the times in a way which has seldom been seen in other countries. Ivan Turgenev's, 'Fathers and Sons', for instance, while being an important literary work, was the best account of two generations of

Notes

Russian intellectuals -the men of the forties and the men of the sixties, as they were known.

The generation of the '40s had been brought up on German idealistic philosophy and romanticism. According to Riasanovsky, they had a metaphysical, religious, aesthetic and historical approach to reality. The '60s generation, on the other hand, believed in utilitarianism, positivism, materialism and especially realism. They were obviously more radical. Socially too, they belonged to a mixed background below the gentry being the sons of priests, petty officials and others who had made their way up by education and effort.

Hugh Seton Watson makes the point that the children of the Russian nobility were quite as capable of extreme revolutionary thought as their social inferiors. But there is a certain venom and fanaticism in the language of non-noble radicals which is not found in their gentleman predecessors. This became and has remained an essential part of the Russian revolutionary tradition.

By the 1870s, an essentially individualist creed of nihilism had combined with populism. The spirit of the former, i.e., nihilism can be understood from Bakunin's famous phrase: "The passion for destruction is also a constructive passion." Between 1869 and 1872 there existed a group of young revolutionaries in St. Petersburg who called themselves the "Chaikovsky Circle". Their first aim was to politically educate the university students. They sold books which had been banned, distributed pamphlets, organized discussion groups among workers and intellectuals.

By 1873 the students were ready for their first movement to the people. They went to the countryside and preached socialism amongst the peasantry. They were in for a rude shock, however. The peasants, far from welcoming them as their saviours, assaulted them and handed them over to the Tsarist police! Obviously there was a disconnect between their understanding of the people and the people's understanding of them. This bitter experience made the Populists change their perspective. The new understanding was that social and economic issues must come before politics. Hence the second movement to the people in 1876 was on a different basis. Groups of young revolutionaries went to live among the people. They practised a normal trade or profession - some learnt manual trades, others went as medical orderlies or midwives, working

with the Zemstvos. Young women played a prominent part in this movement. But even then the masses did not respond and by 1877 these groups had been discovered. Mass arrests followed, thereby ending this ambitious enterprise.

If the peasants would not act, then there was another way -that of terrorism and assassination. The "Land and Freedom" society, formed in 1876, launched an all out terrorist offensive against the government. They believed that because of the highly centralized nature of the Russian State, a few assassinations could do tremendous damage to the regime. They succeeded in killing Tsar Alexander II, but did not manage to bring Tzarism to an end. What followed thereafter under Tsar Alexander III was such severe repression that for the next twenty five years, all Russian revolutionary activity had to be carried on outside the country. No free political discussion could take place within Russia.

5.2.6 Growth Of Socialist Democracy

This period of emigrant revolutionary activity was, however, a very productive one. In the 1880s, even as industrialization was proceeding apace in Russia, the first Marxist groups began to be formed among Russian intellectuals. The major voice was that of Plekhanov who, in his pamphlets, 'Our Differences' and 'Socialism and the Political Struggle' made the following points:

- 1) Socialism cannot be based on the peasantry. It has to be based on the industrial working class.
- 2) Capitalism was going ahead in Russia and the growth of the working class was inevitable.
- 3) The village commune was an anachronism - a mere survival of a pre-capitalist order.

The fundamental break had been made. Populism continued to survive in Russia, reincarnated as the Socialist Revolutionary Party, but it was now marginal to Russian politics. It was now Marxism and Social Democracy which became the mainstream. Meanwhile, within Russia, the first volume of Karl Marx's major critique of capitalism 'Das Kapital' had been published in Russian in 1872. The Tsarist censorship regarded it as too academic and irrelevant to Russian conditions to be subversive.

Vladimir Ilyanovich Lenin, born in 1870, had been converted to Marxism in 1889. In 1893 he moved to St. Petersburg to work with the

Notes

Marxist underground groups. He also visited Plekhanov and other leaders of Russian Social Democratic Party in Switzerland. In 1895, along with Martov, he formed St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class to disseminate Marxist ideas among the working classes and to prepare leaders for the future revolution. The Union also had branches in the cities of Moscow and Ekaternioslav. However, Lenin was soon arrested and he had to spend the next four and a half years in prison and in exile in Siberia. It was while he was thus incarcerated that he published his important work 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia', which proved conclusively that capitalism in Russia was an accomplished fact and contained all the conditions of economic viability. This work was published illegally in Russia in 1899.

Another group of legal Marxists had also come into being around this time. They were basically a liberal group, consisting largely of sociologists and economists. They made a powerful contribution to the debate against the Populists. Peter Struve, for instance, brought out his "Cultural Remarks on the Question of Economic Development in Russia" in 1894 in which he argued that the advent of capitalism in Russia should be welcomed since it would, along with its miseries, also bring the material and spiritual culture of Western Europe to Russia. This included political liberty. The Legal Marxists, however rejected the revolutionary aspects of Marxism.

The League of Combat for Liberation of the Working Class of Lenin and Martov took active part in the day-to-day struggles of workers. They supported the textile strikes of 1896 and '97. Gradually, the Russian Marxists were reaching out to a wider mass base. But involvement with industrial labour also meant that the movement had to concentrate on the more practical objectives, such as the achievement of better wages and working conditions. Some leaders began to argue that the movement should concentrate on such economic objectives because, given the peculiar conditions of Russia, any struggle for economic gains would naturally and inevitably lead to the demand for political objectives. Revolutionary slogans directed towards the overthrow of the autocracy would frighten and even repel the workers. However, Lenin, who was still in exile and other emigrant leaders like Plekhanov, did not agree with this. They argued for the primacy of political objectives and felt that

a campaign which confined itself to practical objectives could not become a country-wide proletarian movement. Lenin pointed out that various groups of workers, immediately interested merely in securing their own, narrow material gains may even try to secure these gains against the interests of other groups of workers. Or they may try to secure immediate advantages at the expense of long term interests. "Consciousness" was more important than spontaneity.

As E.H. Carr has pointed out, by the turn of the century there was a general feeling among the Marxist groups that the time was ripe for passing from mere lecturing on Socialist principles to more systematic and political work among the masses. The time for making the transition from propaganda to agitation has arrived. In 1898, it was decided to hold a Congress of existing Marxist groups in order to form a Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. The groups met at Minsk in Byelorussia and prepared a Manifesto which contained the following memorable passage,...“The further to the east one goes in Europe, the weaker, meaner and more cowardly in the political sense becomes the bourgeoisie and the greater are the cultural and political tasks which fall to the lot of the proletariat. On its strong shoulders the Russian working class must carry the work of liberty”.... The Russian Social Democratic Party became a part of the Second International. It may be recalled that the First International Working Men's Association had been founded by Marx in 1864 and had existed until 1871. It symbolized the coming together of working class parties across national boundaries in the belief that Marxian socialism was essentially international in character and that all members of the working class shared certain common interests. The Second International, founded in 1889, was dominated by the German Social Democratic Party and continued its existence until the First World War. After the Revolution of 1917, there would be a tussle over who was to lead such an International - Russia as the first country to carry out a working class revolution, or other forces in Europe.

5.3 THE 1905 REVOLUTION: PRECURSOR FOR 1917

Notes

Russia's humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in the Russo Japanese War made the Russian people seriously wonder about the strength of their mighty empire. The workers were in any case agitated about their conditions of work and poor wages. On 9 January 1905, a huge crowd of workers, led by a priest, Father Gapon, marched towards the Winter Palace to submit a petition to the Tsar, Nicholas II. This was intended to be a peaceful procession and the participants had full faith in the Tsar. They believed that he was surrounded by bad advisers, who kept the truth about the actual plight of the people away from him. Despite the church icons and portraits of the Tsar that they carried, the Tsarist Guards received the petitioners with a hail of bullets. Over a hundred fell dead, many more were injured. This was the last straw. It was also the signal for the revolution. Strikes spread throughout the country.

Revolutionaries assassinated the Grand Duke Sergei, one of the leaders of the court coterie. Soon, peasant revolts broke out in various parts of the country. Even the fringes of the Russian Empire were affected. There were risings in Poland and in the Black Sea port of Odessa, the crew of the battleship Potemkin joined in the revolt.

All this shook the self-confidence of the Tsar and he promised to convene a Duma, or Representative Assembly, in which, however, the working class would not be represented. All parties of the opposition, from the Liberals to the Bolsheviks, protested against this edict. In October 1905 a general strike spread from Moscow and St. Petersburg throughout the country. The strikers of St. Petersburg elected a Council of Workers' Deputies, the St. Petersburg Soviet, which virtually became the centre of the Revolution. The Soviet called on the country to stop paying taxes to the Tsar. Its members, along with the chairman, Leon Trotsky, were arrested. New strikes broke out and the pressure led the Tsar to issue his October Manifesto of 30 October, in which he promised to extend the franchise to those classes which had until now been excluded. There was also an assurance that no law would take effect without the approval of the Duma. The Manifesto split the ranks of the revolutionaries into those who wanted to withdraw the movement and work the proposals and others, like the Social Democrats, who wanted a Constituent Assemble. The split proved to be fatal for the Revolution and slowly the Tsarist forces recovered their strength. By 1907 the Tsar had

regained his self-confidence and begun withdrawing the semi-liberal concessions which he had been compelled to make in October 1905. Yet, 1905 was an important landmark in Russia's history and things were never the same thereafter. The revolutionaries could learn from their mistakes in this encounter and, when the next opportunity came in the First World War, they were able to plan their strategy with greater maturity. The Soviets, however brief their existence, were a model for the future.

Check Your progress-1

1) What are the reasons of Russian Revolution?

2) "The Revolution of 1905 was an alarm bell". Elucidate.

5.4 FIRST WORLD WAR AND RUSSIA

It has been said that the First World War was different from all previous wars in that it was not just a test of the military capabilities of the warring countries. It was their economies that were being put to the test and Russia was bound to perform badly. In an epoch when "coal was king" Russia produced only 1/16th of the amount of the coal that the US produced, 1/9th that of Great Britain and 1/6th that of Germany. Though Russia ranked sixth in the world production of iron, it manufactured only 6% of the steel produced in the world. As for railroad, when Germany had 11 kilometres per 100 square kilometres, France 8 or 9, Russia had only 400 meters excluding Siberia. When the war began, Russia's trade with the outside world came to a standstill and given its heavy reliance on foreign capital, this seriously dislocated the economy.

Notes

Moreover, large sections of Russia were horrified and disillusioned at the way Tsar Nicholas II conducted the war effort. There were some parties like the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats), which felt that if the conduct of the war was given over to them, they would do a better job of it. In fact, through the greater part of 1916, the country was being governed not by the Tsar or by his bureaucracy or by the court, but by private associations which had sprung up more or less simultaneously. Red Cross Committees which had started out modestly, little by little took over the administration of public health. The Zemstvos, locally elected councils which had come into existence in the time of Tsar Alexander II, i.e., the 1860s and 1870s, had, after 1914 come together to form a Pan-Russian Union of Zemstvos to help the sick and wounded soldiers who were pouring in from the war-front. There was a Committee of War Industries which comprised of representatives of commerce and industry. They became like a parallel government, trying to streamline war production. This was because the Tsarist authorities were increasingly proving themselves to be incapable of even looking after defence production of the country.

There was also a huge consumer's co-operative movement which was spreading rapidly, trying to tackle the difficulties of everyday life such as price increases. A bag of potatoes, which would cost one rouble before the war, had gone up to 7 roubles by 1917. A pood (equivalent to 36 pounds) of wheat flour, costing 6 roubles 50 kopecks before the war was now selling at 40 roubles. On most essential items there had been a seven-to-eight-fold increase, and, needless to say, wages had not kept up with this rise in prices. It was not just the industrial workers who were affected. Civil servants and white-collar workers were also badly hit and this was why, when the workers came out on the streets in demonstrations, they too joined the protests - something which had not happened in the 1905 Revolution.

The administration watched helplessly as it was slowly divested of its powers. Every working group was getting organized and without realizing it, the Russians were beginning to govern themselves. The Duma or the Russian Parliament, which had been constituted after the 1905 Revolution, though largely comprised of supporters of the Tsarist regime, and boycotted by the more radical groups, tried to open the

Tsar's eyes to the growing abyss between the court and public opinion but had no effect. Such were the times that even this loyalist Duma became more and more critical of the government and finally on 25 February 1917, matters came to a head with the Tsar deciding to prorogue the Duma. He accused this body of having instigated the strikes in major industrial units like the Putilov arms works, the street demonstrations and the defiance by soldiers of their officers. But so complete was the loss of Tsar's authority that the Duma decided to meet in defiance of the Tsar's orders and with the support of the workers and soldiers, went to form a Provisional Government. That was the February Revolution of 1917, termed so because the Russian calendar was different from Gregorian calendar. This revolution, in which the Tsar was forced to resign and hand power to his sickly ten year old Alexis with de facto power being wielded by the boy's uncle, the Grand Duke Michael and Michael refusing to ascend the throne until he had been invited to do so by Constituent Assemble, ended Tsarism in Russia.

5.5 OCTOBER REVOLUTION

But the February Revolution was only the beginning of a long and complicated process, which ended in the final Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. This revolution occurred through a series of dramatic political events leading eventually to a capture of power by Bolsheviks. This phase of revolution was completely dominated by the Bolsheviks. Let us now turn to them.

5.5.1 Bolsheviks?

The name derives from the Russian term 'Bolshinstvo' which means majority. When the Russian Social Democratic Part held its second Congress in 1903, differences arose over the way in which the party was to be run and the kind of members that it should have. Lenin wanted to restrict the membership of the party to hardened professional revolutionaries, while Martov, another influential leader of this period, believed in a more broad-based and inclusive formula. The party split and Lenin's group managed to obtain a majority. Hence the 'Bolshevik'. Martov's group became the Mensheviks (men'shinstvo—minority) but

Notes

they controlled the party newspaper 'Iskra'. This split weakened the Russian Social Democratic Party, as do all splits within parties. What made this splitting of ways all the more unfortunate was the fact that Russia was then on the brink of its first Revolution—i.e., the Revolution of 1905.

Over time, Mensheviks became more and more like German Social Democratic Party whereas the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership made some significant departures from traditional Marxist formulations.

In July 1905 was published Lenin's pamphlet 'Two Tactics of Social Democracy'. In it he argued that Russia would strike a different path—even though Russia too would have a bourgeois revolution, going through all the stages of France after 1789, the leadership would come, not from the bourgeoisie but from the working class, in alliance with the peasantry. This idea, of having the peasantry in the revolutionary process, was a relatively new one. Traditionally, the Marxists believed that the peasantry was incapable of creating or supporting a revolution. But Lenin maintained that in Russia the rich and middle peasants could be more dependable allies than bourgeoisie. The latter was weak and cowardly and was capable of even betraying the revolution and compromising with the ruling class. The rich and middle peasants, on the other hand, would be interested in overthrowing the landed class and confiscating their large estates.

Lenin's pamphlet also outlines the scenario after the overthrow of Tsarism, as he visualized it. A 'Provisional Government', which would be a 'revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry', would be set up. However, the type of government that would emerge would be a bourgeois-democratic, not socialist in nature. For the achievement of Socialism, it was necessary for a more advanced proletariat of some other major industrial country of Europe to create a socialist revolution. Only then would it be possible for Russia to bypass its bourgeois democratic stage and create a socialist revolution.

Thus, in many ways, Lenin was able to anticipate the turn of events in Russia. Where he, as well as many of his fellow revolutionary leaders, went wrong was in their expectation that the first socialist revolution would occur in Germany or any other highly industrialized country of

Europe. That was not to happen and it fell to the lot of Russia to carry out this task.

Leon Trotsky, a charismatic leader who was to play a dynamic role in the St Petersburg Soviet, was a Menshevik for a long time even though his views were quite close to those of Lenin. Where he differed with Lenin was on the question of the peasantry's potential. He was sceptical of the peasants and firmly believed that they had a role in the crushing of the Revolution of 1905.

From February to October

After the February Revolution, the internal contradictions within Russia became evident and were accentuated over time. The Provisional Government, headed by Prince Lvov, and representing the moderate forces, was committed to carrying on the war effort. The more radical forces were concentrated in the Petrograd Soviet. They were in favour of introducing democratic reforms, confiscation of landed estates and promulgating an eight-hour day for workers. They also wanted to enter into negotiations with the proletariat of other countries in order to bring an end to the war. Though the Provisional Government was the official regime in the eyes of the world, within Russia it was unable to take a single important decision unless it was endorsed by the deputies of the Soviet.

5.5.2 Soviets

What was the Soviet? First constituted in the course of the 1905 Revolution the St.Petersburg Soviet was a Council of Workers' Deputies, which, in the words of Isaac Deutscher, "soon became the most spectacular centre of the revolution." The orders and instructions of this Soviet commanded universal obedience. It was the people's parliament par excellence and in the absence of any parliamentary institutions, it was the broadest and most representative body that Russia possessed. In 1917, a few days after the Tsar's abdication the St. Petersburg Soviet was reconstituted. Its members were elected from factories, workshops and later in the barracks of regiments that were stationed in the capital. They were not elected for any fixed term - the electorate had the right to replace them by other men at any time. It was also the de facto executive

power in Russia. The writ of the Soviet ran in factory, railway depot, post office and regiment alike. In fact the Provisional Government was virtually a prisoner in the hands of the Soviet. In the months after the February Revolution, Soviets mushroomed all over Russia - in provincial towns and in villages. Because of the mode of their election, they did not represent the nobility and the middle classes. By August 1917, there were 600 Soviets in Russia. They had assumed all the responsibilities of government.

5.5.3 Lenin's April Thesis Of Lenin

In April 1917 Lenin arrived in Russia from Finland and issued his 'April Theses' in which he set forth the new slogan "All power to the Soviets". Capitalism had to be overthrown and the war brought to an end. The bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks were deceiving the proletariat. The Revolution had entered the socialist phase. Land and banks should be nationalized, the police and the army abolished. Those who heard Lenin's ideas were stunned and thought that he had taken leave of his senses. It was like an avalanche and some of the proposals sounded completely like flights of fancy. But slowly, in the following weeks, the ideas seeped in and Lenin was able to win over many to his views.

5.5.4 Appalling Situation

Meanwhile the Provisional Government was alienating itself from the people continuously. They wanted peace but the Government had already declared that all the Tsarist Government's commitments to the war would be adhered to. In the face of mounting opposition, the members of the first Provisional Government had to resign and in May, a new government, still headed by Prince Lvov, but with six socialist Ministers drawn from the Soviets, was constituted. But this new government was even less able to tackle the problems of the day. These were internal differences: while the liberal group wanted to delay certain fundamental reforms until the convening of a Constituent Assembly, the socialists were anxious to respond to the popular demands for immediate reform. The economic situation grew worse. When workers demanded more wages, the industrialists, unwilling to grant them any increase, began to close down factories. The Government provided no protection to the workers. To add to the problems a Russian military offensive in Galicia ended disastrously. The Provisional Government was unable to handle

the wave of popular unrest which was triggered off by the offensive and Prince Lvov had to resign.

Thus, by July 1917, in little more than four months, a third Provisional Government had been constituted. Clearly these Governments were incapable of providing stability to Russia and tackling its pressing problems. Sensing their own incompetence, the Government became more and more defensive. They began directing their anger against the Bolsheviks, who were the only group among the socialists which had not joined the Provisional Government.

Orders were issued for the arrest of Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders like Zinoviev and Kamenev. Lenin and Zinoviev evaded arrest and escaped to Finland while Kamenev got arrested. It was at this time that Trotsky and several other members of the Menshevik party decided to join the Bolsheviks. They too were promptly arrested.

Throughout this period, there was growing unrest in the countryside. Thoroughly disillusioned with one Provisional Government after another, the peasants decided to carry out a veritable agrarian revolution on their own. They seized the estates of the landlords and began cultivating them with the help of local land committees. Peasant anger also found reflection in the army, as more and more soldiers began deserting the war front and returning to the villages.

5.5.5 Mutiny Of Kornilov

Thereafter, events moved with lightning speed. In August 1917 there was an attempt at a military coup. General Kornilov, the head of the armed forces, had been invited by Kerensky to the capital in order to help him crush the Bolshevik forces. But Kornilov exceeded his brief. He thought he could seize this opportunity to wipe out not just the Bolsheviks but also the Soviets, the moderate Socialists and Kerensky himself!

The Kerensky government was panic-stricken. It realized that it could not defeat the forces of Kornilov without the help of the Bolsheviks, many of whom were behind bars. They were released. Trotsky's services were sought for obtaining the help of the Kronstadt sailors (Kronstadt was a naval base outside Petrograd), who were extremely radical and powerful. Trotsky used to address the Kronstadt sailors frequently. They faithfully followed him, even idolized him. The Soviets formed a

Notes

Committee for struggle against Counter-Revolution. Kornilov's troops deserted him. The railway workers stopped his trains, the telegraph operators refused to relay his messages.

This aborted military coup clearly showed where the actual power resided. The Kerensky Government had lost face and credibility. A fifth Provisional Government was formed on 21 September. It had ten Socialist ministers and six others. The Bolsheviks continued to steer clear of the government. However, they were steadily gaining more and more seats in the Soviets.

In October 1917, following a series of defeats in the war, the Provisional Government planned to shift the capital from Petrograd to Moscow. This was seen by the people as the final act of betrayal and the Bolsheviks, along with the Soviets, called for a defence of Petrograd as the capital of the revolution. They managed to get the support of all the parties and the Provisional Government thereby stood exposed.

Lenin, though still in hiding, had moved closer to the scene of action by this time. In a short article titled 'The Crisis is Ripe', he wrote: "we stand on the threshold of a worldwide proletarian revolution". It was important to seize the moment – the timing was crucial. Trotsky on the other hand was adamant that any armed insurrection must coincide with the convening of the All Russian Congress of Soviets. Lenin warned that if they were to "let slip the present moment, we shall ruin the revolution". On 9 October Lenin came to Petrograd in disguise and on 10 October the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party met. By a majority vote of 10 to 2, the Committee voted in favour of armed insurrection. A 'political bureau' consisting of seven members was to be formed to carry out the task. In the meantime, the Petrograd Soviet had also formed a Military Revolution Committee (MRC) to make the military preparations for the coming resolution.

Thereafter the Bolsheviks and the Soviets began acting in unison in the countdown for the revolution. In any case the Soviet had already assumed the responsibility for the defence of the capital, thus lifting itself to a new prominence and authority which would enable it to undo the Provisional Government.

5.5.6 Taking Bower: Bolsheviks

25 October (7 November according to the English Calendar) was the date fixed for the revolution. The All Russian Congress of Soviets was to meet in the evening and the insurrection was to be carried out before that. The final touches were given on the eve of the revolution. The members of the Bolshevik Central Committee along with those of the MRC took charge of the different arms of the government – posts and telegraphs, railway communications, food supplies and even the Provisional Government itself!

Early on the morning of the 25th, Bolshevik forces went into action. The key points in the city were occupied and members of the Provisional Government were taken into custody. There was virtually no resistance to this takeover. The news agency, Renters, reported only two casualties whereas in February over 1000 people had been killed or wounded.

In the afternoon, Lenin announced to a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, the triumph of the workers' and the peasants' revolution. In the evening, the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the transfer of all power to the Soviets throughout Russia. It may be mentioned here that when the first All Russian Congress of Soviets had been convened in June 1917 the Bolsheviks had been treated with disdain. One of the speakers had challenged the delegates to say whether there was a single party in Russia that was prepared to shoulder the responsibility for government. Lenin had got up and said that his party was willing to do so. His words were drowned in hilarious laughter.

Now Lenin had shown that he meant what he had said. In the confused, ever changing scenario that had unfolded from February to October, it was the Bolsheviks alone, under the leadership of Lenin that had understood the needs of the people and assessed the true strengths and weaknesses of the various classes in the country. It had figured out that the capitalist class was a weak one, whereas the peasantry had revolutionary potential.

It was with this clarity of perspective that, on the day following the revolution, three Decrees were promulgated: The Decree on Peace, the Decree on Bread and the Decree on Land. These were the three issues that were uppermost in the minds of the Russian people: they wanted Russia to pull out of the war immediately; they wanted amelioration of

the conditions of acute food scarcity; and the redistribution of the large landed estates. Though the Land Decree proclaimed that henceforth there would be no private property in land and all land was to pass into the hands of the Soviets, it was realized that the small peasants would be unwilling to part with their lands yet. Hence the Land Decree was only partially implemented.

5.5.7 Early Legislation Of New Regime

The new regime was keen to show that it represented a radically new and different order. All institutions and customs associated with the autocracy were to be abolished. All ranks, titles and decorations were to be done away with. Army commanders as well as judges were to be elected. All agencies of local government were set aside and replaced by a hierarchy of Soviets. Women were given equal rights with men. All banks and joint stocks companies were nationalized. Payment of interests and dividends were prohibited. Safe deposit boxes were opened and all valuables confiscated, since they were now considered national property. In January 1918, it was announced that ill state foreign and domestic loans would be annulled. This caused the new regime to become extremely unpopular, especially in the eyes of those countries which had loaned large sums for Russian's industrialization.

In the factories, an eight hour day was introduced. For the first time in the world, workers' control of industrial enterprises became legal.

Universal labour service was introduced and only those with workers' books could receive rations. Lenin explained that his immediate purpose in introducing compulsory labour service was to fight the forces of counter-revolution. Many of these policies were to be revised and even reversed later. But the commitment to ending Russia's involvement in the war was steadfast and so was that of redistributing the nobility's estates amongst the peasants. These were the reasons for the survival of the Bolsheviks and the spreading of their influence in the crucial months after the October Revolution.

5.6 RESPONSES AND REACTIONS

5.6.1 The Heritage Of Russian Revolution

The new regime set up by the Bolsheviks survived no doubt with many changes and even distortions, for some seventy-odd years, until the 1990s. Though regarded with apprehension, suspicion and at times with awe, Soviet Russia influenced the course of events in many parts of the world, sometimes in predictable but more often in unpredictable ways. Some historians regard the Russian Revolution as the most significant event of the twentieth century and see most of the major developments in the world during this period and even thereafter, as being related to this event in some way or the other. In the words of E. J. Hobsbawm in his *Age of Extremes*.....with the significant exception of the years from 1933 to 1945, the international politics of the entire Short Twentieth Century since the October revolution can best be understood as a secular struggle by the forces of the old order against social revolution, believed to be embodied in, allied with, or dependent on the fortunes of the Soviet Union and international communism.... The old order was that of capitalism and imperialism. It felt threatened by the onset of socialism from the very outset. When Russia signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk with Germany in March 1918 and pulled out of the First World War, the Allies felt betrayed. They regarded this action as strengthening the hands of Germany, their enemy; even though Soviet Russia had pulled out of the War as much because it could no longer sustain the war effort as because of the ideological commitment of the Bolsheviks to end all imperialist wars.

The subsequent surge of confidence amongst all left-minded groups in Europe and in other parts of the world caused great alarm to entrenched political systems based on exploitation and maximization of profit. A revolutionary wave swept Europe in 1918 and 1919, with German revolutionary sailors carrying the banner of the Soviets through the country. Spanish revolutionaries experienced a new burst of energy, a short lived socialist republic was proclaimed in Bavaria in 1918 and another one in Hungary in March 1919. Other parts of the world were also in ferment. "Soviets" were formed by tobacco workers in Cuba, revolutionary student movements erupted in Argentina and in China. In

Notes

Mexico, the revolutionary forces under Erniliano Zapata now drew inspiration from revolutionary Russia and in India too, M.N.Roy and later many others were greatly influenced by communism. Jawaharlal Nehru has explained, in his Autobiography, what Russia meant to people like him:Russia, following the great Lenin, looked into the future and thought only of what was to be, while other countries lay numbed under the dead hand of the past and spent their energy in preserving the useless relics of a bygone age.....Yet, there were certain negative aspects too. There was a strong authoritarian streak in Bolshevism which carried over into Communist Russia as well. The spirit of democracy was often compromised with individual Communist Parties which were set up in different countries were too closely tied to the apron strings of the Comintern (The Communist International, set up by Soviet Russia in 1919 to promote the world revolution) for them to grow in a healthy, organic fashion. Within Russia too, especially in the Stalinist years, terror and dictatorial methods became the order of the day and a bureaucratic machine replaced the Soviets which had caught the imagination of the world.

Though Stalin's Russia heroically defended itself against the onslaught of Hitler and was responsible for beating back the forces of Fascism to a significant extent, in the years that followed the regime turned inwards, drawing an iron curtain across Europe and cutting itself off from the outside world. Anti cosmopolitanism and xenophobia came to replace the internationalism of the early years and that was the great irony. It negated the very spirit of the Russian Revolution, which had an ingrained internationalism, which had discarded old divisions of nationality as obsolete and whose vanguard, the Bolshevik, had once proudly regarded himself as a citizen of the world.

5.7 LET US SUM UP

This Unit was a discussion of the Russian Revolution, as an important political phenomenon of the 20th century that had global implications. One major feature of the Russian Revolution was that although the revolution occurred in Russia, it was not conceived of as a national event

but rather as a global event. It was hoped and anticipated that a series of socialist revolutions in various parts of the world would cumulatively create a world revolution. The leaders of the revolution actually provided a theory of the transformation of the world from a capitalist order into a socialist one. The revolution inspired similar activities in other parts of the world and also motivated a number of anti-imperialist liberation struggles taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America against colonial domination.

5.8 KEYWORDS

- 1) **Proletariat:** working-class people regarded collectively (often used with reference to Marxism)
- 2) **Bolsheviks:** a member of the majority faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party, which seized power in the October Revolution of 1917
- 3) **Mensheviks:** a member of the moderate non-Leninist wing of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party opposed to the Bolsheviks and defeated by them after the overthrow of the Tzar in 1917.
- 4) **Intelligentsia:** intellectuals or highly educated people as a group, especially when regarded as possessing culture and political influence.
- 5) **October Revolution:** Also known as the Great October Socialist Revolution, Red October, the October Uprising or the Bolshevik Revolution, was a seizure of state power instrumental in the larger Russian Revolution of 1917. It took place with an armed insurrection in Petrograd on 25 October, 1917.

5.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

- 1) Why did the Socialist Revolution take place in Russia?
- 2) In what ways were the ideas of the Socialist Revolution different from manner in which the revolution actually came about?
- 3) Write a note on the legacy of the Russian Revolution.

5.10 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agatha Ramm : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 1789-1905.*

James Joll : *Europe Since 1870.*

David Thomson : *Europe Since Napoleon.*

Owen and Sutcliffe. (ed.) : *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*

5.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) Russian Proletariat, Tsarist Despotism, December Uprising, Russian Intelligentsia, Populist, Growth of Socialist Democracy. (for explanation see section 5.2)

2) On 9 January 1905, a huge crowd of workers, led by a priest, Father Gapon, marched towards the Winter Palace to submit a petition to the Tsar, Nicholas II. This was intended to be a peaceful procession and the participants had full faith in the Tsar. The Tsarist Guards received the petitioners with a hail of bullets. Over a hundred fell dead, many more were injured. This was the last straw. It was also the signal for the revolution which culminated in October Revolution.

UNIT-6: SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS

STRUCTURE

- 6.0 Objectives
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Further Developments in USSR (1945-64)
- 6.3 Monumental phase of Socialist Industrialization
- 6.4 The Private Sector
- 6.5 Spread of Soviet Model in Eastern Europe
 - 6.5.1 Hungary
 - 6.5.2 Rumania
 - 6.5.3 Poland
 - 6.5.4 Czechoslovakia
 - 6.5.5 Bulgaria
 - 6.5.6 East Germany (German Democratic Republic)
 - 6.5.7 Yugoslavia
- 6.6 The Achievements of Socialist Industrialization in Eastern Europe
- 6.7 Socialist Initiatives outside Soviet Bloc
- 6.8 Summary
- 6.9 Keyword
- 6.10 Questions For Review
- 6.11 Suggested Readings And References
- 6.12 Answers To Check Your Progress

6.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit we will study how Russian model was applied differently in the countries under the Soviet influence which gradually gave way to the dominant capitalist system

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This Unit will give us the idea about the way Soviet experiment in application of the socialist model underwent various phases in

accordance with the demands of the time. We will see how it was not a model which could completely shun the principles of market economy, but tried very often to overcome the restrictions put in its way.

6.2 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN USSR (1945-64)

Collectivization, the Planned Economy, nationalized banking and the prevalence of large trusts in industry and trade (often called 'kombinaty') were to be the hallmarks of Soviet socialism for the next fifty years. The institutions came to represent economic socialism. The Soviet government undertook large projects within the framework of the system (such as General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's 'Virgin Lands' scheme to increase land under cultivation). A major feature of the economy for the whole period was the use of revenue for arms industries and expansion of the armed forces with only a marginal eye to improvement of consumer goods. The mechanism of the Planned Economy made this possible.

Innovations did take place. Some were undertaken with a fixed eye to collective enterprise; some were undertaken with an eye to a decrease of the burden on agriculture, and some bearing in mind the private sector that survived in agriculture. In the case of the burden on agriculture, for instance, procurement prices were increased after 1952 to set right the anomalous nature of prices paid to the kolkhoz - which were often insufficient to meet the cost of delivery of collective farm products. Taxes on private plots in agriculture were substantially reduced. Various experiments of the post 1952 period, however, with no attention to local circumstances, indicated often how the Planning system could be misused. After 1956, for instance, Nikita Khrushchev, the Party General Secretary, disapproved of the cultivation of grasses (for fodder): and many fields were dug up just because of this disapproval. Attempts at decentralizing the Planning process through the creation of 'sovnarkhozy' - in principle admirable for the increase of popular involvement - merely led to 'localism' in industrial policy. This meant that the broad sense that planners had, as well as their knowledge, was

wholly downplayed, and ridiculous instances of local favouritism crept into economic development.

6.3 MONUMENTAL PHASE OF SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

This last phase of socialist industrialization has attracted imaginative comment recently. Stephen Kotkin, for instance, in his *Magnetic Mountain*, (University of California Press, 1995), proceeds far beyond the position of Alec Nove and his sympathizers. Nove stresses the inefficiencies and bottlenecks of the planned economy, as well as the imaginative ideas that went into it, while Kotkin regards such un-integrated treatment, or a fixation with Bolshevik ideology, to be a limited perspective. Providing a picture which goes beyond these perspectives, Kotkin's focus is Magnitogorsk i.e. the steel production centre created during the First Five Year Plan in the high flatlands of the Urals, on the Ural River, by Magnetic Mountain. Kotkin treats the city as a microcosm of Soviet life. He shows how this putative showcase for Soviet socialist living came to be conceived; how the plans for its construction were pell mell executed and how 'the idiocy of urban life' was the consequence.

The 'heroic', 'breakneck' construction of the factory complex at Magnetic Mountain is reduced to a farce in Kotkin's history. He points out that the location itself was deemed questionable and, despite later legend, the complex got off the ground slowly. The reality was a shoddy plant where there were 550 stoppages of work in the first year alone and ultimate closure for complete reconstruction in November 1933.

Expansion at Magnitogorsk, in the years to come, followed a pattern common to the Planned Economy. Over invoicing, cooked books, exaggerated statistics of production and mismanagement for the sake of record and rhetoric was meticulously documented by Kotkin. It further lays behind the construction of blast furnaces, coke batteries, open-hearth ovens and blooming mills. Much of this held good for industrial expansion in established sites in the Ukraine and St. Petersburg. It also held good for new sites such as Kuznetsk.

There was often little choice of whether to go or not, and mobilization went along the lines described by one labourer: ‘Comrades, you’re going to Magnitka. Do you know what Magnitka is?’ ‘No, we haven’t a clue”, he further replied, “unfortunately neither do I, but you’re going to Magnitka all the same”. Social and family life in the city’s cold and isolation degenerated into cards, drinking, abuse and delinquency, despite the efforts of the Komsomol and Party stalwarts. The various ‘clubs’ for locals were characterized by lack of heating and other elementary facilities; poor urban communications, appalling distribution arrangements for essentials (all planned with a lack of appreciation for local requirements) left little time for recreation and culture. The only hot spots in this mess were the Magnit cinema hall, the circus and a small local theatre. Little wonder that many who came initially arrived on short contracts, and fled at the earliest. When passports were introduced to restrict movements, a trade in false documents quickly ensued. In such conditions, the lexicon of Soviet achievement was spread; the bruited of socialist attainments and the ‘heroic’ depiction of every venture compelled public wonder for what was often little better than a cloacae. Equally, the labour achievement awards for Stakhanovites, the ‘proper’ classification and description of workers, and the ‘proper’ recording of worker biographies, providing the necessary terms, gave the inhabitants of the socialist urban complex their social identity. As Kotkin points out, however, many failed to play their allotted role, just as solid proletariat refused to lay off rearing goats and cows, despite the exhortations of Party faithful.

6.4 THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Imaginative though Kotkin’s perspective is, it fails to detail the strength of private enterprise in the midst of this ‘planned system’ or ‘command economy’. In agriculture, this was crucial, as indicated in the following statistics of kolkhoz market sales (i.e. returns from the sale of produce from private plots in the collective farm). At a time when kolkhoz incomes in total came to about 12.5 billion roubles, such sales provided (in billions of roubles):

1940--29.1 Roubles

1950--49.2 Roubles

1951--50.8 Roubles

1952-- 53.7 Roubles

Source: Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*

In industry also, however, there was a tendency for various deals to be made within the framework of the plan as many memoirs have recently pointed out. The dynamic role of management in the Soviet space is rarely discussed as yet, the assumption being that blind following of the plan was the order of the day. Soviet sources, who always congratulated themselves, give the impression that whatever the Party said was good enough. They rarely show (except in stray incidents) how planned production worked, despite many obstacles, and how it also created a space for aggrandizement which gave the enterprise under socialist industrialization a dynamic of its own.

6.5 SPREAD OF THE SOVIET MODEL IN EASTERN EUROPE

After the Second World War, Eastern European countries and the Baltic states adopted many aspects of the Soviet model, although they initially favoured very moderate versions of it since, unlike the case of Russia in 1917, the state had hitherto played a moderate role in the economy. In the Baltic States, the assimilation into Soviet practice was quick, since Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became members of the USSR. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the move came after the statement of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the Marshall Plan and the formation of the Cominform (1947). After this the USSR encouraged countries under its political control to adopt its own perspectives on economic development. The Soviet model's crucial role in the region's economic development was the result of the USSR's post-war military presence in the region and its position as the main recipient of reparations from Hungary and Rumania, who had supported the Axis powers. In a departure from what occurred in the Soviet Union, though, almost in all cases, in the form of socialist industrialization that took place, small-scale cultivation played

an important part in agriculture, although collectivization was encouraged in the years after 1949 for a brief period, and various measures were taken to hold such cultivation together in collective or cooperative enterprise. Hungary, (and to some extent Rumania) were slightly exceptional. Here large state farms also had a major role in agriculture. This was an outcome of the organization of agriculture in Hungary and Rumania before 1945, when large latifundia played a considerable part in agriculture. The share of such latifundia substantially passed on to the state.

A decade-long experience of extreme varieties of Soviet-style planning and state control in these countries came under the aegis of the Cominform and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, acting in tandem as sources of pressure, in the period after 1949. A good deal of industrial output was sold to the USSR at reduced rates (sometimes linked to reparations, as in the case of Hungary and East Germany, but sometimes not, as in the case of Poland). The 'Stalinist' experiment was subject to major attacks during the mid 1950s (during the disturbances in Hungary and Poland in 1956), but it was only modified in any meaningful manner after the approval to economic reform by the Soviet economist Liberman in the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* in September 1962. Here, the reform focused on: a reduction in planned targets; a greater stress on profitability; economic rewards for efficiency; greater variety in pricing; greater industrial concentration, accompanied by decentralization. Stiffer controls were reintroduced rapidly, though, after 1968 (and the move against economic reform in Czechoslovakia). The only country which was able to maintain its reforms was Hungary, where, despite the ups and downs of the reform system, imports of Western technology, relative freedom of movement abroad and encouragement of small-scale private industry became a permanent feature of the country by the late 1970s. In all countries, increase of Soviet oil prices in 1975 seriously destabilized the economies.

6.5.1 Hungary

With Soviet occupation, a Hungarian National Independence Front, comprising a number of radical and socialist parties formed a Provisional Government (December 1944) which quickly moved towards economic

reform. At the time, large-scale private wealth dominated the economy. In agriculture, there existed a number of latifundia or great estates that were commercially oriented and that were owned by aristocratic families (Esterhazys, Szechenyis, Karolyis and others). Smallholdings which belonged to peasant proprietors were divided: some were very small, others substantial and geared to the market. Industry was concentrated, with the Credit Bank and the Commercial Bank having major shares in over 60% of what there was, and a number of important players running the important manufactures (the Vida, Kornfeld, Weiss and Dreher-Haggenmacher families primarily).

The reforms came in the following stages:

- i) In January 1945, workers control was introduced in almost all industry through a decree which gave major powers to factory committees.
- ii) By a decree of 17th March, the great estates were taken over by the state, as were the holdings of the Catholic Church. Almost all peasant farms were exempt from the decree. About 60% of the land was distributed - a large portion going to agricultural labourers and small-scale proprietors.
- iii) Despite the success of the non-socialist parties in the elections of November 1945, pressures from Soviet forces, the Communist and Socialist parties and a section of the Smallholders' Party forced through the nationalization of four of the country's largest industrial enterprises.
- iv) A Three Year Plan was adopted in July 1947. In the wake of the political crisis of 1947 (after the elections of August) in November 1947, nationalization of the major banks followed, as did the adoption of a Three Year Plan. On 25th March 1948, the nationalization of factories employing more than 100 workers took place.

The implementation of the reforms fell to the Hungarian Working People's Party, which was created from a fusion of the Social Democrat and Communist Parties in June 1948. This party was reconstituted in 1956 as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Both before and after 1956, the party dominated the government and followed the model of the Soviet economy. In the period up to 1956, intensive industrialization was the order of the day, with a stress on capital goods industries. Hence, under the first Five Year Plan (1950-54), industrial production increased by 130%, and machine

industry production by 350%. There was little development of consumer industry, and collectivization of agriculture was encouraged. After 1956, cooperativization among small-holders, rather than collectivization, became the goal of the socialist economy, and a greater diversification into consumer industry was noticeable.

Under the New Economic Mechanism (launched on 1st January 1968), steps to develop a programme of 'liberalization' were undertaken. These involved greater imports of Western technology and freer travel abroad and independence to major enterprises: measures devised by Rezso Nyers, the country's best known 'reformist'. Increases of oil prices by the USSR led to a restoration of controls on enterprises, and heavy subsidies to maintain low domestic prices (and Nyers' removal from the Politburo). A return to a reform programme began in 1977, with restrictions on private farmers relaxed in 1980 (they were permitted to acquire machinery), gradual division of large enterprises and license to small foreign firms to work in the country. Prices were permitted to rise in 1979 (to allow them to come to world levels) and in 1982, the country joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Attempts to return to a system of controls and subsidies in 1985 led to the consolidation of a dissident radical group in the country under Imre Pozsgay. The group's influence was felt when long-serving President Janos Kadar was forced to step down (22 May 1988), Pozsgay was admitted to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in a prelude to Hungary's quiet revolution of 1989.

6.5.2 Rumania

Soviet troops were in occupation of Rumania from August 1945, although the Communists (the Rumanian Workers' Party) only formally established control over the government of the country after the abdication in 1947 of King Michael. Under occupation a number of steps were taken to adapt the economy to the Soviet model. The main stages of the adaptation of the Rumanian economy to the Soviet model were:

- i) The dissolution of the main Rumanian banks in August 1948 and concentration of financial activities in the National Bank of Rumania (later the Bank of the Rumanian People's Republic).
- ii) The formation of a number of joint stock companies (Sovroms) based on Soviet and Rumanian government investments in various industries -

iron and steel, where (the Resita organization was transformed into a Sovrom), petroleum, where the Sovrompetrol was formed, insurance and mining. Here the USSR took over the German and Hungarian shares in the industries concerned by a law of April 1946. During 1954-56, Soviet shares in industry were systematically transferred to the Rumanian state.

iii) The creation of centres of control for the mining industry in 1948 at Bai Mare (northern Transylvania) and Brad (Bihar Mountains, central Transylvania).

- v) The promulgation of Land Reform Acts on March 22 1945 (mainly involving the expropriation of properties over 50 hectares) and March 2nd 1949 (which involved the confiscation of the land of property owners of more than 15,000 hectares). This intensified inter-war expropriation of large estates and redistribution of property. The main beneficiaries were peasants (who dominated the wool and subsistence agriculture oriented economy of the Carpathian uplands and Transylvania; but, as in Hungary, larger holdings were directly controlled by the state also the commercial grain economy of the Banat and the cash crop belt of the Carpathian lowlands (Moldavia and Wallachia), where vineyards and market gardens are common. The considerable influence in Rumania of the National Peasants' Party during 1944- 45, and thereafter of peasant proprietors in general ensured that peasant ownership continued to be a decisive feature of the Rumanian economy until recent times. Industry was dominated by state ownership, though, a small private sector (especially in trade) persisted even after large scale nationalization of the trading apparatus. Investments under the Rumanian Five Year Plans were directed to oil-based industry, commercial agriculture and timber felling and export.

6.5.3 Poland

The Polish Committee of National Liberation undertook the application of the Soviet model of socialist economic development to Poland.

Formed in 1944, this was the core of the post 1945 government. The

Notes

main features of the socialist transition (eventually supervised by the Polish United Workers' Party) were:

i) The decree of 6 September 1944, which confiscated all landholdings above 50 hectares. This followed up legislation of the inter-war period which pushed through redistribution of great estates. Together with the confiscation of Church land ((1950), the 1944 measure increased the domination of agriculture by peasant holdings, albeit to the advantage of richer peasants. Hence, while 65% of the land was held in allotments of under 10 hectares, over 33% was still held in allotments of between 10 and 50 hectares. Polish governments did not focus on collectivization after redistribution, except for a brief period during 1947- 53, when they encouraged collective farms, which only covered 10% of arable land by 1954, and maintained state farms. Collectives were allowed to dwindle after 1956 (in 1959 they only covered 1% of arable land). Since state farms came to 15% of the arable land at their peak, the bulk of agriculture was based on peasant smallholdings until the most recent times. The government tried various measures to induce collective activity (for instance the formation of Agricultural Circles in 1956, where members could rent machinery at reduced costs). These had hardly any effect.

ii) The formation of a Central Planning Office which organized a Three Year Plan (1947-49), and later a Six Year Plan for the economy. Most industrial production and mining were transferred to state hands after 1945. By 1949-50, 92% of industry was nationalized. Call for reform by Polish economists such as Lange and Brus in 1956 included demands for flexibility in approach to economic policy, encouragement of foreign investment and decentralization of industrial organization.

Demonstrations in favour of this intensification of the 'New Course' (initiated in 1953 by First Secretary Bierut after Stalin's death) merely led to a change in leadership in Poland (the selection of the 'moderate' Gomulka as head of the Party). Reforms after 1962 (concentrated around 1968-70) led to price increases and a wager on increased investment in 'modern industries' (machine building, electrical and chemicals). This in turn led to demonstrations against the effects of such measures (in December 1970) and to the ascendancy of Edward Gierek in the Polish Party.

6.5.4 Czechoslovakia

Soviet troops moved out of Czechoslovakia in November 1945. But a Works Council Movement began in 1945, which demanded nationalization of mines and industry, establishing workers' control. After initial reluctance by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to accept this nationalization plan, it gave way slowly, and measures in this vein were systematically undertaken, especially after 1947 and the statement of the Truman Doctrine and the formation of the Cominform. The pattern of land redistribution and rapid State takeover of industry was followed here as elsewhere:

- i) In March 1948, all estates of over 50 hectares were confiscated, redistribution and cooperativization were initiated. Thereafter, all cooperatives were merged into collective farms by a law of 23rd February 1949, which was enforced with special severity after 1953.
- ii) By 1949-50, 96% of industry was nationalized, after initial restraint in this area (in 1948, 20% of industry was still in private hands). Under planning, stress fell heavily on heavy industry and munitions production. A programme of economic reform was attempted under the encouragement of Alexander Dubcek and the economists Sik and Selucky (all of the Slovak republic) in 1968. This would have involved a degree of freedom to workers to demand wage increases, a freeing of prices and due allowance for the formation of private enterprises. The invasion by the Warsaw Pact of Czechoslovakia, however, forestalled the implementation of the programme.

6.5.5 Bulgaria

Collectivization was more marked here in the earlier stages of economic reform, although peasant production never ceased to be important. Small plots occupied 13% of the arable land in 1975, and produced 25% of produce (dominating potato and fruit output). A commitment to large scale industrialization developed in the late 1960s, when there was a move away from traditional stress on food processing.

- i) During 1945-48, landholdings were limited to 20 hectares, and holdings above this level were redistributed. Thereafter, smallholdings were merged into collective farms, and 50% of arable land was in these by 1953. All privately owned machinery and farm equipment was

compulsorily acquired by the state, and a kulak defined as one owning over 5 hectares. Proprietors owning over 10 hectares had to sell 75% of their grain crop to the state (1950), while collectives had their delivery quotas reduced (1953).

ii) By 1949/50, 95% of the limited industry that existed in the country was nationalized.

6.5.6 East Germany (German Democratic Republic)

Adaptation to the Soviet model began late here, since a myth was maintained that East Germany would be united with West Germany in the long term, and radical alteration in the production system was not a good idea considering this. Nationalization of industry and trade, however, began long before the formal decision to embark on socialist construction by the Socialist Unity Party in 1952 under the direction of Walter Ulbricht. Industry and trade in private hands (19% and 37% respectively) was taken over by the state thereafter, and collectivization of agriculture begun and intensified (especially after 1958). The Liberman-sanctioned reforms took shape in the GDR in the form of the New Economic System that lasted from 1963 to 1970 (when controls through Planning were intensified). Industrial production grew by 5.8% between 1960 and 1964, and 6.4% between 1964 and 1970. Per capita growth rate and increase in standard of living was of the order of 4.9% between 1970 and 1975. Abandonment of the New Economic System was marked by the dismissal of Gunter Mittag from the Council of State in 1971, and adaptation to increased Soviet oil prices (after 1975) by increases in state subsidies of domestic prices.

6.5.7 Yugoslavia

An alternative variety of socialist industrialization, the case of the Yugoslav Federation was marked by a 'mixed economy', where, like the other East European cases, emulation of the Soviet model was clear, but where a large non-state sector grew up over time. The following stages are noticeable in the Yugoslav model:

i) 1946 - a nationalization law which made permanent government takeover of most German and Italian property in the country.

ii) Redistribution of land in German hands and of holdings over 45 hectares to peasant proprietors. Peasant holdings were restricted to 20-25 hectares.

iii) Initiation of the First Five Year Plan. The USSR agreed to set up a number of joint ventures in shipping and air transport. But these were quickly closed down after the Yugoslavs considered these excessively favourable to the Soviet Union. Grants from UNRRA were very important in this early phase.

iv) Slow move away from the Soviet model, after the political break with the Soviet Union in 1948. This took time. Initially, the state favoured collectivization through concentration of peasant households in Peasant-Worker Cooperatives, in order to control grain marketing. But poor performance here and in nationalized industry under central direction led to the development of self-managed state enterprises (1950) and a decrease in interest in collective agriculture (although maximum holdings were reduced to a size of 10 hectares). The standard practice of using centralized investment was modified by the creation of communal banks that had their own sphere of investment.

After the First Five Year Plan, the planning system was amended to involve less of the 'command style' and permit greater cooperation between state industry, independent of the central (and state) planning commissions. The trend was assisted by investment from the USA, although government stress on the development of heavy industry and armaments industry persisted.

v) Following Stalin's death, relations with the Soviet bloc varied. Initially, improvements led to a large increase in trade with the CMEA countries. But continuous inflow of soft loans from the United States and good relations with Western Europe led to the development of several ventures in close association with these countries: ventures which were not guided rigidly by the Planning system. The significance of the state remained significant. Despite the existence of self-management, communal banks etc., the Central Investment Fund controlled 70% of investment and industry bore marks of political control. Marks of central control included the focus of investment in heavy industry and the existence of 'political factories', i.e. factories which were set up with noneconomic considerations in mind.

Notes

vi) Associate membership of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1960 led to pressure on the 1961-65 Five Year Plan and intensification of the move away from central control in the Planned Economy. Investment came increasingly from communal banks, and devaluation took place to encourage foreign trade. Initially, to curb inflation and maintain aspects of the old system, a wage freeze was initiated. But this situation proved unworkable, led to a debate on the future of the economy, and intensification of the development of private enterprise and decentralization after 1965 (in the so-called 'market oriented reforms').

vii) The new course (which involved the development of a commercial banking sector), received great impetus in the 1970s with the greater inflow of foreign loans, and, after 1979, the country moved into a debt crisis in which the political crisis of the late 1980s took shape, leading to the disintegration of the Federation.

Check Your progress-1

1) How did Soviet Model spread in other parts of Europe?

2) Describe the views of various thinkers on Socialist Industrialization.

6.6 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

As much of this system initially took shape, it was moulded by bilateral agreements with the USSR (for imports of primary products from the Soviet Union at exaggerated costs initially, and exports of primary and finished goods to the USSR at excessively reduced prices). Bilateral

trade between the countries was worked out within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. But such trade was notoriously lacking in a real bilateral quality: i.e. little trade developed according to the initiative of any two CMEA states independent of the rest. Common investments in Soviet oil and natural gas industries paid trumps for most CMEA countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when all of them received output at rates below the world price at a time of increases in oil prices in the West. All the countries benefited from the USSR's special relations with Angola, Mozambique, Syria, Iraq, Vietnam and India. Moreover, from June 1971, under the terms of the 'Complex Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and Development of Socialist Economic Integration' of the CMEA, coordination was given more importance, and its status rose in CMEA affairs. A number of international economic organizations were begun: the Interstate Commissions for the implementation of specific tasks; the International Bank for Economic Cooperation; the International Investment Bank; research and development coordinating centres and international laboratories. At various sessions of the Council during 1973-81, integration measures were introduced into the member countries' plans and harmonized into a coherent plan by the Committee for Cooperation and Planning.

Such measures did not come to much where it really mattered: in the development of technology which could compete with global standards after the information revolution. US blockade of sales of such technology to the 'east' was substantially responsible for this. Equally responsible, though, was inertia within state-run industry, which was willing to work with minor innovations, but unwilling to fundamentally change what existed. The resulting poor performance in trade relations with the West coincided with a major problem in the 1980s. The CMEA did not prevent member countries interacting with the West - either through trade or through application for loans. The decrease in oil prices globally in the 1980s, the refusal of the USSR to reduce its prices, and the high level of indebtedness of many CMEA countries (Poland and Yugoslavia especially) to the West led to a troubled situation. By 1989, the CMEA had ceased to be useful in almost any sense and had ceased to represent a common interest. Not only were some countries initiating experiments

with ‘market reforms’, but the common cause that had marked the bloc in the 1950s, 60s and 70s was gone.

6.7 SOCIALIST INITIATIVES OUTSIDE SOVIET BLOC

Attempts to rein in capitalism were common in a number of countries where socialists were powerful during the inter-war and post-Second World War period. In France, for instance, under Leon Blum and the Popular Front (1936-38), attempts were made to control capital transfers out of the country, and important steps were taken to establish state control over the munitions’ industry. Major reforms were introduced in the factories - where employers were compelled to give workers a minimum paid holiday each year, and where working hours were strictly limited. In Britain, after the Second World War, the Labour government nationalized the coal and steel industries and introduced the ‘welfare state’ (i.e. the National Health Scheme, which reduced health costs dramatically, as well as the introduction of unemployment benefit to the out-of-work). The Labour governments of Harold Wilson (1964-70), extended cheap housing for the population through the agency of local government, while socialist governments on the Continent introduced their own version of the ‘welfare state’ through systems of insurance. Much of this initiative was in imitation of the state-led model prevalent in the USSR (and Eastern Europe). But in developing their own focus on ‘insurance’ (where the state, the employer and the employee contributed to a common fund), countries such as France, Germany and Italy developed their own variety of ‘welfare’ which involved a smaller role for the state. This dimension to socialism outside the Soviet bloc is what made it unique. Accepting capitalist enterprise and a limited place for state initiative, it was strictly non-Leninist.

6.8 LET US SUM UP

In this Unit you have read about the way Soviet experiment in application of the socialist model underwent various phases in

accordance with the demands of the time. You have also read how it was not a model which could completely shun the principles of market economy, but tried very often to overcome the restrictions put in its way. There were contradictions from within and outside which eventually led to its disintegration. At the same time, the same model was applied differently even in the countries under the Soviet influence, which gradually gave way to the dominant capitalist system. Yet, it would be immature to argue that this model was a complete failure as it was this model which forced the so called capitalist economies of the Western Europe to integrate welfare economic principles and strengthen social distribution networks albeit with a limited role for the state. On the other hand, the criticisms of the capitalist economic system and visions of alternative models have continued to drive the thinkers and activists alike. It is in this respect that the theories of underdevelopment, especially in the context of the third world, have taken the centre-stage. About this you would read in the next Unit.

6.9 KEYWORDS

- 1) **Sovroms:** Joint stock companies in Romania
- 2) **Latifundia:** a large landed estate or ranch in ancient Rome or more recently in Spain or Latin America, typically worked by peasants or slaves.
- 3) **Cooperativisation:** A theory, where the people used to pool their resources in certain areas of activity.
- 4) **Cominform:** Founded in October 5, 1947, it derived its name from Communist Information Bureau, which is the common name for what was officially referred to as the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties.
- 5) **Sovnarkhozy:** Acronym for Sovety Narodnogo Khozyaistva, or Councils of the National Economy. They were state bodies for the regional administration of industry and construction in Russia and the USSR that existed from 1917 to 1932 and again from 1957 to 1965.

6.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

Notes

- 1) In what ways socialist industrialization is different from capitalist industrialization?
- 2) Was socialist industrialization a uniform policy initiative in the case of Soviet Russia? Comment.
- 3) How different was the experience of other countries under the hegemony of Soviet Russia in terms of socialist industrialization?

6.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agatha Ramm : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, 1789-1905.

James Joll : *Europe Since 1870*.

David Thomson : *Europe Since Napoleon*.

Owen and Sutcliffe. (ed.) : *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*

6.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) In the Baltic States, the assimilation into Soviet practice was quick, since Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became members of the USSR. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the move came after the statement of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the Marshall Plan and the formation of the Cominform (1947). After this the USSR encouraged countries under its political control to adopt its own perspectives on economic development.
- 2) In this we can discuss the views of Kotkin, Alec Nove, Marx etc (for explanation see section 6.3)

UNIT-7: NATIONALISM: FORMS, NATURE AND EFFECTS

STRUCTURE

7.0 Objectives

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Meaning

7.3 Nature

7.4 Types of Nationalism

7.4.1 Gellner's Typology

7.4.2 Anthony Smith--Typology

7.5 Stages in the Development of Nationalism

7.5.1 Nationalism before 1789

7.5.2 Modern Nationalism in 19th Century

7.6 Conservative Nationalism in late 19th century and early 20th century

7.6.1 Spread of National Ideas

7.6.1.1 Nationalism--Czechoslovakia

7.6.1.2 Nationalism-- Hungary

7.6.1.3 Nationalism--Poland

7.7 Effects of Nationalism

7.7.1 Authoritarianism and Modern State

7.7.2 The Nation States

7.7.3 National and Social Class vis-a-vis Germany and Britain

7.7.4 Italian Nationalism and Popular Mobilization

7.8 Summary

7.9 Keyword

7.10 Questions For Review

7.11 Suggested Readings And References

7.12 Answers To Check Your Progress

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you shall be able to learn: how the ideas of nationalism springs up in Europe; the contribution of nationalism and modern state in creating a nation-state; the role of language and democratic politics in mass mobilization and fostering the growth of nationalism and nation-state; and phases in growth of national identities in Eastern European countries.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Even though its idea can be traced back in time, nationalism in the modern sense emerged only during the 18th century in Western Europe. During the 19th and 20th centuries it disseminate throughout the world. Nationalism aligned with the modern state in giving rise to nation-state. In certain cases, the modern state fostered a spirit of nationalism to provide the people living within geographical boundaries with a viable nationalist ideology. Both together they gave rise to popular mobilizations which further strengthened the state and helped the formation of nation-states.

7.2 MEANING

During a lecture in March 1882 at Sorbonne, the French orientalist and historian Ernest Renan pointed that the nation was an incorporeal and intangible community which wished to uphold its sense of unity through a day to day vote of confidence. In a tract entitled ‘Marxism and the

National Question', Joseph Stalin pointed that, "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture". Though Renan offered an 'idealist' definition of the nation as against the 'materialist' analysis of Stalin, it is interesting that both authors believed that there was nothing eternal or everlasting about nations and hence a state of flux.

Hans Kohn, regarded as one of the founders of the academic study of nationalism pointed that "nationalities are products of the living forces of history and therefore always fluctuating; never rigid". Neither they are identical to clans, tribes and folk-groups nor they a simple outcome of common descent or common habitat. Kohn noted that, "Ethnographic groups like these existed throughout history, since time immemorial, yet they do not form nationalities; they are nothing but 'ethnographic material' out of which under special circumstances a nationality might arise. Even if a nationality arises, it may disappear and dissolve again, absorbed into a larger or new nationality." Kohn argued that, "both the idea and the form of nationalism were developed before the age of nationalism". The idea of nationalism was traceable to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. The idea of the chosen masses, the feeling of national history and national Messianism were important qualities of nationalism which emerged with the ancient Jews. But he acknowledged that despite their "fierce nationalist ideology", the Greeks lacked "political nationalism". Also there was only a brief period of patriotism during the Persian Wars.

Although it is possible to trace the idea of a nation to the earliest times and certainly to the 16th century - as in the case of the German word Volk for people - there is considerable unanimity among historians that nationalism is a modern concept. Despite other disagreements, scholars like Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm agree that nationalism is a phenomenon which emerged in the 18th century in Western Europe and then spread during the 19th and 20th centuries to the eastern parts of the world. It is the considered view of historians that industrial capitalism or print capitalism are the forbearers of nationalism in the modern sense which was then sustained by a variety of factors like

notions of community based on language, ethnicity or religion or by the rivalry and competition among states and imagined communities. Within the Marxist tradition, the definition of the nation has evolved from the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Hobsbawm. Broadly speaking, the nation is regarded as a historically evolved phenomenon which emerges only with decline of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Tribes, clans and peoples existed prior to the emergence of capitalism but it was because of new economic scenarios produced by the emergence of the capitalist means of production that nations were created. Nationalism was regarded as an ideological construct which enabled the bourgeoisie class to identify its interests as a class with the interests of the whole society. Hobsbawm pointed that nations and nationalist aspirations have to be examined in, “the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development”. Though essentially constructed from above, nationalism cannot be understood unless it is also pondered from below i.e in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, aspirations, longings and interests of common people which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist".

7.3 NATURE

The modern concept of the nation emerged during the Age of Revolution i.e the American Revolution of 1776 A.D and the French Revolution of 1789 A.D. In America political discourse did not harp on the unitary aspect of nationalism as the Americans were concerned with the sacrosanct rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness coupled with the proper relation between the American union and the states and with development of a liberal capitalist society. By contrast in France the nation was conceived as “one and united”. The idea of the nation was intricately linked up with mass participation, citizenship and collective sovereignty of the people or of a given nationality. Hobsbawm draws a distinction between the revolutionary democratic and nationalist conception of the nation. In the revolutionary democratic view of the nation the sovereign citizen people within a state constituted a nation in

relation to others whereas in the nationalist view the “prior presence” of some differentiating features of a community, setting it apart from others, was necessary to constitute a nation. The French insistence on linguistic constancy after the Revolution was quite strong but the Revolution itself highlighted how only a microscopic minority spoke about it. In the revolutionary French concept of the State, the readiness to speak French, by non-French speakers in France, was one of the prerequisite for full French citizenship.

In the case of Italy the only basis for unification/integration and nationalism was the Italian language. In 1860 when Italian unification was achieved only two and a half percent of the population used the language on daily basis. The prophet of Italian nationalism, the leader of Young Italy i.e Mazzini believed that the popular sovereignty of the nation must be inseparable and that various proposals for a federal and united Italy were mere mechanisms for ensuring the continuity of local ruling classes. Mazzini also believed that the Italian people had to be ‘created’ so as to overcome the division of Italy, although he had an occult faith in the inviolability and unity of the popular will. Mazzini pointed that writers must, “reconnoitre the needs of the peoples” so that Italian literature could rejuvenate the nation. Literature could be a sine quo non and help to shape political development.

The growth of nationalism can be broadly divided into two phases. The first phase occurs before the late 18th century when certain initial notions of national unity can be said to have existed. Its chronology varies from one country to another but these ideas of geographical or cultural unity were only progenitor to the modern nationalism. The latter takes shape only in the wake of French Revolution, except perhaps in the cases of Britain and France where the nation-building work had been going on since 16th century and 17th century respectively.

7.4 TYPES OF NATIONALISM

The above explanation for the rise of nationalism must take into account two factors. One, nationalism could not have risen in a day but its emergence was spread over stages which need to be located at various

Notes

points in the evolution and revamping of the world from the agrarian to the industrial. The section above constructed two ideal types of human societies, the agrarian that was largely impervious to nationalism and the industrial that appeared destined to be a prone nationalist. The two formations must certainly not have existed in their pure form in most cases. But most agrarian societies would have shown resemblance to the model constructed above.

Likewise, the advanced industrial societies should possess the qualities listed in our description of the industrial society. The timing, pace and trajectory of the evolution from one to the other would inevitably vary from place to place. The main point is that the different stages in the arrival of nationalism are related to this mutation. Since the very nature of this evolution was different for different societies, the stages of nationalism also varied. It is, therefore, not possible to construct uniformity in stages applicable to all parts of the world. It is also important to note that nationalism, like other global phenomena (capitalism, imperialism and colonialism) materialize through stages and not in a single motion.

Two, nationalism arrived in stages, but nowhere did it replicate itself in shape, form and size. Although the entire world changed drastically in the last 200 years from being completely nationalism free to being completely nationalism dominated, the nature of nationalism varied dramatically from area to area. So exaggerate is the change that some scholars have begun doubting the very existing of the generic category called nationalism. No two nationalisms are found to be similar, yet all nationalisms do share certain basic qualities. This indeed is the great irony of nationalism. To put it differently, nationalism changes its size and form in different societies yet retains its essence in all of them.

Nationalism led to the transformation of nations into nation-states but the procedure of this transformation varied.

The various nation-states of the modern world were created through varied routes, characterized by different kinds of nationalisms. A common myth has been to look at the arrival of nation-states through only two routes - the market and the protest, i.e., nationalism engendered by the market forces or by national movements. In fact the scope of nationalist experience is much more different than that.

7.4.1 Gellner's Typology

Gellner wrote exclusively about Europe. He divided Europe into four spheres travelling from west to east and prepared four different types of nationalisms applicable to each sphere. Gellner understood nationalism in terms of a marriage between the state and a pervasive high-culture and saw four different patterns of this marriage in the four European zones. Zone 1 is located on the western belt consisting of England, France, Portugal and Spain and witnessed a smooth and easy marriage of the two as both the ingredients (state and high-culture for the defined territory) were present before to the advent of nationalism. In Gellner's metaphor, the couple were already living together in a kind of customary marriage and the strong dynastic states more or less corresponded to cultural linguistic zones even before the decree of nationalism ordered them to do so. In other words, these societies fulfilled the nationalist principle before the advent of nationalism. Only the minor cultural vagaries within these societies needed to be systematized; peasants and workers had to be educated and morphed into Englishmen, Frenchmen etc. Needless to interpret, that this procedure was smooth and conflict free as it did not require any violence for the accomplishment of the nationalist principle.

Zone II (present day Italy and Germany) situated on the area of the bygone Holy Roman Empire was different from Zone 1 in the sense that, metaphorically speaking, the bride (high culture for the territory) was ready (for Italians from the days of early Renaissance and for Germans since the days of Martin Luther) but the groom was absent (a State for exclusive territory). Whereas strong dynastic states had metamorphosed in zone 1 along the Atlantic coast, this zone was marked by political stratification. The era of nationalism, which had found both the elements--state and high culture for the territory--present in Zone 1, found only one (high culture) in Zone II. So, although no 'cultural engineering' or ethnic cleansing was required here, a state-protector correlating to the area had to be found or created. It was for this reason the nationalist project here had to be concerned with 'integration'. Here also, as in Zone I, nationalism was amiable, benign, congenial and conflict-free. There were no claims and counter-claims for the territory. Culturally similar

Notes

territories did not have to be carved out; they already existed. The high-culture also persisted; it only needed to reach out to peasants and workers.

It is in Zone III (Poland, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Balkans etc.) that nationalism ceased to be amiable and liberal and had to necessarily be unpleasant, abominable and obnoxious. The horrors, generally associated with nationalism were inevitable here as neither of the two preconditions (state and high-culture) existed in a clear congruent fashion. Both a national state and a national culture had to be carved out. This process required violence, ethnic cleansing and forced transfer of population in an area marked by a complex patch work of linguistic and cultural differences. The cultures living at the margins of the two empires (Ottoman and Russian) did not correspond either with a territory or language or state. Here, in order to meet and fulfil the nationalist imperative (passion for nationalism was quite strong in 19th century Europe), plenty of brutal earth-shifting had to be done in order to carve out areas of homogeneous cultures requiring their state. Culturally uniform nation-states could only be produced by violence and ethnic cleansing. To quote Gellner, 'In such areas, either people must be persuaded to forego the implementation of the nationalist ideal, or ethnic cleansing must take place. There is no third way.' (*Gellner, Nationalism*, p.56).

Zone IV is the area of Russian Empire on the farthest east in Europe. This zone was different in some ways. The First World War deleted the empires of the world (Habsburg, Ottoman and Tzarist Regimes) from the world map. Yet the Russian Empire survived under a new idea and the socialist ideology. The bonding of state and culture did not take place here or at any rate for a very long time. The nationalist imperatives were kept mercilessly under check by the Tzarist Empire and were contained creatively by the pseudo nationalist ideology of socialism. In fact many of the national cultures flourished under the USSR, some were even propagated by the State. There is no evidence that the collapse of the Soviet Russia in 1991 was brought by nationalism, but certainly nationalism gained by the disintegration of the empire. In other words the marriage of state and culture followed the dismemberment without causing it in any way. A high culture in different cultural zones had been in a

way nurtured by the socialist state and the other element--the state--simply arrived upon the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

7.4.2 Anthony Smith--Typology

Is it possible to create a similar categorization for the entire world?

Though a neat Zonal division of the world (along European lines) is difficult and the pattern would be much more complex, Anthony Smith has attempted some kind of a bifurcation of a world into different types of routes that nationalism takes in its journey towards creation of nation-states. His basic division is simple. The creation of nation-states has taken two routes - gradualist and nationalist. The gradualist route is generally conflict free and contest free and is one where the initiative was taken by the state to create conditions for the spread of nationalism. Nation-states were thus formed either by direct state sponsored patriotism (like zone I of Gellner) or were the result of colonization (Australia and Canada--they did not have to fight for independence) or provincialism where cultures/ states just ceded from the imperial power, were granted independence and were on their way towards becoming nation-states. One feature of the gradualist route is that it was marked by the absence of conflict, violence, contesting claims over nationhood or any other national movement. The nationalist route is characterized by rupture, conflict, violence and earth-moving. Smith divides this rupture-ridden route into two sub-routes - those of ethnic nationalism and territorial nationalism. These terms are self-evident and their meanings clear. The ethnic sub-route is divided into two lanes – based on renewal and secession. Renewal is based on the renewal or the revival of a declining ethnic identity like Prussia in the 1890s. The secessionist lane could be further divided into three by-lanes of breakaway, Diaspora and irredentist nationalism. The breakaway group (either from empires or multi-national states) sought to sever a bond through cessation like Italians and Czechs from the Habsburg Empire; Arabs, Armenians and Serbs from the Ottoman Empire; and Poles and Ukrainians from the Tsarist Russian Empire. Bangladesh that broke away from Pakistan in 1971 could also come in the same category.

The Diaspora nationalism is best represented by the Jews. Completely devoid of a state, territory of their own, or even a high-culture till the

mid-19th century, Jews lived for nearly two centuries like perpetual minorities on other people's lands. They were eventually constituted into a nation-state through struggle, other powers diplomacy, ethnic cleansing (done to them by others), earth moving and also by statistical probability of being on the right side in the great world war. Had the war gone the other way, we can be sure that Israel would not have been formed into a nation-state in 1949. The irredentist nationalism normally followed a successful national movement. If the new state did not include all the members of the ethnic group (this mildly violates the nationalist principle) who lived on the adjacent land under a different polity, they would have to be redeemed and the land on which they lived, annexed. This happened in Balkan nationalism among Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians and in Germany of Somalia today.

Territorial nationalism occurred when a diverse population was coercively united by a colonial power. The boundary of the territory and the centralized administration of the colonial power formed the focus of the nation in the making. On taking over power (invariably through a national movement) the nationalists try to integrate the culturally diverse population (tribes, various other cultural groups and people living on the margin), who had neither shared history nor common origin except colonial hegemony. This happened for instance in Tanzania and Argentina. In certain instances (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kenya, Nigeria) there were national movements that defined their aims in terms of wider territorial units, yet were clearly spearheaded by members of one dominant ethnic group. Later their domination was challenged by other smaller groups, creating space for a breakaway nationalism.

7.5 STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM

7.5.1 Nationalism Before 1789

In the historical literature, the rise of the modern nationalism is in the late 18th Century. Nationalism acquires a more democratic character in the period of mass politics in the late 19th Century. However, there is some

emphasis on looking back into the medieval history to understand issues in post-medieval Europe in some recent writings. Several 19th Century observers believed that nascent nationalism emerged in the medieval period - a sense of ethnic or linguistic or national identity. This can be called a form of patriotism or proto-nationalism.

The 19th century historian and politician Guizot believed that the Hundred Years War between England and France (1337-1453) brought together the nobility, burghers and peasantry in a common desire to defeat the English King, who attacked and plundered France. Though modern historians regard this as a period of crises marked by war, plague and famine, it did create a sense of patriotism. In a later period the growth of monarchy took place which facilitated the rise of a unified French state. Though some historians have emphasized that France was a geographical reality which hardly depend on the role of the centralizing monarchy, this geographical determinism is not very convincing.

Geographically speaking there was no Gallo-Roman predestination of France as well as real natural frontiers of France. The state of France was the accidental creation of history and there could well have been a southern Mediterranean France or a Franco-English empire or even a Burgundian France.

7.5.2 Modern Nationalism In 19th Century

This century is regarded as a century of nationalism - a period in which the idea of the nation and nation state based on Britain and France was generalized and perceived as the nation-state system's universal principle for modern societies. Friedrich List in *The National System of Political Economy* (London 1885) stated that, "a large population and an extensive territory endowed with manifold national resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality. A nation restricted in the number of its population and in territory, especially if it has a separate language, can only possess a crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and science. A small state can never bring to complete perfection within its territory the various branches of production". In practice, the principle of nationality applied only to nationalities of a certain size in the liberal period of nationalism because of its faith in the benefits of large scale states. It is this tacit liberal assumption of a certain size of states which Hobsbawm calls the

"threshold principle" of nationality, which the liberal bourgeoisie broadly endorsed from about 1830 to 1880. It is this threshold principle of nationality which is shared by figures as far apart as John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Engels, and Mazzini etc. It is this principle which explains why Mazzini, the apostle of nationalism, did not support the cause of Irish independence. The principle of national self-determination in the period of Mill and Mazzini was therefore substantially different from that in the period of the American President Woodrow Wilson.

Mazzini's map of Europe drawn up in 1857 based on nations included only a dozen states and federations. By contrast the Europe refashioned after World War II on the basis of the right to national self-determination had 26 nation states. In the post-World War II period 42 regionalist movements have been identified in Western Europe alone.

The big change in the attitude towards nationality and nationalism came about in the late 19th century with the growth of mass mobilization in political movements in the era of democratic politics. After 1880, the debate about the national question becomes important with the need to mobilize voters for different political parties—vote bank politics, and to gain adherents for new ideologies whether among socialists or minor linguistic and national groupings. In the later stage of mass politics and national movements, the state played a dynamic role. Colonel Pilsudski, the liberator of Poland, in fact observed, "It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state". Whatever view one takes of the relation between nation and state, it was electoral democracy which weakened the liberal theory of the nation.

7.6 CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISM IN LATE 19th AND EARLY 20th CENTURY

By the late 19th century the processes of modernization and homogenization had produced a sense of nationalism in the older states and those large states which had achieved unification by then. The idea of unitary nationalism often produced counter-nationalism among groups, ethnic or linguistic, which felt either oppressed or excluded by a process of nationalist homogenization. Nationalism in the period 1880-1914 was no longer constrained by the 'threshold principle' which had

limited the demands for nation states earlier. Anyone claiming to be a nation could advocate the right to national self-determination. In these "non-state" nationalisms the ethnic linguistic criterion for defining nationalism became a decisive and unitary consideration. In Hobsbawm's view, the late emergence of the ethnic linguistic criterion in defining nations is insufficiently acknowledged in the literature on nationalism. Although linguistic and cultural revival movements grew in Europe between the 1780s and 1840s it was only a body of rabble-rousers who created a national idea in the second phase of the national movement. Only in the third stage, according to Hroch did mass support for nationalism emerged in late 19th century European nationalist movements. The reasons for the increasing readiness of real and imagined communities to make claims of nationhood and national self-determination was because of the pace of change, economic distress and large scale migrations of peoples in this period. Traditional groups felt threatened by the pace of modernization. Educated middle strata with modest incomes - journalists, school teachers and petty officials were the torchbearers of linguistic nationalism. Migration produced friction and conflicts between groups unused to coexistence with different groups. It was the nationalist, petty bourgeoisie which played a major role in the emergence of the new ethnic linguistic nationalism as well as the chauvinist and right wing movements within the older nation states. Contrary to conventional views Hobsbawm argues that in practice it was hard to separate the support which the masses gave to socialism, nationalism or religion since they had "several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality". Mass movements could simultaneously express aspirations conventionally regarded as incompatible. The movements which were making class appeals were later in post-World War I Europe the basis for mass based national movements.

Hobsbawm, however, overestimates the significance of the perspective of 1917 - of social transformation based on revolutionary or primarily class based movements - for the assessment of nationalism in post War Europe. The oppressed nationalities of Eastern Europe did become independent states based on Wilson's support for the principle of national self-determination but it is hardly possible to assert that significant

numbers had dreamed of both social revolution and national independence. The collapse of the belligerent states first led to isolated and short-lived revolutionary upsurges and then to fascist and right wing movements. Nevertheless the relation between revolutionary movements and the desire for social transformation requires a more elaborate analysis.

7.6.1 Spread Of National Ideas

Hobsbawm cites evidence to show that autonomous popular movements of national defence against foreign invaders had ideologies which were "social and religious" rather than national. In 15th and 16th century Europe peasants who felt betrayed by their nobles decided to take up cudgels on behalf of their faith against invading Turks. A popular national patriotism could arise in Hussite Bohemia or on the military frontiers of Christian states among armed peasant groups, given sufficient freedom to enable them to combat invaders. The Cossacks are an example. Proto national feeling existed among the Serbs because they had kept alive the memory of the old Serb kingdom which was destroyed by the Turks. Some form of patriotism was kept alive by the Serbian Church which had canonized the Serb kings. Although the Cossacks were not drawn from any one ethnic group, they were united by beliefs. In 17th century Russia, pressures from both Catholic Poland and Muslim Turks made religion and holy icons an important element in popular national consciousness. It was only after the growth of a sense of cultural nationalism based on a sense of language, culture and history that nationalism as an idea influenced the smaller nationalities of Eastern Europe.

7.6.1.1 Nationalism--Czech

The Czech politicians of the late 19th century produced no grand political schemes and had to settle for small concessions. Economic and cultural advances in the Czech lands meant that the bourgeoisie had insufficient reason to support Czech nationalism. It was World War I which triggered nationalism in the Czech lands as elsewhere in Europe. Wartime difficulties produced unrest in the towns, desertions on the battlefield from 1915 onwards and Czech writers in 1917 published a manifesto supporting a future democratic Europe of free nations. Tomas

Masaryk had pleaded for the independence of small nations in Europe in October 1915 and the rapid political changes during World War I led to the realization of such dreams. In 1915 the demand for an independent Czechoslovakia state was made. Czech and Slovak military units joined the enemies of Austria-Hungary during World War I and thus established their claims to recognition by the victorious Entente powers. After a thousand years the Czech lands were reunited with Slovakia because of the result of Czech nationalism, the effects of World War I on large dynastic states and President Wilson's support for national self-determination.

7.6.1.2 Nationalism--Hungary

In Hungary the creation of the Dual Monarchy appeased the Hungarians but aroused national sentiment among the other nationalities. According to the official census between 1850 and 1910 A.D conducted by the Hapsburgs, the Hungarians constituted an absolute majority only from 1900 A.D onwards. Even including Croatia in 1910, the Hungarians constituted only 51.5% of the whole population. Under the Nationality Act of 1868, the State gave non- Magyars the right to schools in their mother tongue and the right to form banks and economic associations but the idea of the nation-state demanded that the Hungarian nation and its claims be placed up-most. In 1883 the government which made Hungarian compulsory by law in secondary schools was not to be compulsory in elementary schools until 1907 A.D. Hungarian statesmen tried to assimilate the non-Magyar population by means of the state language Hungarian. According to Peter Hanak, between 1890-1914, as a result of modernization and industrialization, more than a million people were successfully assimilated by the Magyars. Budapest, which in the mid-19th century had a German speaking and non-Magyar population, became a Hungarian speaking city by the early 20th century. In fact Magyarization became an essential precondition for economic success and social mobility. Emigration to the United States was in fact encouraged by the government to reduce the non-Magyar population. Approximately three million people migrated to the USA, mainly Slovaks and Serbs.

The government could not however influence the economic performance of the various nationalities. It could not thwart the rise of Romanian-owned savings banks. The Churches supported secondary schools where students were taught in their mother tongues, Since the Church prelates had representation in the Upper House and they could represent their nationalists there. All the Churches were considered 'national' Churches with the exception of those of the Slovaks and Germans since these nationalities were divided on the basis of faith between Catholicism and Lutheranism. The Orthodox Church took up the cause of the Serbs and the majority of Romanians, and the Uniate Church for the Ruthenes and the minority of Romanians. The high electoral census was intended not merely to keep out the non-Magyars from the political system but also Magyar parties hostile to the regime. By the early 20th century a new and more active political elite emerged among the Romanians and Slovaks. The break-up of the Hapsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary led to the creation of new nation states of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Owing to the problems involved in demarcating precise national frontiers - which plagued the post-war settlement - over three million Magyars became a minority in the newly independent neighbouring states of a truncated Hungary. It was a "great reversal of roles" which made the dominant Magyars a minority in new states, since the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 A.D forced one in three Magyars to live outside the country. Hungarian ruling elites lost big estates, banks and factories, and therefore they used discontent produced by the reduction of Hungary to 1/3rd of its former size to mobilize opposition to the unjust Treaty of Trianon. The conservative elites, utilizing this Treaty to deflect popular discontent into nationalist channels, eventually carried Hungary into the camp of fascist Germany and Italy during World War II.

7.6.1.3 Nationalism--Poland

In Poland the nobility by the 18th century developed a sense of Polish identity based on the acceptance of the Polish language and culture. The Polish nobility, constituting 8% of the country's population, was large by European standards. The peasants and even burghers were not included in the political nation at the end of the 18th century. As for the peasantry, they spoke Polish dialects in the western provinces, Ruthenian dialects in

the east, and Lithuanian in the north-east. Language was not yet in the 18th century a basis for national consciousness. The religious differences of the Polish population played a significant role in this period. Peasants did not have a developed national consciousness but they had participated in the battle for Polish independence in the late 18th century. It was during the 19th century that abolition of serfdom and enfranchisement, the ending of villeinage, took place at different points in time under the auspices of the three Great Powers i.e. Prussia, Austria and Russia, which had partitioned Poland among themselves in the 18th century. National consciousness was speeded up by granting civil and democratic rights to burghers and later Jews; by movements and parties demanding agricultural reform and by the gradual elimination of legal inequalities between classes.

The second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of a Belorussian and Ukrainian national consciousness based on a language and literature which resisted domination by Polish language and literature. Polish writers from Belorussian lands also wrote in Belorussian and helped to create a national literary tradition. These differences of language were linked to social differences. Polish was linked to the nobility and intelligentsia while Belorussian and Ukrainian consciousness emerged from within a plebeian tradition opposed to the Polish state. In so far as Polish was the language of the upper classes or those seeking upward mobility it was considered a natural step for the peasant to accept Polish as the higher cultural language. Therefore Belorussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian, regarded as peasant languages, were considered inferior. While Polish national consciousness had developed as a response to oppressive German nationalism after the creation of an independent Poland in 1918 A.D the nationalism of the Poles too, became oppressive towards minority groups. The Polish Republic which came into being in 1920 A.D was a product of the revolutionary changes which swept the whole of central and eastern Europe stirring the national consciousness of several groups. In the new Polish state over 1/3rd of the population was non Polish--the Ukrainians constituting 16%, the Jews 10% and the Belorussians 6% of the population in 1931 A.D.

It was during the inter-war years that national consciousness developed among the Ukrainians and Belorussians although simultaneously

Notes

processes of assimilation were also at work and many people belonged to groups of intermediate or incipient national consciousness. The growth of fascism intensified national antagonisms throughout Europe in the 1930s and thus helped to undermine the settlement at Versailles based on the principle of national self-determination at the end of World War I. The development of national movements and nationalism in Eastern Europe during the inter-war period, the course of World War II, and the final post-war settlement devised at Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta by the victorious Allies, shaped the post-World War II map of nation states in Eastern Europe and the political map of all Europe.

Check Your progress 1

1) When did the idea of nationalism develop?

2) What was the role of language in the development of nation-states?

3) Discuss the emergence of nationalism in Eastern Europe.

7.7 EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism as an ideal began to grow in the 19th century based on the ideas of the French revolution and the consequences of Napoleonic military victories and the political realignments which these victories produced. The simplification of the political map of Europe by the reduction in the number of states within the German Empire; the

quickenings of the pulse of Spanish nationalism during the military campaigns of the Peninsular War; and the rise of Italian and German nationalism based on the inspiration of the French armies, the Napoleonic role in nation-state building and the contagion of revolutionary and democratic ideas helped to spread the gospel of nationalism in Europe. It appealed to the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie which spearheaded the movement for Italian and German unification. Mass politics in the late 19th century was to give an additional fillip to nationalism especially in Eastern Europe. A region which was relatively backward compared to the more industrialized parts of Western Europe.

7.7.1 Authoritarianism And Modern State

The absolutist states, particularly in Western Europe played an important role in the gradual transition from feudalism to capitalism. The dynastic rulers of Europe in the 16th century and 17th centuries were responsible for the creation of centralized states with substantial standing armies.

The absolutist states claimed rights to taxation and monopoly over the legitimate use of force within the boundaries of the state. The emergence of strong centralized states was the product of wars among the absolutist rulers; the growth of state taxation was linked to the costs of waging such wars; and the prime objective of the mercantilist policies of absolutist rulers was to enhance the economic power and thereby the military power of their states vis-a-vis other states. The wars of the 16th and 17th centuries accelerated, "all the fundamental state-making processes". In the economic and military competition of this period, most of the 500 or so political entities or states perished but the political unification of Italy and Germany was possible only with the emergence of nationalist ideology in the 19th century.

Modern states, nations and nationalism are all territorial in the sense that they claim or are based on specific geographical areas. In the 19th century, the idea spread that the state and the nation should "coincide geographically in the nation state". The modern state is often called the "territorial state" since it has a clearly demarcated territory in which it claims sovereign rights over all its citizens. Nationalism is a territorial ideology which is internally unifying and externally divisive. As an

ideology nationalism discourages conflicts based on social class or status within a nation but enhances the differences between different peoples and nations

7.7.2 The Nation States

Authorities as different such as Max Weber and Lenin have argued that nations and nationalism have to be seen primarily in political terms and in relation to statehood. Nationalism is an ideology which links culturally and historically defined territorial communities called nations, to political statehood. Nationalism as an ideology may produce a demand for an independent state, transformation of a pre-existing state, or merely an attempt to seek political legitimacy for state policy in the higher interests of the nation, i.e. national interest.

Three ways in which nationalism has shaped the modern state have been identified. In the older states like England and France the rise of nationalism was linked to the development of more democratic relationships between the state and civil society. Secondly, nationalism furthers the internal unification of culturally and economically diverse regions into a more homogenous state territory. Finally, nationalism divides one political community or nation from another and even determines the geographical boundaries of the nation in many cases. Nationalism can support both movements of unification and separation. In Italy and Germany, nationalism and the state created a new nation state. In Scandinavia, nationalism produced the separation of Norway from Sweden. In the case of Poland, there was both separation and unification which created the Polish nation state. In the late 19th century the doctrine of national self-determination was the basis for creating new nation-states based on language, on an invented national language, ethnicity or common culture and tradition. The nationalism of Greece, Czechoslovakia and Ireland emerged before the emergence of these nation states which gained their freedom from the multi-national empires within which they had blossomed. These new nation states were carved out of the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and Britain respectively. As the idea of nationalism spread to Central and Eastern Europe - in regions with little industrialization and weak bourgeoisies the role of the lower middle class and the peasantry in the shaping of nationalism

increased. As a result of the growth of industrialization, rise of the working class and socialism, and of inter-imperialist rivalries, nationalism became associated with conservative and right wing ideologies not just with the republican ideas of the French Revolution.

7.7.3 Nationalism and Social Class vis-a-vis Germany and Britain

It was the revolutions of 1848 that revealed the weakness of the liberal bourgeoisies in Europe. It compelled the liberals in Germany to accept a compromise with the Prussian state and led to the ascendancy of Piedmont-Sardinia in Italy. In Europe the revolutions of 1848 revealed the emergence of nationalist sentiment within the Habsburg Empire and Eastern Europe, the emergence of working class and socialist ideology throughout Europe, and the differences within the liberal democratic movements which separated the middle classes from the workers, peasants and urban poor. During the 1848 revolutions in Europe the struggles, of the poor and of the middle classes had distinct features and objectives which were apparent. The middle classes were willing to side with conservative Prussia or the Emperor of the French, Napoleon III, rather than accept a greater pace of change.

In Germany, liberal nationalism which had a anti-feudal orientation acquired anti-clerical and anti-socialist overtones during the Kutturkampf. While anti-clericalism was partly progressive in its support for enlightenment rationalism, it also was regressive in so far as it criticized the "black horde of Romans without a fatherland". During the years 1870-1878 the anti-clerical element in bourgeois nationalism prepared the basis for the conflict with the Social Democratic party and movement after 1878. The new right wing nationalism which emerged in the late 1870s was hostile to left-wing liberals as well as Social Democrats. In this new phase of rightwing nationalism Prussian large landowners and small manufacturers weighed down by economic competition actively began to cooperate with industrialists favouring protectionist economic policies. In the economic crisis of 1870s marked by slower growth and international price deflation, social tensions multiplied and vindicated Marxist theories about capitalism and class struggle. The middle classes both old and new, the latter consisting of

Notes

white collar employers and officials, became anxious to preserve their economic and social standing as well as to distance itself with Marxist Internationalism. Winkler states, "In the late 1870s to be a nationalist no longer meant being anti-feudal but instead anti-internationalist, and very frequently, anti-semitic".

In Germany liberalism was not very strong and though there was indeed a silent bourgeois revolution in Germany in the 19th century. The traditions of political democracy was weaker than in Britain and France. The weakness of liberal democratic movements in 19th century Germany certainly led to the growth of right wing nationalism and the containment of Socialist Democracy. It is significant that the only way the liberal sociologist Max Weber thought it possible to reduce the power of the Junkers and the authoritarian State was to adopt a prestigious German world policy.

Successful overseas expansion was supported by the right wing to secure economic benefits would not only benefit businessmen and middle class colonial officials, but also the industrial working class, at least in the export industries. Whether or not a labour aristocracy arose in countries with substantial overseas trade and investments or not, it is true that economic prosperity and cheap colonial and overseas produce improved the lot of the industrial workers and the common people in metropolitan countries like Britain, France and Germany. Though recent expats like Davis and Huttenback have argued that the return on overseas and specifically colonial investments was not very high in the case of British foreign investments, cheap food and raw materials from overseas did have some beneficial consequences. The popular support for overseas expansion and investments was not only about chauvinism and ideology, but also about economic rewards.

Although recent writers like Patrick O'Brien have returned to old Cobdenite free trade agreements about the economic irrelevance of empire to Britain there is still much merit in the social class analysis of the motivations for imperial expansion and an assessment of the economic benefits of the empire. In any case the improvement in the living standards of workers and urban consumers in the industrial nations like Britain and Germany did help in co-opting the labour movements in these countries. The reformist trade unionism in Britain and the

combination of repression and co-optation in Bismarckian Germany diluted the challenge of labour and left wing opposition to ideologies of race, empire and right wing nationalism. In Britain the franchise was extended in 1867 and 1884 to incorporate most adult males into a more reformist Parliamentary democracy. Repressive laws in Germany between 1878-1890 against trade unions and socialist political parties were combined with progressive welfare legislation, the Hohenzollern emperor's 'social message' of 1881 and a system of social insurance for the workers.

Though the SPD grew under a repressive and right wing regime its weaknesses cannot be attributed to such restrictive conditions alone. Critics of the SPD have argued that though the party vote grew from 5, 50,000 in 1884 to 2 million in 1898 to nearly 4 million by 1913 it was a party which had been weakened by its social limitations and ideological beliefs. The party had become a prisoner of parliamentary democracy, its leaders and sections of the workers had acquired middle and lower middle class incomes and values and the party's beliefs were debilitated by revisionism and economism. Therefore, the enthusiastic participation of the SPD and its supporters in the Kaiser's war in 1914 is not a matter of such great surprise. Furthermore by an analysis of the failings of the SPD we get an idea of one of the ideological and political factors which allowed German right-wing nationalism to retain its political ascendancy despite powerful countervailing forces which emerged in German politics and society. The German right-wing was able to forge an alliance of landowners, industrialists and middle class to hold in check the growth of the liberal middle class, workers and socialism but this cannot be regarded as an inevitable outcome of Germany's authoritarian modernization and political unification.

7.7.4 Popular Mobilization In Italy

In Italy the participation of the masses and the peasantry was limited because of the conservatism of the rulers of states, the reluctance of the landlords to grant concessions to the peasants to draw them into the national movement, the inability of the intelligentsia and the

Notes

revolutionaries to bridge the gap between the town and country and the fear of radical change which affected the elite which dominated Italy in the 19th century. It has been argued by Coppa that the 1848 war was an "ideological war" on the Italian side. In the War against Austria, Garibaldi's volunteers and Milanese revolutionaries fought with the troops from Piedmont, the Papal States, Tuscany and Naples. Yet the participation of the rulers was born out of fear of revolution or the force of public opinion. In the failure of the Republic in Venice and Rome is to be found further evidence of the failure of the Mazzinian ideals of people's war.

In the period 1859-61 the motives of Cavour were "patriotic rather than nationalist" since his objective was to secure a dominant position for Piedmont more than an ideological commitment to Italian unification. The successful 'southern initiative' of Garibaldi produced a revolution in Sicily and after his victory in Naples he seemed to have willingly accepted an auxiliary role in the process of Italian unification which Cavour had assigned to him. Garibaldi had accepted the need to work with the monarchy long before he launched his movement. It was thus possible to unify Italy both by force and popular consent as manifested in plebiscites. The centralized form of government of the new Italian state alienated opinion in both Naples and Sicily. A war with brigands in the Neapolitan provinces between 1861 and 1865 represented the sense of alienation felt in the Italian south from the new centralized Italian nation state. The fact that only a tiny minority of 2.5% spoke Italian at the time of unification, that over 100,000 troops had to be deployed to establish control over the turbulent south soon after unification, the fact that Cavour had to instruct his agents in Central Italy to conduct plebiscites to demonstrate that the people endorsed the decisions of their assemblies to enter into a union with Piedmont, the fact that Napoleon III of France and Cavour of Piedmont conspired to ensure that the plebiscite in the Romagna and the Duchies went in favour of Piedmont, and in Nice and Savoy in favour of the French, revealed the insufficiency of mass participation in the process of Italian unification.

In Italy the divisions between the more industrialized north, the less developed central region and the neglected and backward south actually intensified after the Italian unification. The Italian south remained an

alienated, almost colonized, region. The Italian unification, due more to military success and international diplomacy rather than people's war or mass struggles, was based on the lowest possible mobilization of the masses required for achieving independence and unification. Even after the creation of the Kingdom of Italy the politics of the nation was dominated by political parties with narrow social bases and limited contact with the Italian masses.

The extension of the franchise, the spread of public education, the growth of industries and towns in Italy was slower than in France and Germany. For these reasons the politics of Italy was regarded as a form of 'trasformismo' in which despite frequent political realignments and changes there was little substantial change. In Gramsci's words, the process of Italian Unification was a form of passive revolution in which the Italian elite had mobilized the Italian masses only to the extent necessary to achieve the political objective of national unification and independence from Austria. The democratic mobilization of the masses was slow and the absence of organic intellectuals in Italy impeded the development of more radical movements.

With the growth of industries, workers organisations, and socialism, the conservative politicians of Italy and the landowners and lower middle class in particular, felt endangered. In fact the economic development of Italy and the growth of civil society and democratic values were so slow and inadequate that the crisis after World War 1 created the conditions for the growth of fascism and Mussolini's victory. The post-war crisis led to a Fascist victory despite the fact that Italy had played a less significant role in the war and had joined late. Italian democracy developed slowly even after unification and Italian nationalism did not succeed in winning over the Italians in the south.

7.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit you have seen how nations and nationalisms have evolved through a complex historical process in modern times. While there has been a large consensus among historians about their recent origins (despite objections from the primordialists), there is considerable

confusion over different stages and types of nationalism. In this sense the dominant models of European nationalism have met with a challenge from the likes of colonial nationalism as in the case of India. It is in this sense that we talk of not just one nationalism, but, many nationalisms. At the same time, it is a phenomenon which is part of an ongoing process and which will continue to define our day to day lives for years to come. The democratization of polity in Europe helped the popular mobilizations around the issues like language and empire-building which strengthened the feeling of nationalism among people. The modern states also played a crucial role in giving shape to nationalist feelings and forging the nation-states. We have also discussed that in Eastern Europe, excepting Russia, the cultural issues proved to be more important in giving rise to national sentiments.

7.9 KEYWORDS

- 1) **Nationalism:** identification with one's own nation and support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations.
- 2) **Authoritarianism:** the enforcement or advocacy of strict obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom (lack of concern for the wishes or opinions of others)
- 3) **Fascism:** It is a form of government that is a type of one-party dictatorship. Fascists are against democracy. Fascism puts nation and often race above the individual. It stands for a centralized government headed by a dictator. Historically, fascist governments tend to be militaristic, and racist.
- 4) **Nazism:** the political principles of the National Socialist German Workers Party. It is also associated with extreme racist or authoritarian views or behaviour.
- 5) **Semitic:** relating to or denoting a family of languages that includes Hebrew, Arabic, and Aramaic and certain ancient languages such as Phoenician and Akkadian, constituting the main subgroup of the Afro-Asiatic family.

7.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

- 1) What is a nation? Discuss with an overview of different definitions.
- 2) Is nationalism the ultimate product of modernization? Discuss with reference to Gellner and Smith debate.
- 3) Discuss different models of nationalism.

7.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

Agatha Ramm : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, 1789-1905.

James Joll : *Europe Since 1870*.

David Thomson : *Europe Since Napoleon*.

Owen and Sutcliff't. (ed.) : *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*

7.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

- 1) Even though its idea can be traced back in time, nationalism in the modern sense emerged only during the 18th century in Western Europe. During the 19th and 20th centuries it disseminate throughout the world. Nationalism aligned with the modern state in giving rise to nation-state. In certain cases, the modern state fostered a spirit of nationalism to provide the people living within geographical boundaries with a viable nationalist ideology.
- 2) The cultures living at the margins of the two empires (Ottoman and Russian) did not correspond either with a territory or language or state. Here, in order to meet and fulfil the nationalist imperative, plenty of brutal earth-shifting had to be done in order to carve out areas of homogeneous cultures requiring their state. Culturally and linguistically uniform nation-states could only be produced by violence and ethnic cleansing. This particularly happened in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Germany and Italy.

Notes

3) By the late 19th century the processes of modernization and homogenization had produced a sense of nationalism in the Eastern European States and those large states which had achieved unification by then. The idea of unitary nationalism often produced counter-nationalism among groups, ethnic or linguistic, which felt either oppressed or excluded by a process of nationalist homogenization e.g. Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.